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Abstract 
Studies of several languages, including Swahili [swa],1 suggest that realis (actual, realizable) and 
irrealis (unlikely, counterfactual) meanings vary along a scale (e.g., 0.0–1.0). T-values (True, 
False) and P-values (probability) account for this pattern. However, logic cannot describe or 
explain (a) epistemic stances toward beliefs, (b) deontic and dynamic stances toward states-of-
being and actions, and (c) context-sensitivity in conditional interpretations. (a)–(b) are deictic 
properties (positions, distance) of ‘embodied’ Frames of Reference (FoRs)—space-time loci in 
which agents perceive and from which they contextually act (Rohrer 2007a, b). I argue that the 
embodied FoR describes and explains (a)–(c) better than T-values and P-values alone. In this 
cognitive-functional-descriptive study, I represent these embodied FoRs using Unified Modeling 
LanguageTM (UML) mental spaces in analyzing Swahili conditional constructions to show how 
necessary, sufficient, and contributing conditions obtain on the embodied FoR networks level. 
Keywords: Swahili, conditional constructions, UML, mental spaces, Frames of Reference, 
epistemic stance, deontic stance, dynamic stance, context-sensitivity, non-monotonic logic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
1 The ISO 639-3 identifier [swa] stands for Swahili. ISO 639-3 is a standardized code of three-letter identifiers for 
all known languages (Eberhard, Simons, & Fennig 2019). 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Aims, objectives, and motivations 
Studies of several languages, including Swahili [swa],3 suggest that realis (actual, realizable) and 
irrealis (unlikely, counterfactual) meanings vary by degree on a scale (e.g., P = 0.0–1.0). T-
values (True, False) and P-values (probability) account for this pattern.4 However, logics as 
symbolic systems cannot describe or explain the influences of (a) epistemic stances toward 
knowledge claims (beliefs), (b) deontic stances (e.g., permission, obligation, desire) and dynamic 
stances (e.g., (in)ability, volition) toward states-of-being and actions, and (c) context-sensitivity, 
viz., the flexibility of constructional interpretations due to contextual factors such as (i) discourse 
content, information structure, and genre, (ii) the semantic influences of co-occurring 
constituents (e.g., tense marker and a realis marker; see §3.2 on Construction Grammar), and 
(iii) the ‘real-world’ experiences of ‘social stance’ and ‘social status.’5 Both (a) and (b) are 
embodied deictic properties expressing metaphorical positions and distance (see §1.3, (P3) and 
§2.3, Table 1, Dimension 11)6 Frames of Reference (FoRs), namely, space-time loci in which 
agents perceive and from which they contextually act (Metzinger 1999; Gallese 2000; Kessler & 
Thomson 2010). Put differently, logics are agnostic about how language, mind, and brain 
 
3 The ISO 639-3 identifier [swh] stands for Swahili. ISO 639-3 is a standardized code of three-letter identifiers for 
all modern (non-ancient) languages (Eberhard, Simons, & Fennig 2019). 
4 ‘T-value(s)’ and ‘truth-value(s)’ appear interchangeably throughout this study; the former contrasts with P-values. 
5 The dimension I add to these terms evoked in sociolinguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis is embodiment, 
namely, that ‘social stance’ is an embodied Agent’s metaphorical, value-asserting ‘position’ facing ‘toward’ an 
individual or collective animate Undergoer. Conversely, the agentively asserted social status value of the animate 
Undergoer mirrors the Agent’s stance value. 
6 Embodied metaphors are cognitive analogies from physical positions to non-physical positions (e.g., social status 
as ‘high’ or ‘low’; a belief as ‘highly’ likely or a ‘far cry from the truth’, as in colloquial American English) toward 
the goal of comprehending the world through neurophysiological and mental simulations of states-of-being and 
events (Perlman, Marcus, & Gibbs 2013). 
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interrelate (Chilton 2014: 4), and logicians often ignore contextual and pragmatic constraints on 
constructional meaning (but see, e.g., Kamp 1993; Willer 2010; Stalnaker 2016; Galván 2019).  
 Does using an embodied FoR as a heuristic describe and explain (a)–(c) (see §2.3 on 
embodiment)? In this cognitive-functional-descriptive study, my primary aim is to argue and 
show that the embodied FoR is a better heuristic for conditional interpretations than T-values and 
P-values alone. An underlying presupposition of my analysis is that each semantic modality type 
(epistemic, deontic, and dynamic) has a corresponding pragmatic stance type that influences T-
values and P-values. My secondary aim is to show that necessary, sufficient, and contributing 
conditions, as the logical properties correlating with T-values and P-values, obtain on the level of 
embodied FoR networks between agentive stances and ‘real-world’ states-of-being and action.  
 My primary objective is operationalizing Unified Modeling LanguageTM (UML) mental 
spaces as embodied FoRs as a heuristic of semantics, pragmatics, and context-sensitivity in 
Swahili conditional constructions.7 Thus, comprehensively describing Swahili conditional 
semantics and pragmatics is not in view, nor are the morphosyntactic distributions of the 
conditional prefixes and conjunctions; these are the tasks of multiple corpus analyses. The 
analytical focus is on expressions of modal stances in Swahili conditional conjunctions as they 
pattern with conditional prefixes and conjunctions in situational-discursive contexts. For 
instance, I discuss examples in which the socio-cultural values of ‘real-world’ embodied agents 
expressed through modal stances impinge upon T-values and P-values. My secondary objective 
is to argue and show that deontic stance and dynamic stance are significant for linguistic 
analysis, especially of conditional constructions. Studies on epistemic stance abound, while 
 
7 Used by permission. Per the copyright requirements of the Object Management Group (2017), I hereby state that 
my implementation of OMG UML 2.5.1 is not exhaustively representative.  
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deontic stance has only recently been studied in languages besides English (e.g., Stevanovic 
2013). I conceptualize dynamic stance (Maciuchová 2016: 24) as a pragmatic function that 
indicates an agent’s assertions regarding instances of (in)ability and volition in contexts (§2.3.4). 
 The theoretical motivation for my selecting Embodied Cognition (EC) as my 
methodological framework (Rohrer 2007a, b) is my desire to empirically ground (i.e., involving 
reproducible data collection methods and testable hypotheses, see Samson 2001) claims about 
human cognition while synthesizing descriptive findings in corpus and discourse data. 
Specifically, I claim that (a) modal stances are embodied deictic properties and that (b) embodied 
FoRs are cognitively plausible. Moreover, a typological motivation guides this study. Non-Indo-
European languages such as Swahili are common in cognitive linguistic studies (e.g., Idström & 
Piirainen 2012: 17; Levinson 2003, Rau, Wang, & Chang 2012, Buszard 2003, and Kwon 2012, 
2014; see Rice 2017b for a historical description) but rarely appear in studies in the philosophy 
of language and logic. Since this interdisciplinary study falls within all three categories, choosing 
Swahili mitigates this substantial under-representation in the latter two categories. Among other 
contributions is a synthesis of experimental findings in cognitive neuroscience with findings in 
descriptive, cognitive, and functional linguistic studies.  
 In this chapter, I define key terms and concepts (§1.2), state the problem I address (§1.3), 
propose a solution (1.4), anticipate potential objections (§1.5), delimit the research scope (§1.6), 
and outline the thesis structure (§1.7). 
1.2 Definitions 
This section defines key terms and concepts. First, a CONDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION is a pairing of 
a P (protasis or antecedent) clausal proposition and Q (apodosis or consequent) clausal 
proposition that depicts realis (actual, realizable) and irrealis (unlikely, counterfactual) events. 
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Three logical conditions relate to conditional constructions: NECESSARY CONDITION, that the non-
existence of A makes B impossible; SUFFICIENT CONDITION, that the existence of A makes B the 
case, and CONTRIBUTING CONDITION, that the existence of A makes B more probable 
(quantitative) or more extensive (qualitative). Conditional constructions express the following 
properties in varying proportions: truth-value (T-values), probability (P-values), possibility, 
permission, obligation, desire, ability, volition, causality, agency, and contingency (e.g., 
necessary, sufficient, and contributing conditions). 
 In MONOTONIC LOGICS as symbolic systems, T-values of P (protasis) and Q (apodosis) 
propositions are (a) BINARY (two-valued: True or False) (b) NON-DEFEASIBLE, viz., not revisable 
by degree or cancellable across time indexes; P is only and always True or False. 
 In NON-MONOTONIC logics as symbolic systems, P-values (§3.3.2.1, Table 7) of P 
(protasis) propositions are (a) SCALAR (many-valued, viz., along a scale on which P = 1.0 denotes 
True/certainty and P = 0.0 denotes False/impossible8 and (b) DEFEASIBLE, viz., revisable by 
degree or cancellable across time indexes; an agent’s confidence about P may change across time 
indexes (over time). In contrast, Q (apodosis) propositions in non-monotonic logics are binary 
(two-valued: True or False). In this sense, non-monotonicity (P-values) embeds monotonicity (T-
values) rather than rejecting it altogether, a notion that entails that P-values of P propositions 
have semantic scope over (causal ability to revise or cancel) T-values. 
 MENTAL SPACES (Fauconnier 2010 [1994]) are diagrams that model the cognitive 
processing of (a) semantic and pragmatic properties (e.g., deictic properties) and relations (e.g., 
 
8 P (protasis); P (probability of P).  
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temporal, sequential, causal, logical) and (b) contextual factors. Crucially, they represent a 
speaker’s/writer’s perspectival assertions, not reality itself.  
 DEICTIC PROPERTIES are semantic and pragmatic functions that concern metaphorical 
(e.g., social) and physical (i.e., topographic) positions and distance (e.g., proximal, distal). 
Semantic deictic property types include discourse (e.g., subject, object), person (e.g., 1SG), 
temporal (tense and aspect), topographic (e.g., locatives), modal (e.g., modal verbs, evidentials), 
and social (e.g., honorifics). Modal stance types are pragmatic deictic properties, in that they 
map agentive self-positioning and distancing relative to beliefs (epistemic stance) or states-of-
being and actions (deontic and dynamic stances). The division of labor between deontic and 
dynamic modality is by no means settled in the literature (see Nuyts 2006). In this study, ‘deontic 
modality’ and ‘deontic stance’ indicate the categories of permission, obligation, and desire. In 
addition, Following Palmer (1979, 1990; see Verstraete 2001), I use ‘dynamic modality’ and 
‘dynamic stance’ to indicate the categories of ability and volition (e.g., willingness, decision-
making). Deictic property types in embodied FoR mental spaces combinatorially emerge into 
FoR networks—the discursive situating of body, self, referents, society, and environment in the 
perception-action cycle (Zheng, Young, Wagner, & Brewer 2009; Paletta, Fritz, Kintzler, Irran, 
& Dorffner 2007; Friston 2012: 171-177). 
1.3 Statement of the problem 
In the philosophy of language, logics as symbolic systems incorporate either truth-values (True 
or False) or probability values for clausal propositions. Some logicians also analyze conditional 
pragmatics and context-sensitivity, although most do not consider the influence of these factors 
on conditional interpretations. Worse, symbols signifying logical properties such as truth-values, 
probability-values, and modality have no internal conceptual structure, unlike the ‘real-world’ 
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linguistic propositions they purportedly represent. Hence, the three-fold problem I address is the 
inadequacy of both monotonic and non-monotonic logics to describe or explain the influences of 
(a) epistemic stances toward knowledge claims (beliefs), (b) deontic stances (e.g., permission, 
obligation, desire), dynamic stances (e.g., (in)ability, volition) toward states-of-being and 
actions, and (c) context-sensitivity on conditional interpretations. Consider the following opening 
argument based on empirical findings in descriptive and experimental studies:  
(P1)  Descriptive studies show that epistemic stance and deontic stance influence conditional 
interpretations (e.g., Akatsuka 1997, 1999; Rhee 2014: 10).9  
 
(P2)  Epistemic, deontic, and dynamic stance are deictic properties that express positions and 
distance (see Clift 2006; Zhongyi 2015; Urbanik, Paweł, & Svennevig 2019).  
 
(P3) Epistemic, deontic, and dynamic stance types express embodied, agentively asserted 
‘positions’ (in an ‘embodied metaphor’ sense) on propositional content (see §1.2 and 
§2.3, Table 1, Dimension 11).10 This claim pertains to linguistic truth (as perceived and 
expressed), not to metaphysical truth (as things are) in the ‘real world’ (§2.3.1). 
 
(P4)  Several neuroimaging studies (e.g., Li, Zhang, Luo, Qiu, & Liu 2014) show statistically 
significant correlations between (a) specific, predictable neurophysiological (brain, 
nervous system) activation patterns associated with spatiotemporal (deictic) orientation 
and navigation in space and time and (b) brain areas associated with comprehension of 
conditional semantics (e.g., centro-parietal lobe). 
 
(C)  Therefore, modal stances are embodied deictic properties (see Woelert 2011 on 
‘embodied deixis’) that influence conditional interpretations since conditional 
constructions involve semantics.  
 
To (C) add (P5) below as a corollary proposition (secondary conclusion) that follows from (C): 
(P5)  Descriptive studies (e.g., Saloné 1983b; Allison 2017) and experimental studies (e.g., 
Dai, Chen, Ni, & Xu 2018: 906) similarly suggest that situational-discursive contexts 
influence conditional interpretations.  
 
 
9 P = premise; C = conclusion. 
10 An Agent asserting a proposition does not entail that the Agent believes the proposition. 
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Monotonic and non-monotonic truth-conditional accounts often ignore empirical findings in 
descriptive and experimental studies and their implications. Now consider the non-syllogistic list 
in (1)–(4) of relatively representative tenets of truth-conditional claims about the interpretation of 
conditional expressions:  
(1) T-value and P-value level of description: T-values and P-values primarily, if not 
exclusively, obtain on the level of propositional logic symbols representing the semantics 
of a sentence (e.g., Lycan 2001: 1–15; Jordanoska 2017; Egré, Rossi, & Sprenger 2019). 
 
(2) T-value distribution: All subjunctive (irrealis) conditionals have T-values, as do many 
or all indicative (realis) conditionals (the extent of T-value distribution varies among, 
e.g., Lycan 2001: 73, 76; Egré et al. 2019; inter alia). 
 
(3) T-value determination: T-values determine conditional interpretations; in contrast, 
context-sensitivity is a relatively insignificant factor (e.g., Lycan 2001: 109; cf. Lycan 
2011 as a self-critical review; see also Shilon, Habash, Lavie, & Wintner 2012 using the 
‘context-free’ Stat-XFER Framework to machine-translate between Hebrew and Arabic; 
cf. Karlsson, Voutilainen, Heikkilae, & Anttila 2011). 
 
(4) T-value primacy: T-values are the primary heuristic of conditional interpretations, 
excepting only limited cases in which P-values and context-sensitivity play minor roles 
(e.g., Lycan 2001: 74, 141; Malatesta 2002; Jordanoska 2017). 
 
Monotonists vary in their support of tenets (1)–(4) (§2.2). Non-monotonists at large (e.g., Elder 
& Jaszczolt 2016; Kamp 1993; Willer 2010; Stalnaker 2016; Galván 2019) at least reject (3), 
would likely qualify (2) and (4), and tend to accept (1). Non-monotonists, by definition, seek to 
ameliorate what they see as the shortfalls of (3) by reconstituting non-defeasible T-values (truth-
values) as defeasible P-values (probability values). Apart from contextual considerations, 
however, doing so is also descriptively and explanatorily incomplete. Denying (3), however, is a 
step in the right direction (§2.2.2). 
 In principle, (4) is—to borrow a term from the philosophy of neuroscience (see Bickle 
2006a, 2006b, 2007; cf. Jones 2000, 2013)—a ‘ruthless reductionism’ of conditional semantics 
to T-values. All scientific theories, linguistic or otherwise, are abstractions, and in some cases, 
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reductions (i.e., simplifications) of reality for the sake of analysis. Properties of phenomena are 
described and put into categories. Explanations are then offered for how these properties relate to 
each other. However, a descriptive theory that reduces conditional meaning to a solitary property 
(e.g., T-values) and dismisses all other properties (e.g., P-values, modal stance types) is a 
descriptive reductionism—a ‘one-feature-fits-all examples’ methodology of description (Jones 
2000: 22–23, 27–28, 140). Few non-monotonic studies cleanly match this characterization, but 
monotonic studies such as Lycan (2001) do not escape unscathed. The empirical findings cited in 
this section demand an alternative interpretive heuristic that incorporates but also goes beyond 
analyzing T-values or P-values alone. 
1.4 Proposed solution 
As a proposed solution for the three-fold problem outlined above, this study operationalizes 
UML mental spaces (Fauconnier (2010 [1994]) to represent networks of embodied FoRs, their 
respective deictic properties (§1.2 and §2.4), and context-sensitivity. Again, the deictic properties 
of interest are epistemic, deontic, and dynamic stance (modal deictic properties) as they 
influence T-values and P-values. Along the path to effectively using the embodied FoR as an 
anti-reductionist heuristic (Jones 2000: 29–35; Agazzi 1991) are the potential pitfalls of shallow 
description, trivial prediction (see Brandt 2005), and terminological conflict that often 
compromise truth-conditional accounts. 
 My methodological framework is EMBODIED COGNITION (EC), a set of interdisciplinary 
research programs in the cognitive sciences. In essence, its proponents support variations of the 
embodiment hypothesis that sensorimotor experience, the sum of (a) sensory inputs with (b) 
positions and movements in and of the body and mind makes possible, shapes, and constrains 
human perception and action (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch (2017 [1991]); Levinson (2003); 
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Rohrer (2007a, b), inter alia). This notably dense summary statement raises the question of the 
significance of the embodiment hypothesis for conditional interpretations, an issue I address in 
§2.3). EC construes language as an embodied, complex, adaptive system (see also Beckner, 
Blythe, Bybee, Christiansen, Croft, Ellis, Holland, Ke, Larsen‐Freeman, & Schoenemann 2009). 
On this view, the semantics of conditional constructions are not reducible to logic (e.g., T-values, 
P-values). In §4, I show how embodied FoR mental space networks visually model contextual 
constraints, modal stance, possibility, probability, causality, agency, and contingency (e.g., 
necessary, sufficient, and contributing conditions). T-values and P-values only account for a 
narrow subset of these properties.  
1.5 Potential objections 
The interdisciplinary trajectory of this study evokes numerous theoretical, methodological, and 
practical objections. The first two of the following replies are theoretical, the third is 
methodological, and the fourth is practical, in that it concerns the usability of UML mental 
spaces in linguistic fieldwork. First, many logicians and philosophers of language will find it odd 
to not support the thesis with a parallel analysis of UML mental spaces and a formal logic 
language (e.g., Descriptive Logic (DL), see Saeed & Dănciulescu 2018). However, doing so 
would require a consensus on the descriptive and explanatory boundaries between or overlaps of 
conditional semantics and pragmatics. Unfortunately, no such interdisciplinary criteria exist.  
 Second, the prevalence of non-monotonic analyses indicates a growing consensus in 
linguistics and the philosophy of language. Why trouble with another rebuttal of monotonicity? 
Here it is worth mentioning that the interdisciplinary influence of monotonic logics still warrants 
an interdisciplinary response (e.g., see Malatesta 2002 on Swahili; cf. Mayes 1994; Jordanoska 
2017; Reverberi, Cherubini, Frackowiak, Caltagirone, Paulesu, & Macaluso 2010; Elder 2019). 
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Monotonic studies tend to move from a priori presuppositions to “finding” T-values under every 
datum and thus ignore contextual constraints and overlook pragmatic factors (e.g., Lycan 2001).  
 This study aims to avoid these analytical shortfalls. Even so, a potential methodological 
criticism arises for arguing from single-language data while pursuing descriptive and explanatory 
adequacy about the cognitive modeling of conditional constructions. What if the minds of 
speakers of distinct languages either have or enact vastly different cognitive models of the 
world? Consider the following counterargument. All humans share our common experience as 
embodied beings (see Rohrer 2007a, b). Our brains, minds, and environments are deeply 
interwoven and inseparable in analysis, even though there is no consensus on how language 
processing in each relates to processing in the other (§2.3.2) Furthermore, given our shared 
embodied experience, there are no a priori reasons to believe that the brain-mind-world maps for 
one language are radically dissimilar to those of any other language. Even though claims for 
linguistic universals fall short of producing conclusive evidence (Evans & Levinson 2009), 
claims for embodied, cognitive universals (however defined) are based on evidence in 
descriptive and experimental studies, both in linguistics and cognitive neuroscience (§1.3). 
Indeed, all findings from single-language data are preliminary and require data triangulation with 
other languages, but cognitive models (e.g., UML mental spaces) based on it are at least 
plausibly useful for analyzing another. 
 Moreover, this analysis is (a) abductive (inferring from data to best explanations) and (b) 
inductive (inferring from data to generalities). Most truth-conditional analyses are (c) deductive 
(inferring from a priori generalizations to specific conclusions). An abductive-inductive 
approach entails tacitly making data-based claims. Abductive-inductive approaches constrain a 
priori presuppositions that can skew analyses. Consequently, they tend to yield increased 
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precision (consistency between results) and improved accuracy (descriptive and explanatory 
adequacy). They also tend to generate testable hypotheses for further investigation.  
 The following practical objection to using UML mental spaces for field data analysis is 
plausible. Latent skewing between language and meta-language introduces analytical errors, as 
in assuming Swahili conditional conjunctions are grammatically equivalent to the English ‘if.’ 
This issue already persists in descriptive analyses (e.g., Mwamzandi 2017; Saloné 1983a, 1983b; 
Mpiranya 2014: 127). Why add further analytical vulnerabilities by using UML mental spaces 
with English metalanguage? 
 Indeed, choosing theoretical starting points is crucial. Formalisms are imperfect and can 
skew analyses. For field linguists, gratuitous theoretical abstractions yield no efficiency in time-
pressured data collecting and grammar writing. While field implementation is not the primary 
methodological focus of this study, §4 operationalizes UML mental spaces to demonstrate how 
they can inform description in unexpected ways. Take, for instance, the surprising influence of 
deontic stance on conditional meaning. Some linguists may find UML mental spaces to be 
needlessly abstract, but they may nonetheless prove helpful in applications such as discourse 
analyses of narrative and hortatory texts. 
1.6 Limitation of scope 
This interdisciplinary study evokes numerous theoretical concerns beyond its scope. For 
instance, cognitive linguists often use mental spaces to model semantic compositionality (see 
Pagin & Westerståhl. 2010a, 2010b) in conditional constructions. Studies such as Feldman 
(2010), Sweetser (1999), and Dancygier & Sweetser (2005: 210-211) use mental spaces to argue 
that lexical and grammatical constituents as semantic-syntactic parts combine into constructions 
as wholes, the meanings of which are ‘other than’ the semantic sum of the constituents (‘weak’ 
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compositionality). By contrast, Cognitivists (Fodor & McLaughlin 1990; Fodor 1997) defend 
‘strong’ compositionality, the view that the meanings of constructions as wholes are strict sums 
of their semantic-syntactic parts (e.g., quantifiers, modal markers). In this study, I assume 
‘weak’ compositionality while not supplying extended arguments for it. Nevertheless, §3.2 
situates this analysis within the broad framework of the Construction Grammar theories and 
succinctly explains my rationale for supporting ‘weak compositionality.’ 
 Two disagreements on Swahili conditional semantics are also beyond the scope of this 
study. The first concerns whether Swahili has a ‘conditional tense’ which expresses both deontic 
modality and counterfactuality in present and past forms (Thompson & Schleicher 2006: 2750–
276, 367; Mpiranya 2014: Mohamed 2001: 156, 165–167, Almasi, Fallon, & Wared 2014: 335–
342). Of course, a grammatical constituent could mark both, say, counterfactuality and present 
tense. However, this is a different claim than arguing for a compound semantic category—an 
unhelpful option in this case. Arguing for a ‘conditional tense’ conflates rather than distinguishes 
deixis property types, in that deontic modality denotes modal deixis and tense markers denote 
temporal deixis (tense and aspect, see §1.6). The second disagreement concerns the categorical 
status of the concessive marker -japo ‘(even) if.’ Myachina (1981: 53, 60) classifies -japo as a 
conditional marker while Saloné (1983a, 1983b) does not. Since concessives do not express an 
inter-clausal condition (e.g., a ‘real-world’ causal contingency), they are not ‘real’ conditional 
constructions (Lycan (2001: 93–138; Nicolle 2017: 11) as I defined them in §1.2. Consequently, 
no examples and discussions of concessives appear in the analysis.  
1.7 Thesis structure 
The thesis structure is as follows. Chapter Two outlines the limitations of monotonic and current 
non-monotonic logics for analyzing conditional semantics, pragmatics, and context-sensitivity 
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(§2.2), introduces Embodied Cognition (EC) as the present theoretical framework (§2.3), and 
supplies an overview of Mental Spaces Theory (MST) and how deictic properties function as 
mental space builders (§2.4). Chapter Three describes the methodological design principles 
(§3.2), the methods and diagrammatic features of UML mental spaces (§3.3), and the data 
selection criteria and sources (§3.4). Chapter Four discusses realis conditional prefixes and 
conjunctions in Swahili conditional constructions (§4.2) and irrealis conditional prefixes (§4.3). 
Chapter Five outlines the contributions of this study (§5.1), discusses their theoretical 
implications (§5.2) and their limitations (§5.3), and recommends research directions (§5.4). 
1.8 Conclusion 
This study is an extended argument for the embodied FoR as a better heuristic for the analysis of 
conditionals than T-values and P-values alone. Using this heuristic shows that modal stances and 
context-sensitivity influence these values. It also shows that necessary, sufficient, and 
contributing conditions—the logical properties correlating with T-values and P-values—obtain 
on the level of embodied FoR networks. In §1.2, I opened an Embodied Cognition (EC) case 
against absolutizing T-values and P-values and then proposed operationalizing UML mental 
spaces to represent embodied FoRs as a solution (§1.3). Doing so shows how modal stances as 
deictic properties, along with context-sensitivity, delimit conditional interpretations while also 
showing that deontic and dynamic stances are significant for linguistic analysis. In (§2), I survey 
the literature on these divergent themes and provide the theoretical framework for the analysis.  
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2. Literature review and theoretical framework  
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I critically examine the literature and establish my theoretical foundations. 
Toward these ends, the following sections synthesize findings and arguments across several 
disciplines. Examining the historically extended truth-conditional debates requires narrow 
selection criteria. An interdisciplinary approach only augments this problem. Hence, recent 
publications receive more attention than those of historical interest while excepting prominent 
studies; so also do those which are interdisciplinary and critically original. This chapter focuses 
on critically examining monotonic and non-monotonic analyses as the two primary classes of 
truth-conditional theories (§2.2), reviews Embodied Cognition (EC) as my theoretical framework 
(§2.3) and outlines the use of mental spaces for modeling deictic property types (e.g., epistemic, 
deontic, and dynamic stances) of conditional constructions in embodied FoRs (§2.4). 
2.2 Truth-conditional semantics and pragmatics  
Truth-conditionality, the de facto heuristic for linguists and philosophers of language, is a 
nebulous conceptual framework supporting the claim that T-values and P-values relate in some 
way to conditional interpretations; some researchers integrate pragmatics into their models. As 
such, the substantial volume of publications on truth-conditional semantics and pragmatics 
thwarts any attempt to characterize universally-held principles on truth-conditionality. Section 
1.2 outlined four common tenets of truth-conditional studies and argued that many such studies 
do not describe and explain epistemic stance (but see, e.g., Dancygier & Sweetser 2005), deontic 
stance, dynamic stance, and context-sensitivity. Of course, this evaluation requires demonstration 
with data (§4). It is not, however, the intent of this study to reject truth-conditionality as such. 
Rebutting current truth-conditional analyses as far as they support these four tenets does not 
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entail denying a place for truth-conditionality in conditional interpretations. Thus, the present 
research question (§1.1) is not about the legitimacy of T-values and P-values: it is about their 
primacy (e.g., see (2) in §1.3) and how embodied agents assert them in ‘real-world’ contexts. 
2.2.1 Monotonic semantics 
2.2.1.1 Overview 
Monotonicity (non-defeasibility, non-revisability) is the logical principle that P and Q are each 
either True or False; adding further premises to P does not cancel the P ® Q entailment. On 
monotonicity, the T-value of a proposition does not change across time indexes (over time). The 
‘real-world’ oddness of this notion is evident even in rudimentary examples such as (5): 
(5) [If there is a car in the garage]P, [she is home]Q. 
 
Imagine this sentence being uttered by an older sister to her toddler brother, where ‘she’ denotes 
the children’s mother. The older sister asserts the generalization in (5) as true, regardless of time 
index. Now enter the possibility that (5) is true for all times past, but at t0 (present), the mother is 
at a neighbor’s home. (5) is thus false at t0.  
 As other non-monotonic studies (§2.2.2) similarly show (e.g., Minsky 1974), 
monotonicity does not account well for much of human reasoning or delineate the conditional 
semantics of most language data, yet considerable support persists for monotonicity (e.g., Lycan 
2001; Shilon, Habash, Lavie, & Wintner 2012). Worse, some well-meaning descriptive linguists 
inadvertently assume its validity, as their use of truth tables suggests (e.g., see Malatesta 2002 on 
Swahili; Jordanoska 2017; cf. Mayes 1994). Doing so obscures the semantic and pragmatic 
complexities of realis and irrealis conditional constructions. As seen in §1.3, monotonic 
conditional analyses focus on positing T-values for condition-expressing sentences like (5) above 
and not on P-values (e.g., Frege 1967 [1879]; Tarski 1936; Lycan 2001: 73–92; Egré, Rossi, & 
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Sprenger 2019; see also Douven 2015 and Bennett 2003 as theoretical surveys). Furthermore, 
self-consistent (some are not, e.g., Lycan 2001) monotonists also ignore contextual constraints. 
This modus operandi flows from claiming that logical properties (e.g., necessary, sufficient, and 
contributing conditions) primarily obtain on the level of propositional logic. In lieu of further 
generalizations of monotonicity, §2.2.1.2 critically reviews Lycan (2001) as an exemplar. 
2.2.1.2 A critical review of Lycan (2001) 
The following brief critical review of Lycan’s (2001) version of monotonicity serves as a point 
of departure for my typologically motivated (§1.2) arguments in §4 for the descriptive and 
explanatory relevance of conditional pragmatics, P-values, and context-sensitivity. A 
typologically motivated approach entails that theories of conditional interpretations, the specific 
research discipline notwithstanding, should be subject to typological confirmation. While space 
regrettably prohibits a detailed exploration of Lycan’s (2001) arguments for monotonicity (T-
values) over against non-monotonicity (P-values) and context-sensitivity, consider the following 
as a summary of his primary argument that linguistic truth-preservation (de dicto, ‘truth as said’, 
e.g., §1.3, (1)-(4)) is required for metaphysical truth-preservation (de re, ‘truth in reality’). 
 Against what he characterizes as ‘No Truth-Value’ theory (NTV), namely, the purported 
view of Stalnaker (1968, 1984), Appiah (2011) [1985], Edgington (1986), and Bennett (1988), 
inter alia, that truth-values cannot be attributed to indicative conditionals, Lycan (2001) argues 
that indicative conditional sentences are either True or False in reality itself, not merely 
expressions of a communicator’s defeasible (revisable by degree or cancellable across time 
indexes) confidence about what obtains in reality. For Lycan, indicative conditionals (in this 
study, realis constructions) are not merely assertoric (see §1.3, (P3)) expressions of perspectival, 
subjective viewpoints: they objectively and consistently represent real states-of-affairs (SoAs) as 
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either True or False. He worries that, if we accept subjective probability as a philosophical 
construct, we are then bound to accept the view of truth-deflationists (e.g., Horwich 1990) that 
speaking of truth-value is a useless construct for analyzing linguistic expressions. In short, Lycan 
is concerned with metaphysical truth-preservation (de re) in analysis, rather than allowing that 
some languages have grammatical constituents that exclusively express probability (de dicto).  
 Certainly, Lycan is correct in aiming to reserve a place for metaphysical truth; if no state-
of-affairs ever obtained, then embodied human existence would not be possible. Furthermore, if 
linguistic expressions about truth never paralleled reality, embodied agents could not function 
within it. However, we are often wrong in declaring propositions to be the case. De re truth is 
foundational for de dicto truth, not the inverse, as Lycan seems to imply, despite his rejection of 
what he views as strictly assorteric theories of conditional semantics (e.g., Appiah (2011) 
[1985]). Accordingly, the way forward in the linguistic analysis of conditional interpretations is 
not found by ignoring the reality of the ‘tacit’, revisable knowledge (see Polanyi 1966) of 
embodied agents as expressed in both indicative (realis, realizable) and subjective (irrealis, 
unlikely, counterfactual) meanings that vary by degree on a scale. Metaphysical truth-
preservation (e.g., in ‘possible worlds’ analyses) of either-or (True, False) truth-values does not 
entail or account for agentive, linguistic truth-attribution (e.g., in mental spaces analyses) of 
propositional content to reality. 
 My concern is that Lycan’s arguments for the non-defeasibility of truth-values and 
marginal influences of context for the sake of metaphysical truth preservation do not consider 
how many languages such as Swahili have specific realis and irrealis markers that are scalar in 
pragmatic application (i.e., in use). Even within the bounds of conditional analyses of English, 
Stalnaker (1968, 1984), Appiah (2011) [1985], Edgington (1986), and Bennett (1988) present 
Chapter Two: Literature review and theoretical framework 18 
 
evidence for the influences of P-values and context-sensitivity on conditional interpretations, yet 
Lycan dismisses their arguments while granting limited exceptions (e.g., see Lycan 2001: 74 and 
§1.3). However, Stalnaker (1968) insists that context, probability, and pragmatics impinge on 
conditional semantics, not that truth-values are irrelevant. Granted, Appiah (1985: 218–219) does 
claim that indicative (realis) conditionals have no truth-values. By claiming this, Appiah argues 
for a division of semantic labor between truth-preservation and probability-preservation in 
discourse, not truth-value irrelevance. Edgington (1986), and Bennett (1988) argue similarly.  
 The finer details of these disagreements notwithstanding, another reason for questioning 
the validity of Lycan’s (2001: 74–75) arguments above is typological considerations. In addition 
to his apparent conflation of de dicto and de re truth, Lycan bases his arguments concerning 
truth-value primacy on the syntactic distributions and semantic particularities of ‘if’ and ‘when’ 
in English without considering counterexamples from other languages. He does acknowledge, 
however, that languages exist in which a lexeme can mean ‘if’ or ‘when’ depending on context 
and pragmatic resolution (Lycan 2001: 75 cites Traugott’s 1985 Hittite [hit],11 Swahili [swa] and 
Tagalog [tgl] examples and Comrie’s 1986 Mandarin [zho] examples). Nonetheless, it is not 
clear how admitting this supports or is related to his arguments for metaphysical truth-
preservation. It is plausible that he was not aware of how widespread this isomorphic (i.e., same 
form, different meaning) pattern is, say, in Bantu languages (e.g., Nicolle 2017). On the other 
hand, Bantu languages (e.g., Swahili), and for that matter, numerous other languages (see 
Thompson, Longacre, & Hwang 2007: 257, François 2010, Pilot-Raichoor 2010) often have no 
lexical equivalent of ‘if’. 
 
11 ISO-639-2(T) assigns three-letter identifiers to ancient languages (Grimes 2000) (see also Footnote 3 in §1.1). 
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 To his credit, Lycan (2011) thoroughly revises (i.e., disavows) his earlier views by 
supporting the interplay of truth-conditions and pragmatic factors in contexts. His reasons for 
doing so concern assertability conditions and speech acts—matters outside the scope of this 
study. Unfortunately, Lycan’s (2011) nuanced arguments against Lycan (2001) are still based on 
English and thus are not typologically cognizant. Admittedly, I also argue from single-language 
data, but also offer theoretical conclusions as being subject to typological confirmation. Lycan 
(2001) is a tour de force presentation of monotonist arguments; few others compare in terms of 
lucidity and rigor. If this is the case, yet his arguments for monotonicity are not typologically 
cognizant, then looking elsewhere for a heuristic for conditional interpretations that is 
typologically valid and context-sensitive is justifiable.  
2.2.1.3 Recent monotonic logics 
Monotonicity is a core construct in some descriptive studies, many logic applications (e.g., 
machine translation), and for all consistent neo-logicists and neo-Fregeans. Some recent 
monotonic logics, especially those of neo-logicists and neo-Fregeans, go as far as reducing 
conditional semantics to mathematics (e.g., Tennant 2018; Sher 2018; May 2018). Such 
reductionisms are understandably difficult to justify in the face of sustained criticisms. At least 
since Minsky’s (1974) devastating critique of the inability of monotonicity to describe and 
explain ‘common-sense thought’ in ordinary expressions, unqualified support for monotonicity 
continues to ebb as non-monotonic models continue to emerge in cognitive linguistics, the 
philosophy of logic, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) (e.g., machine translation, see Karlsson et al. 
2011). For instance, philosophers of logic such as Stalnaker (2016) argue that assessing context 
is necessary to ascertain conditional meanings (see also Nieuwland & Martin 2012 as a 
supporting neurolinguistic study). However, many (but not all, e.g., Hurskainen 2014) machine 
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translation practitioners, like descriptive linguists who use truth-tables, relentlessly “translate” 
on, assuming T-value primacy, T-value determinacy, and context-insensitivity (e.g., Shilon et al. 
2012). Context-sensitivity is not intuitively lost on descriptive linguists: it is if they invoke truth-
tables to the exclusion of pragmatics and embodied contextual factors from analysis. 
2.2.2 Non-monotonic semantics and pragmatics 
Non-monotonic approaches surpass the descriptive and explanatory inflexibility of monotonicity 
by reformulating T-values as scalar probabilities (P-values) (e.g., Kern-Isberner, 2001; Leitgeb 
2001, 2003, 2004, 2007). Bayesian (non-monotonic statistics) update logics also incorporate 
belief revision (P-values changing over time), robust experimental designs, and advanced 
statistical methods (e.g., Van Benthem 2003; Baltag, Christoff, Hansen, & Smets 2013; cf. 
Spohn 2015). As such, Bayesian methods are particularly useful for analyzing conditional 
constructions in corpora (e.g., Skovgaard-Olsen, Kellen, Hahn, & Klauer 2019). Given these 
methodological enhancements, devaluing non-monotonic logics, especially those of the Bayesian 
sort, is not the purpose of this study; both commendations and critical reflections are in order.  
 On the one hand, Bayesian models can effectively map probability distributions across 
contexts, individual agents, and collective agents (e.g., a committee). For instance, different 
agents express varying degrees of confidence in a belief through a conditional construction in a 
particular context. Non-monotonists also allow for dynamicity, such as agentive belief revision 
across time indexes. On the other hand, to the degree they ignore the semantic-pragmatic 
complexities of conditional modality and context-sensitivity, they fare little better than 
monotonists, despite their insistence to the contrary (e.g., Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, & Over 
2015; see also Aung, Aung, & Hlaing 2018 on Myanmar [mya], or Burmese). All non-
monotonicity qua non-monotonicity adds to conditional semantics is P-value scalarity—nothing 
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more. It is a valuable addition, nonetheless. Non-monotonic models may allow for contextual 
and pragmatic factors, but such are not the purview of non-monotonicity. It is only a claim that 
P-values are defeasible, revisable, cancelable, and dynamic (i.e., changing across time indexes). 
2.2.3 Context-sensitivity in truth-conditional semantics and pragmatics 
Montague (1974) as a monotonist—in countering the deficiencies of sentential semantics—no 
less than set the keystone for analyzing context-sensitivity. He did so by examining cross-
sentential anaphora, viz., pronouns and demonstratives ‘pointing to’ referents in previous 
discourse. He also attempted to allow for discursive pragmatics (see Sbisà, Östman & 
Verschueren 2011: 19). Developments in monotonic and non-monotonic approaches toward 
discourse context-sensitivity include Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) (e.g., e.g., Kamp 
& Reyle 1993; Kamp, Van Genabith, & Reyle 1993, 2011) and its variants, viz., Underspecified 
Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (USDRT) (Schilder 1998), Segmented Discourse 
Representation Theory (SDRT) (Lascarides & Asher 2008), and Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 
1999, 2003, 2005a, 2005b; see Elder & Jaszczolt 2016). Unfortunately, the recent emergence of 
Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars (PCFGs) (e.g., Jin, Doshi-Velez, Miller, Schuler, & 
Schwartz 2018) in computational linguistics suggests that an interdisciplinary consensus on the 
relevance of context is not forthcoming (see Young, Poria, & Cambria 2018).  
 In short, mainstream focus on monotonic T-values or non-monotonic P-values to the 
exclusion of conditional pragmatics and context-sensitivity has regrettably resulted in a 
‘hermeneutical myopia’ (a term borrowed from Villa 1995: 4, inter alia) in linguistics and the 
philosophy of language. An optimistic outlook for non-monotonic models is yet warranted, as far 
as they model probability distributions, dynamicity, pragmatics, and context. The findings of 
non-monotonic studies consistently parallel those in descriptive and conversational studies that 
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show how probability, possibility, and contingency are scalar properties (e.g., Mwamzandi 2017; 
Greenberg 1986; Akatsuka 1985; Heritage 2013). By extension, this conclusion entails that realis 
and irrealis constructions have scalar interpretations (see Greenberg 1986; Mwamzandi 2017).  
2.3 Embodied Cognition as the theoretical framework  
The descriptive and explanatory shortfalls of monotonic and current non-monotonic models 
require an alternative heuristic to show how modal stances and context-sensitivity influence 
conditional T-values and P-values. As such, the EMBODIMENT HYPOTHESIS (EH) (§2.3.1 below) 
as a theoretical point of departure is a viable but hardly intuitive or self-explanatory candidate. 
Consider, for example, Rohrer’s (2007a) survey of the various senses of ‘embodiment’ (Table 1):  
Table 1 Dimensions of ‘embodiment’ (adapted from Rohrer 2007a: 348–359) 
Dimension Sense Definition 
 
1 
 
Philosophy 
 
Non-Cartesian perspectives on mind, cognition, and language 
 
2 Sociocultural situation Bodily situatedness of self in sociocultural practices as shaping factors 
 
3 Phenomenology Awareness of bodily experience as shaping force upon self and society 
 
4 Perspective The physically external (e.g., topographic position) and internal (e.g., 
neurophysiological) constraints of bodily experience 
 
5 Development 
 
Biological transformation of body in stages 
 
6 Evolution 
 
Biological, genetic transformation of a species in history 
7 
 
The cognitive 
unconscious 
Mental processes that occur too quickly for human self-awareness to 
detect them 
 
8 
 
Neurophysiology 
 
Neurological components (e.g., a brain region) and processes that are 
necessary for environmental perception and action in frames of reference 
 
9 Neurocomputational 
modeling 
 
Brain process modeling in software applications (e.g., MatLab, see 
Sherfey, Soplata, Ardid, Roberts, Stanley et al. 2018) 
 
10 Morphology 
 
Implementing neurocomputational modeling in ‘real-world’ interactions 
requires a physical component (e.g., robot) 
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Dimension Sense Definition 
   
11 Directionality of 
embodied metaphor 
 
One-way semantic flow in multi-tiered ‘conceptual’ metaphors from 
bodily experienced,12 ‘source’ layers (e.g., ANGER IS HEAT) to abstract 
‘target’ layers in expressions, e.g., He burned with anger.  
 
12 Grounding 
 
Bodily experience is the basis from which abstract symbols arise. 
 
 
As can be seen by comparing Table 1 to preceding sections, the difficulty with grounding an 
alternative heuristic in Embodied Cognition contra reductionist ‘T-value-only’ analyses is this: 
they subsist on separate levels of description (i.e., propositional and cognitive, respectively). 
This dissimilarity precludes directly substituting the latter for the former. In any case, the 
motivation of this study is to empirically ground and theoretically contextualize T-values and P-
values, not to replace them; hence, a further narrowing of theoretical formulations to generate 
testable hypotheses is necessary. As such, Dimensions 1, 5–7, and 8–11 are beyond the scope of 
this study, although I adopt them as underlying presuppositions. My doing so for Dimension 8 is 
based on findings in neuroimaging studies (§1.3). I focus on Dimensions 2–4 and 12 in the §4 
data analysis while not referring to them as such. 
2.3.1 Empirical foundations 
The Embodiment Hypothesis (EH) is the empirically based argument that pan-modal (involving 
all bodily senses) sensorimotor experience, the sum of all (a) sensory inputs (e.g., seeing, 
touching) with (b) positions (e.g., stance ‘toward’) and movements in and of the body and mind 
makes possible, shapes, and constrains all human perception and action in space, time, and 
environmental contexts (e.g., availability of information and resources) (Rohrer 2007a, b; Varela, 
 
12 For instance, consider human skin temperature slightly rising in a moment of anger because of sympathetic 
nervous system activation. 
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Thompson, & Rosch 2017 [1991]: 147–183; Fowler 2010; Van Dam, Rueschemeyer, 
Lindemann, and Bekkering 2010; cf. Mahon & Caramazza 2008). In practice, this sweeping 
claim entails that language learning, production, and comprehension involve cognitive maps of 
embodied experiences as (a) perceived objects and events and (b) performable actions (e.g., as 
embodied agents express conditional constructions; see Kuperberg 2007; Pickering & Garrod 
2013; Vernon, Lowe, Thill, & Ziemk 2015; cf. Dove 2013: 353–354).  
 Surprisingly, some language processing models diminish or deny the role of embodiment 
in language perception and action (e.g., Fodor 2000: 68–69; cf. Weiskopf 2002). For Fodor 
(2000: 77–78), “language perception is perception.” This quasi-tautology is a conjunct of his oft-
repeated claims that brain and mind have extraordinarily little (if anything) to do with each other 
when it comes to language processes. Countless thousands of neuroimaging studies suggest 
otherwise (e.g., in a Web of Science, Semantic Scholar, or PubMed database search). Given 
these empirical findings, it is highly improbable that findings in neuroscience are irrelevant for 
describing and explaining the communications of perceiving and acting agents as Fodor claims. 
Fodor and other Cognitivists (language as mental symbolic manipulation) offer no empirical 
counterevidence to undermine the findings in neurolinguistics and cognitive neuroscience. 
 The upshot of these empirical findings is that no conditional construction exists without 
an embodied agent expressing it. Furthermore, the constraints of embodiment (e.g., not being 
omniscient or omnipresent) preclude having non-defeasible knowledge about most propositional 
claims. Thus, propositions are assertible as true or false from either minimally innate knowledge 
(however defined, e.g., moral constraints) or knowledge acquired in collective or individual 
embodied experiences (see Polanyi 1966 on ‘tacit knowledge’; see also Polanyi 1968, 1969, 
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2015 [1958]; Polanyi & Prosch 1975). Again, this claim pertains to linguistic truth (as perceived 
and expressed), not to metaphysical truth (as things are) in the ‘outside world’(§1.3, (P3)). 
2.3.2 Theoretical foundations 
The Embodiment Hypothesis (EH) is the central tenet of Embodied Cognition (EC), which 
serves as the theoretical framework for the present study. An emphasis on the ‘lived body’ (see 
Merleau-Ponty 2010 [1962]; Polanyi & Prosch 1975) pervades and informs EC (see Wilson 
2002: 625–636; Shapiro 2012: 118–146), including in the EH. EC is a diverse and sometimes 
contradictory set of research programs in the cognitive sciences. Proponents do agree, however, 
that direct correlations exist between mental activity and neurophysiological activity (Clark 
1996, 2017 [1998]; Anderson 2003; Johnson & Rohrer 2008). Other representative EC 
publications include Feldman (2010, 2013), Cassell, Stone, & Yan (2000); Fox (2002); Fowler 
(2010); cf. Arbib, Gasser, & Barrès (2014: 57–70).  
 EC describes neurophysiological states (e.g., neurons resting or firing) and processes 
(e.g., one brain area activating another) as necessary conditions for mental states (e.g., 
attentiveness) and processes (e.g., perceiving, acting) (Gallagher 1986: 139–142). Put differently, 
having no brain processes means having no correlating mental processes. A detractor might 
object as follows: if brain states and processes are necessary conditions for language learning, 
production, and comprehension in the same way, say, electrons, blood cells, and mitochondria 
are, what difference do they make for conditional interpretations? Is this not ‘proving too much’ 
by touting trivial and uncontroversial claims? 
 EC linguists do not equate physical and non-physical processes and thus avoid explaining 
away non-trivial correlations between them (Varela et al. 2017 [1991], 13; cf. Bickle 2006a, 
2006b, 2007). Such correlations are (relatively) uncontroversial. Unfortunately, (a) the 
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typological complexities of conditional semantics and pragmatics (Funk 1985: 365) and (b) 
current technological limitations on research methods prevent consensus on these correlations 
(Stabler 2013: 317). For instance, mismatches of hemodynamic response (HR) (brain blood 
flow) rates and data recording rates in fMRI tend to generate misleading findings (Eklund, 
Nichols, & Knutsson 2016; Mueller, Lepsien, Möller, & Lohmann 2017).  
 While acknowledging that no one knows precisely and comprehensively how brain and 
mind correlate in language processing, the fact that all human experience occurs within a ‘real 
world’ perception-action cycle should lead to denying the possibility of isolating semantics from 
pragmatics in a disembodied, context-free sense (see Jacob 2012 and Vakarelov 2014 on EC 
enactivism and pragmatics; cf. Matthen 2014). The upshot of embracing conditional pragmatics 
is the ability to see language as an embodied phenomenon enacted by contextually situated 
agents using conditional constructions, even if the sole purpose is to inform addressees (§5.2).   
2.3.3 Approaches to data analysis 
In the beginning, EC studies were qualitative and theoretical, but they now are becoming 
quantitative and experimental (Lakoff 2012; Horchak, Giger, Cabral, & Pochwatko 2014; Janda 
2013, 2015). EC is, however, no empirical panacea. EC analyses often lack standardized 
heuristics for generating quantitatively testable and qualitatively plausible hypotheses (Willems 
& Francken 2012). As a result, their claims concerning linguistic functions are plausible yet 
empirically unverified in some cases (Mahon & Glenberg 2015; Caiani 2011). On the EC view, 
reductionistic truth-conditional models are promoted with insular, ‘just-so’ stories without 
empirical evidence. Unfortunately, this characterization often befits EC studies as well.  
 No inherent conflict persists between EC and truth-conditionality per se. Conflict arises 
when a conception of truth-conditionality leads to ignoring the embodied realities of pragmatic 
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and contextual factors. Few researchers in truth-conditional debates consistently offer testable, 
reproducible evidence for detractors to assess. Logicians and philosophers of language often 
reject the primacy of empirical data (e.g., Fodor 2000) and offer “well-formed” logical structures 
of conditional semantics. EC theorists base claims on empirical data from cognitive neuroscience 
without operationalizing universal heuristics (e.g., UML mental spaces) to show the practical 
implications of EC for conditional analyses. This clashing of incommensurable presuppositions 
and research goals tends to overshadow substantive evidence and supporting argumentation. 
 In §4, I show by operationalizing UML mental spaces as embodied FoRs that the 
descriptive and explanatory potential of EC allows for forming testable hypotheses and 
predictions about conditional pragmatics and context-sensitivity. The first testable prediction of 
this EC study is that arguing for the effects of modal stances on T-values and P-values will 
produce coherent descriptions and explanations. Second, examining Agent and Undergoer 
experiences in situational-discursive contexts will do so as well. Finally, necessary, sufficient, 
and contributing conditions obtain on the level of embodied FoR networks, contra the 
mainstream notion that they obtain primarily on the level of propositional logic (§1.3, (1)). 
2.3.4 Reconceptualizing modal stance in Embodied Cognition 
The generating of further testable hypotheses within EC demands a reconceptualizing of modal 
stance types to account for how each one contextually delimits conditional interpretations. As 
such, consider the following baseline reconceptualization of modal (i.e., epistemic, deontic, 
dynamic) stance in EC. First, in descriptive, functional, and cognitive linguistics, epistemic 
stance concerns probability, possibility, and agentive belief (e.g., Fillmore 1990; Dancygier & 
Sweetser 2005; Dancygier & Trnavac 2007). An Embodied Cognition construal of epistemic 
stance is as an embodied agent’s metaphorical, value-asserting ‘position’ facing ‘toward’ WHAT 
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truly, probably, or possibly is or is not the ‘state-of-being’ in a Frame of Reference. In Table 2 
below, an Undergoer belief has a positive, neutral, or negative epistemic status as ‘believed’, 
‘disbelieved’, or ‘neither believed nor disbelieved’, respectively (center column): 
Table 2 A reconceptualization of epistemic stance in Embodied Cognition 
Epistemic stance (Agent)  Epistemic status (Belief as Undergoer)  Range of agentive confidence 
 
Positive (+)  
 
Positive (+): ‘believed’ 
 
Between P = 0.6 and P =1.0 
Neutral (=)  Neutral (=): neither ‘believed’ nor ‘disbelieved’ P = 0.5 (uncertain/indeterminate) 
Negative (−)  Negative (−): ‘disbelieved’ Between P = 0.4 and P = 0.0 
 
 
Positive and negative values have corresponding ranges of agentive confidence, and a neutral 
value is 0.5 (Table 2, right column). An epistemic status value matches the Agent’s stance value.  
 Alongside epistemic stance, several recent studies in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 
conversation analysis, and anthropological linguistics show how deontic stance impinges on 
constructional semantics (e.g., Heritage 2013: 570; Stevanovic 2018; Stevanovic & Svennevig 
2015; Xu 2015; Landmark, Dalby, Gulbrandsen, & Svennevig 2015; Shoaps 2017). Thus, it 
seems reasonable to give deontic stance its long-awaited place alongside epistemic stance. An 
advantage of doing so is the added ability to distinguish between (a) an Agent’s assertions about 
what is the case in a FoR (epistemic stance) from (b) an Agent’s assertions about what ought to 
be the case (state-of-being) or be done (action) in an FoR (permission, obligation, desire) (see 
Teller 2004, Du Bois 2007, and Gray & Biber 2012 on stance-conceptualizing debates). 
Accordingly, a reconceptualization of deontic stance in Embodied Cognition is as an embodied 
Agent’s metaphorical, value-asserting ‘position’ facing ‘toward’ three possible Undergoer 
scenarios in which animate and inanimate Undergoers can be permitted, obligated, or desired or 
not to BE in a state-of-being or DO an action. This broad definition even allows for literary 
expressions in which inanimate objects are prohibited from doing an action. In the center column 
of Table 3 below, the deontic status values vary against the stance values in the left column: 
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Table 3 A reconceptualization of deontic stance in Embodied Cognition 
Deontic stance (Agent)  Deontic status (Undergoer)  Stance-status value contrast examples 
 
Positive (+)  
 
Positive (+), Neutral (=), Negative (−)   +A (desire) >> −U (not be obligated) to DO 
some action 
 
Neutral (=)  Positive (+), Neutral (=), Negative (−)  =A (indifferent) >> +U (being permitted) to 
DO some action 
 
Negative (−)  Positive (+), Neutral (=), Negative (−)  −A (desire) >> +U (be obligated) to BE in a  
‘state-of-being’  
 
 
Such contrasts arise when a stance involves one category such as desire, and its correlating status 
involves another category such as obligation (e.g., right column, first row).  
 As for dynamic stance, only Maciuchová (2016) mentions it, and, to my knowledge, no 
peer-reviewed publications suggest it as a functional category. Since each modality type 
plausibly has a pragmatic dimension, this study attempts to show how it is a valuable construct 
for interpreting conditional constructions. It also will undoubtedly show the limitations of doing 
so without the benefit of corroborating publications. A preliminary conceptualization of dynamic 
stance in Embodied Cognition is as an embodied Agent’s metaphorical, value-asserting 
‘position’ facing ‘toward’ (a) a state-of-being in which the Undergoer ‘is’ or ‘is not’ able or 
willing to BE and/or (b) an action the Undergoer ‘is’ or ‘is not’ able or willing to DO. 
Conversely, dynamic status is the agentively asserted value of the Undergoer (Table 4):  
Table 4 A conceptualization of dynamic stance in Embodied Cognition 
Dynamic stance (Agent)  Dynamic status (Undergoer)  Stance-status value contrast examples 
 
Positive (+) 
 
Positive (+), Neutral (=), Negative (–)  
 
+A (willing) >> –U (to not be able) to DO 
some action (e.g., to encounter an enemy) 
 
Neutral (=) Positive (+), Neutral (=), Negative (–)  =A (indifferent) >> +U(A) (to be able) to 
BE in a ‘state-of-being’ (e.g., debt-free) 
 
Negative (–) Positive (+), Neutral (=), Negative (–)  –A (unwilling) >> +U(A) (to be able) to 
DO an action (e.g., mountain-climbing) 
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In Table 4, stance and status values contrast when one involves a category such as volition, and 
the other involves another category such as ability, as in the right column on the first row. In 
self-attribution, an Agent is also the Undergoer. 
2.4 Modeling deictic properties in mental spaces as embodied FoRs 
This EC and Mental Space Theory (MST) study models deictic properties (e.g., epistemic, 
deontic, and dynamic stances as modal deixis) of Swahili conditional constructions with UML 
mental spaces as embodied FoRs. The following is my taxonomy of the deictic properties (see 
also Laczkó 2010; Giaxoglou 2015; Fillmore 1975) encoded by grammatical and lexical 
constituents that build these embodied FoRs: (a) referential (nouns), (b) discourse (e.g., subject 
and object markers), (c) person (i.e., pronouns, including number), (d) temporal (tense as event-
external time and aspect as event-internal time), (e) topographic (i.e., physical space, see 
Aikhenvald 2015), (f) modal (modality), and (g) social (Levinson 1979; Manning 2001).  
 Fauconnier (2010 [1994]) initially used mental spaces to model the logical structure of 
propositions, although he emphasizes that a mental space is not a visual representation of a 
‘possible world’ (e.g., Stalnaker 1968). Instead, it is a partial, dynamic representation of an 
agent’s assertions about the external world (Sweetser & Fauconnier 1996: 11; Lakoff & 
Sweetser (2010 [1994]). Mental Space Theory (MST) studies of conditional constructions 
include Dinsmore (1987: 1–21; 1991); Sweetser (1996; 1999); Dancygier & Sweetser (1996; 
1997; 2005); Takubo & Kinsui (1997); Tabakowska (1997); Mok, Bryant, & Feldman (2004); 
Sanders, Sanders, & Sweetser (2009); Dancygier & Vandelanotte (2010); Bivin (2018); Sanders 
& Van Krieken (2019), inter alia. This list spanning several decades shows that cognitive 
linguists often find MST to be useful for analyzing conditional constructions.   
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 The research goal of MST set forth in Fauconnier (2010 [1994]) and Fauconnier & 
Turner (2002: 40, 102) is ‘neurobiological plausibility’ (Coulson 2011: 414). For Fauconnier 
(2007: 351), mental spaces represent “sets of activated neuronal assemblies,” and the 
“connections between elements correspond to coactivation-bindings” (see also Fauconnier 2010 
[1994]; Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 40, 102; see Kowalewski 2017 as a supporting 
neurolinguistic study). Feldman (2006: 224) and Kowalewski (2017: 168) as EC and MST 
proponents nevertheless caution that, although studies show correlations between hippocampus 
(a brain region) activity, spatiotemporal processing, and semantic memory (e.g., Burgess, 
Maguire, & O’Keefe 2002; Fernandino, Binder, Desai, Pendl, Humphries, Gross, Conant, & 
Seidenberg 2016, Kepinska, de Rover; Caspers, & Schiller 2018: 8), the brain mechanisms and 
processes for mental spaces are still unknown.  
 Recent neuroimaging studies also suggest surprising correlations between sensorimotor 
processing and the processing of conditional semantics in the brain (e.g., Li et al. 2014) which 
involve all bodily senses (or, are ‘pan-modal,’ see Jackson, Ralph, & Pobric 2015). Even so, the 
precise correlations between mental spaces and brain activity are the source of many open, and in 
some cases, open-ended questions. Determining the extent to which spatiotemporal (deictic) 
memory constrains and shapes conditional semantics will require aggregating data and findings 
across multiple studies (e.g., fMRI13 meta-analyses, e.g., Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant 2009) 
on semantic memory and spatiotemporal processing. In agreement with Feldman’s (2006) and 
Kowalewski’s (2017) assessments, at this point in the history of cognitive neuroscience, claiming 
 
13 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) yields real-time, dynamic scans, as opposed to the static, single 
images of MRI scans.  
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as Fauconnier (2007) does that mental spaces correlate with specific neurophysiological 
mechanisms and processes is premature at best.  
 As seen already with Feldman (2006) and Kowalewski (2017), the strongest criticisms of 
MST are often from MST theorists themselves. For example, Brandt (2005: 1579) concludes that 
one fault of MST theory is the focus on the T-values of propositions and sentences to the 
detriment of descriptive adequacy. Indeed, using MST to explore conditional T-values alone 
would be short-sighted. Furthermore, as Brandt (2005: 1582) points out, MST analyses are by 
default context-insensitive because they usually focus exclusively on the sentence level. These 
empirical shortfalls are not due to any inherent methodological limitations of MST and need not 
be the case. However, they impede the process of making MST fully compliant with EC tenets 
(§2.3.2; Wilson 2002). As expected, researchers not using MST often disregard or ignore it, 
presumably because of MST theorists overstating its descriptive and explanatory efficacy.  
 Despite these shortcomings of MST, few other research programs unite (a) descriptive-
functional findings on semantic and pragmatic functions in discursive-situational contexts (see 
Chelliah & de Reuse 2010: 15, 325), and (b) explanatory findings in neurolinguistics and 
cognitive neuroscience on language perception, comprehension, and production (see Lakoff 
2012). These findings suggest that symbolic logics, whether they be monotonic or non-
monotonic, are inadequate for doing so (§1.3). Mental spaces as embodied FoRs—whatever their 
correlating neurophysiological mechanisms and processes happen to be—model how semantic 
and pragmatic functions, specifically in the form of embodied deictic properties mapping 
physical and metaphorical positions and distance, along with context-sensitivity, contribute to 
conditional interpretations.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I first outlined descriptive and explanatory inadequacies of monotonic and non-
monotonic models for analyzing modal stances context-sensitivity in conditional constructions. I 
then introduced and critically evaluated Embodied Cognition (EC) as the theoretical framework 
and Mental Spaces Theory (MST) as the method of analysis. Despite their methodological 
shortfalls, EC and MST nonetheless merge to create a viable framework in which Embodied FoR 
networks shown as mental spaces better model (a)–(c) than T-values and P-values alone in 
monotonic and non-monotonic analyses, respectively. Therefore, the embodied FoR is a 
preferable heuristic for conditional interpretations. Next, §3 describes the methodology, methods 
of using UML mental space ontologies, the data selection criteria, and data sources.
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3. Methodology, methods, and data 
3.1 Introduction 
As I discussed in §1.5, this study is an abductive-inductive methodological approach to data, 
which in practice entails cycling between data description and theoretical explanation. It also 
unites (a) descriptive-functional findings of how embodied agents use language in discursive-
situational contexts and (b) explanatory findings in neurolinguistics and cognitive neuroscience 
on language perception, comprehension, and production (§2.3). This chapter outlines the 
methodological design principles (§3.2), delineates the methods of using UML mental spaces 
(§3.3), and describes the data selection criteria and sources (§3.4). 
3.2 Methodological design principles 
Three methodological design principles guide this study. First, carefully selecting, modifying, or 
designing a diagrammatic ONTOLOGY is crucial in developing ‘object-oriented’ (OO) models 
such as mental spaces. In information science (e.g., computer science, cognitive linguistics, 
systems biology) an object-oriented ontology is a formal, semiotic system (concerning 
representations of reality) of (a) objects (e.g., boxes in diagrams as mental spaces or diamonds to 
represent agent decisions, see §3.3.1.4, Table 5), (b) features that represent ‘real-world’ 
properties, (b) interrelations (e.g., ‘is a,’ ‘is a necessary part of’) between the objects, (c) a set of 
specifications, and a (d) system-specific terminology (see Fonseca 2007, Man 2013).  
 The more common usage of the term ‘ontology’ in philosophy refers to theories about 
what exists (i.e., being qua being) in reality or ‘possible worlds.’ This study employs a narrower 
sense of ‘ontology’ as what exists (e.g., deictic properties) as components of human cognition. 
Crucially, mental spaces are objects in diagrams of cognitive processing (thought processes) of 
speakers and writers and not only the constructional constituents that evoke the cognitive 
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processing. By extension, mental spaces of relevant and possible implied FoRs (implicatures) 
appear along with mental spaces representing grammatically expressed FoRs (explicatures). It is 
not, however, necessary or even possible to map all ‘possible worlds’ (i.e., scenarios). 
 Mental spaces are diagrammatic ontologies that often appear in cognitive linguistics, 
albeit in a mosaic of stylistic presentations. For instance, Dancygier & Sweetser (2005) integrate 
metalanguage into mental spaces, while Bierwiaczonek (2013) integrates paraphrases. Moreover, 
mental space ontologies—unlike ontologies that model language as ‘object’ (e.g., those used in 
machine translation) only—model language as both static ‘object’ (properties and relations) and 
dynamic ‘event’ (communicative act) (see Walrod 2006 on ‘language as event’). However, given 
the nature of complex, adaptive systems (e.g., a language), no diagrammatic ontology captures 
every nuance of the communicative act. As Fauconnier (2007: 351) similarly insists, mental 
spaces non-exhaustively and dynamically represent thinking and communicating.  
  On the one hand, any diagrammatic ontology (e.g., UML mental spaces) should be 
conceptually and structurally as minimal as possible to avoid over-generating predictions and 
thus “proving” what the data cannot substantiate. On the other hand, a mental space ontology 
must accommodate the vast array of semantic, pragmatic, or morphosyntactic properties 
expressing conditionality, such as sequential markers (Allison 2017: 34–35) or combinations of 
grammatical constituents jointly marking conditionality. For example, Ute [ute] speakers 
combine an irrealis suffix, an anterior aspect marker (i.e., denoting an out-of-sequence, 
previously-unmentioned event) and a subject nominalizer to form a hypothetical 
counterfactual¾a construction denoting an event that did not occur, but could, should, or would 
have happened (Givón 2011: 141–142). Such grammatical collocations require a further design 
principle to account for them. 
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 As such, the second methodological design principle is incorporating into the analysis the 
claims of Construction Grammar (CG) regarding the semantics-morphosyntax interface 
(Goldberg 1995, 2013; Bergen & Chang 2005; Bergen, Chang, & Narayan 2004; Verhagen 
2007; see Gries 2013 on data in CG). In CG, all grammatical units from morphemes up to 
sentences are syntax : semantics :: form : content pairings which jointly form a construction. 
Crucially, the meaning of the construction is not always the sum of the meaning of its parts 
(weak compositionality, §1.5). Moreover, constructions as form-meaning pairings aggregate into 
complex, adaptive discursive systems of constituents (see Croft 2010: 463; Beckner et al. 2009). 
 In comparison to syntax-primary generative theories supporting strong compositionality 
(§1.5), CG is a set of semantic-primary theories that better accounts for how morphemes map to 
semantic functions in polysynthetic languages (e.g., Rice 2017a; Baker 2018; Kpoglu 2019; cf. 
Genee 2018) and agglutinative languages (e.g., Gildea & Jansen 2018).14 In such languages, 
semantic properties delineating conditional interpretations are often sub-lexically encoded (e.g., 
Swahili conditional prefixes, in contrast with the conditional conjunctions); CG allows for these 
morphosyntactic patterns. Crucially, in CG, a semantic function (e.g., probability) does not 
always correspond to a single grammatical constituent; instead, the function can emerge from 
constituent collocations (see Schmid 2007 on the significance of emergent meaning in CG for 
corpus studies). This claim also aligns with those in Emergent Grammar (e.g., Hopper 1988, 
2011, 2014 [1998]; Rhee 2014; see Auer & Pfänder 2011: 8).  
 The third and final design principle is this: successfully analyzing conditional 
constructions within a complex, adaptive discursive network of form-meaning pairings requires 
 
14 Understandably, this generalization requires demonstration, yet space prohibits accommodation. See Boas & Ziem 
(2018) for a CG perspective and Müller (2018) for a critical review. 
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focused attention on the tangled interactions between semantics, pragmatics, and context, no 
matter how one limits the scope of analysis. Even though a study that brackets pragmatics can 
elucidate the semantic complexities of conditional constructions, the reality of human 
embodiment in situational-discursive contexts poses a challenge for any decontextualized 
approach that excludes pragmatics. As Saloné (1983a: 312) similarly argues, a ‘pragmaticless’ 
analysis of conditional constructions (e.g., Lycan 2001) is descriptively inadequate. In §4, I show 
how semantic and pragmatic functions consistently overlap, specifically at the loci of epistemic, 
deontic, and dynamic modality (Papafragou 2000; see also Depraetere & Salkie 2017 as a survey 
of perspectives). The next section introduces the UML mental spaces used in §4 that model these 
overlaps and the effects of context on conditional interpretations. 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Designing a mental space ontology in Unified Modeling LanguageTM 
The mental space diagrammatic ontology in §4 diverges from Fauconnier’s (2010 [1994]) 
ontology which consists of networks of circles, co-indexed dots, lines, letters, and descriptive 
text for modeling semantics, pragmatics, and contextual factors.15 The circles in Fauconnier’s 
(2010 [1994]) ontology each serve as mental spaces (e.g., place, event, state-of-being) in which 
dots with attached letters denote referents. When a referent appears in more than one mental 
space, its dots are connected by association lines. Regrettably, this minimalistic format is not 
optimal for analyzing the semantic, pragmatic, and contextual properties of morphemes. For 
instance, in the diagrams of Korean semantics in Kwon (2014) only contain English. How the 
 
15 My mental space ontology also incorporates these components. Due to space limitations, however, a detailed 
comparison of UML mental spaces and Fauconnier’s mental spaces is not possible in this thesis. 
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diagram features relate to Korean morphemes is not made clear, an issue that consistently arises 
in Mental Space Theory publications on non-Indo-European languages.  
 Thus, while I adopt Fauconnier’s methodological principles such as modeling the 
grammatical and cognitive components of a speaker or writer’s assertions, my mental spaces 
conform (with a few minor exceptions) to the OMG Unified Modeling LanguageTM (UML) 
(Rumbaugh, Jacobson, & Booch 2004; Seidl & Brandsteidl, Huemer, & Kappel 2012; Lavagno 
& Martin, & Selic 2003; Duc 2007; Rumpe 2016), an interdisciplinary, broadly implemented 
diagram protocol consisting of 14 diagram types. UML diagrams frequently appear in software 
engineering, systems biology (e.g., Roux-Rouquié & Caritey, Gaubert, & Rosenthal-Sabroux 
2004), and computational linguistics (e.g., Kurdi 2017; Schalley 2004) but infrequently in 
cognitive linguistics (e.g., Schalley 2011). Imaz & Benyon (1999; 2007) conceptualize but do 
not operationalize UML ‘use case’ diagrams as mental spaces but not UML ‘state machine’ 
diagrams (§.3.3.1.1 below). No publication to date conceptualizes or uses UML ‘state machine’ 
diagrams as mental spaces.  
 Comparable ontologies in cognitive linguistics to those in UML are used in Embodied 
Construction Grammar (e.g., Chang, De Beule, & Micelli 2012). Similarly, ‘merger 
representations’ in Default Semantics (e.g., Jaszczolt 1999, 2003, 2005a, 2005b; Elder & 
Jaszczolt 2016) are diagrammatic objects (e.g., text boxes) that incorporate pragmatics and 
context along with semantics. However, in contrast with these explanatorily proficient but non-
universal ontologies, UML is an interdisciplinary universal diagrammatic interface that is useful 
for pursuing descriptive and explanatory adequacy of languages as complex, adaptive systems. 
Crucially, I intend UML mental spaces to be optimal for analyzing the semantic, pragmatic, and 
contextual properties of morphemes, words, constructions, and discourse. 
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3.3.1.1 UML ‘state machine’ diagram  
The mental space networks in §4 are STATE MACHINE DIAGRAMS, one of the fourteen diagram 
types in UML. Despite its name being reminiscent of computational models of language 
cognition, the UML ‘state machine’ is appropriate for networking mental spaces as diagram 
objects modeling embodied FoRs since it (a) represents State of Affairs (SoA) in a complex, 
adaptive system of events and (b) only includes contextually relevant information. In this study, 
a FoR is conceptually equivalent to a SoA in other truth-conditional publications, excepting the 
added notion of embodied experience (see Tavangar & Amouzadeh 2006; Vaysi & Salehnejad 
2016 on SoAs). A standard UML state machine object template appears in (Figure 1): 
 
 
The mental spaces in §4 resemble the State diagram object in Figure 1 with two notable 
exceptions. First, although the overt/non-overt (+, –) attribute distinction often appears in 
linguistic analyses, this study does not assume the existence of null grammatical markers and 
thus excludes this optional feature. Second, the Operations box and its included parameters are 
designed explicitly for use in software engineering and are also absent from the mental spaces. 
3.3.1.2 Specifications for UML mental spaces 
Below are specifications (S-1–S-16) for UML mental spaces: 
S-1. UML mental spaces each represent an embodied Frame of Reference (FoR). 
 
S-2. Bolded title-case headers include a time index and referent names (not in alphabetical 
order) or co-indexes (e.g., s = speaker; a = addressee), but not ‘not’ for negation (S-11).  
 
Sw
im
 L
an
e
Figure 1.  UML state machine template nested in a swim lane.
State
+ attribute : value
? attribute : value
operation(parameter)
operation(parameter)
Attributes
Operations
overt/visible
non-overt/invisible/null
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S-3. Referent co-indexes appear attached to referent names/titles in headers and in the 
Attributes box lines (see (7)). 
 
S-4. Referent co-indexes appear alphabetically in the Referent(s) line (Attributes box) when 
they occur in the header or the lines below the Attributes Box; contextually required 
referents are also included.  
 
S-5. Referent co-indexes indicate coreference as follows:  
a. Attribution: a(b) where b is an appellation to a, e.g., a (person) ‘is a’ b (leader).  
b. Collection: a(b) where a ‘is a member of’ set b, e.g., a = frog, b = amphibians. 
c. Identity: a(b) where a and b are singularly identical, e.g., same person. 
 
S-6. Co-index letters are prioritized in descending order (a–d) for visual predictability:  
a. {s = speaker, a = addressee, w = writer, r = reader} (used as applicable)  
b. First letter of data language (i.e., Swahili) lexeme  
c. First letter of analysis language (i.e., English) lexeme  
d. Default order in linguistic publications (i, j, k, etc.) (e.g., indicating phrasal 
referents, e.g., [slave owner]i). Note that (a)–(d) are general guidelines only. 
 
S-7. Time (t) indexes: Present = (t0); Past = (t–1), (t–2), etc.; Future = (t1), (t2), etc. The (tn) 
index indicates an undefined moment or ongoing interval, depending on context. 
 
S-8. Row content types appear sequentially as referent, discourse, person/number (P/N), 
temporal, topographic, modal, and social (top to bottom) in the Attributes box. 
 
S-9. Solid borders indicate a FoR as realis.  
 
S-10. Dashed borders indicate a FoR as irrealis and thus invert positive and negative stance 
and status values (+ to –, – to +) inside the FoR. When a stance or status value is neutral 
(=), the dashed irrealis borders do not specify a resultant value (+, –). 
 
S-11. Dashed borders indicate negation when a negation marker appears in the data and FoR. 
 
S-12. Beliefs are formatted with square brackets, e.g., [s B2] (P = n), where s denotes speaker 
and B2 denotes a specific belief. Curly brackets group beliefs into sets attributed to one 
and only one Agent, e.g., {[w B1], [w B2]}. 
 
S-13. Beliefs are formatted as below in bold text when they correspond with ‘given’ (old) 
information flowing from a contextual FoR (MOD = modal deixis, epist = epistemic 
stance, w = writer, k = Kaduma, t = Tanzania):  
 
MOD : epist : +w >> +k Representing t 
 
This line is read as: ‘The writerw knows that Kadumak is representing Tanzaniat.’ 
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S-14. UML swim lanes (see Figure 1 above) group mental spaces, e.g., P (protasis), Q 
(apodosis). P and Q swim lanes do not contain FoRs evoked by dependent clauses (e.g., 
(36) and (40) in §4.3).  
a. P and Q Swim lanes are not line-connected since their contained FoRs are.  
b. Lines connecting other swim lanes are optional, (e.g., two context swim lanes). 
c. Context swim lanes are optional. 
 
S-15. Operator arrow lines (§3.3.2) cross by using ‘line jumps’ (half-circle indentations).  
 
S-16. UML simple states have no internal parameters and represents a concept, e.g., ‘Being 
educated’, as in Figure 2: 
 
 
 
Note that for S-14a, no part of a FoR network is the exact equivalent of a proposition in the 
symbolic sense, but P and Q Swim lanes are the closest features. However, atomic symbols 
have no internal structure; swim lanes do. Thus, the propositional level of abstraction on which 
symbols subsist is only roughly equivalent to the interrelation of P and Q Swim lanes.  
3.3.1.3 UML mental spaces and deictic properties 
The Attributes box in the UML FoR mental space template contains deictic properties (Figure 3): 
 
 
The Referents row contains referent co-indexes. The abbreviations for row content types (S-8) in 
Figure 3 are: DISC = discourse deixis, P/N = person/number, TEMP = temporal deixis (tense and 
Being educated
Figure 2.  UML simple state.
Figure 3.  UML template for a Frame of Reference (FoR) mental space.
pragmatics
Mental Space (tn)
Referent(s): co-index(es)
DISC : data [ gloss ], data [ gloss ]
P/N : data [ gloss ] 
TEMP : tense : data [ gloss ] 
TEMP : aspect : data [ gloss ]
TOPO : referent(s) : data [ gloss ] 
MOD : epist : (+/=/?)referent(s) >> referent(s) : data [ gloss ]  
MOD : deontic : (+/=/?)referent(s) >> referent(s) : data [ gloss ]  
MOD : dyn : (+/=/?)referent(s) >> referent(s) : data [ gloss ]  
SOC : referents : data [ gloss ] 
semantics
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aspect), TOPO = topographic deixis, MOD = modal deixis (epistemic, deontic, and dynamic), 
and SOC = social deixis. Discourse deixis markers (e.g., subject and object agreement) connote 
previously introduced referents as proximal (old, familiar) information and other referents as 
distal (new, unfamiliar) information. The semantics-pragmatics overlap in Figure 3 shows 
epistemic and deontic modality as semantic functions and epistemic, deontic, dynamic, and 
social stance as pragmatic functions (Staples & Fernández 2019: 349; Mortensen 2012). 
 For the topographic deixis row (TOPO) in Figure 3, two possible values (+, –) (binary 
function) indicate the physical presence or absence of a referent, respectively (e.g., +r, –z).  
 For the pragmatics rows (MOD and SOC), three possible values (+, =, –) indicate both 
modal deixis (i.e., epistemic, deontic, and dynamic stances) and social deixis (i.e., social stance). 
Stance values precede an Agent co-index which is followed by the symbol >> for ‘toward’ and 
then by an Undergoer co-index to indicate that an Agent’s attributing of a status value to a 
concrete Undergoer (e.g., person) or an abstract Undergoer (e.g., action, belief) (§2.3.4). Note 
that for the epistemic stance line, ‘+’ preceding the ‘>>‘ signifies the 0.6 to 1.0 P-value range, 
‘=‘ signifies 0.5, and ‘–’ stands for the 0.4 to 0.0 P-value range (§3.3.2.1, Table 7).  
 As another example, when –y>>–{s, a} appears on the SOC (social deixis) line, it is read 
as ‘Agent y is (a) taking a negative social stance toward (>>) and (b) attributing a negative social 
status to Undergoers s and a.’ Opposite values (i.e., +, =, –) are possible on pragmatics lines, 
even for the same referent, where an Agent in an FoR is taking a stance of the same type (e.g., 
dynamic) but with contrasting subtypes (e.g., ability and volition, see §2.3.4) on opposite sides of 
the ‘>>‘. For instance, MOD : dyn : +r >> –r means either (a) referent r is (taking a positive 
stance toward) ‘willing, but not able,’ or (b) ‘able, but not willing’. Note that whenever data 
expresses a deictic property in a FoR, it appears row-finally. 
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 For the tense and aspect rows seen in Figure 3, Figure 4 below explicates the UML-
compatible format for the tense and aspect rows of FoR mental spaces: 
 
 
In Figure 4, the all-caps deixis property (e.g., TEMP for temporal deixis) is followed by (a) a 
subcategory (e.g., tense), (b) the corresponding data string of orthographic segments (e.g., -na-), 
and then by (c) the corresponding gloss which is a subcategory (e.g., PRS for present) of second-
position category (e.g., in (8) above, tense). In this chapter (§3), all of the deictic property lines 
that appear below Referent(s) line in Figure 3 (this section) are omitted in all examples except 
(6) (Figure 7) to incrementally introduce UML formalisms.  
3.3.1.4 UML pseudostates 
In UML, PSEUDOSTATES are information flow nodes rather than States-of-Affairs (SoAs, or FoRs 
in this analysis) (Table 5): 
Table 5 UML pseudostates (Object Management Group 2017: 709) 
 
Node Function 
 
Initial State 
  
Beginning point of flow sequence 
 
Choice 
 
 
 
Junction in flow sequence, viz., Branch (AND: arrow in, two or more arrows out), 
and Merge (OR: two or more arrows in, one arrow out) 
 
Exit 
  
Exit point in flow sequence (e.g., a mid-sequence ‘dead-end’ option such as an 
unspecified outcome of an Agent’s decision) 
 
Final State 
  
End point of flow sequence 
 
 
Figure 4.  UML-compatible format for the tense and aspect rows of FoR mental spaces.
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): y
TEMP : tense : -na- [ PRS ]
'is a subcategory of'
'is a text data string of'
'is a subcategory of'
deictic 
property
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UML state machine diagrams begin at only one Initial State node (Table 5, top row) and flow to 
states (e.g., a FoR mental space) and pseudostates (e.g., Choice, Exit, and Final State nodes). In 
this study, a Belief node (a diamond containing a ‘B’) is a Choice node subtype (Figure 5): 
 
The Belief node is a junction from which beliefs flow. A belief can flow to an optional X-ed 
circle Exit node (Table 5, row 3). Alternatively, it can flow to the Final State node. State 
machine diagrams flow to only one Final State.  
 State machine diagrams of FoR networks only show speaker/writer beliefs that are 
relevant for the construction. Beliefs the speaker/writer presumably shares with the audience 
(e.g., about an event) appear as context FoRs denoting ‘given’ information. The P-values for 
complementary (codependent) beliefs (e.g., §4.3.2, (33), Figure 29) on arrows flowing from a 
Belief node (§3.3.2.1) add to 1.0 (e.g., 0.4 and 0.6); supplementary (independent) beliefs do not.  
 Next, the Decision node is another Choice node subtype (Figure 6):  
 
Unlike lines flowing from the Belief node, P-values on lines after the Decision node either add 
up to P = 1.0 (e.g., see §4.2.2, (17)) or are unspecified, depending on context. Finally, state 
machine diagrams end at one and only one Final State node (bottom row, Table 5). Instances of 
each of the pseudostates except for the Exit node appear later in (10) (§3.3.2.5).  
 
B
Figure 5.  Belief node (subtype of Choice node).
Decision
Figure 6.  Decison node (subtype of Choice node).
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3.3.2 UML Operator arrows 
UML operator arrows for networking FoR mental spaces appear in Table 6: 
Table 6 UML operator arrows contextualized for embodied FoR mental space networks 
 
Operator Arrow Interrelationship(s) Definition(s) 
 
Flow 
 
Y 
 
Z 
 
Sequence 
 
Y sequentially (e.g., informationally, 
logically, temporally) precedes Z.  
 
Inheritance 
 
Y Z Property scope (e.g., 
context, quality, quantity) 
Y having property x causes Z to have x. 
 
 
Composition P W Part-whole (strong);  
Necessary condition 
W (whole) impossible without P (part);       
P is necessary for W. 
 
Aggregation 
(large head) 
P W Part-whole (weak) 
 
W (whole) is possible without P (part) 
(standard UML definition; used in §4). 
 
Aggregation 
(small head) 
P W Contributing condition P makes W more probable (quantitative) or 
more extensive (qualitative) (contextualized 
definition in this study, see §3.3.2.4). 
 
Realization Y Z Implementation/Causation;  
Sufficient condition 
Y implements Z/Y causes Z to be the case; 
Y suffices for Z.  
 
Dependency 
 
 
 
Y 
 
Z 
 
Contingency 
 
 
Y depends in some way for a time interval 
on Z (standard UML definition; not used in 
§4, see §3.3.2.6) 
 
Codependency 
 
 
Y Z Biconditional Y is True iff Z is True. Y and Z have the 
same T-value (True, False) (contextualized 
definition in this study, see §3.3.2.6). 
 
 
These UML operator arrows indicate that the arrow head FoR is cognitively accessible from the 
FoR at the arrow tail (§3.3.2.1). Constraints on cognitive accessibility include factors such as the 
(a) extent of shared contextual knowledge, (b) beliefs of communicating Agents about each other 
and discussion subjects, and (c) attentiveness (see Leonard 1995 on Swahili ‘attention deixis’).  
Each of the operator arrows above in Table 6 are discussed separately next in §3.3.2.1–§3.2.2.6, 
excepting only codependency as a variation of dependency (§3.2.2.6). All of the operators can 
point to either a FoR as a whole or to a FoR line for emphasis. 
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3.3.2.1 Flow 
In a sense, all UML operator arrows indicate flow, each with their specific semantics. However, 
in standard UML and this study, the flow operator arrow is the most general type of flow that 
simply reads ‘moves/navigates to next’ (process sequence) and is semantically underspecified for 
logic or temporal sequence. Put differently, flow indicates the sequence interrelationship, viz., 
that the tail Y sequentially precedes the head Z, as seen in the first row of Table 6 above.  
 In Mental Space Theory (§2.4), Fauconnier (2010 [1994]) conceptualizes mental spaces 
as being cognitively (in)accessible from each other in mental maps of semantic and pragmatic 
properties and how these properties interrelate. In my UML mental space networks, the flow 
arrow serves this purpose of interconnecting UML mental spaces and deictic properties (e.g., 
epistemic stance). In addition, flow can be either unidirectional or bidirectional. Flow also 
appears on arrow ends that do not have a more specific arrow type to assure that all network 
FoRs are accessible from the Initial node—a UML ‘state machine’ diagram requirement to make 
the diagram ‘executable’ (completable).  
 Now, in Figure 7 below for (6), three flow arrows connect the FoRs and Belief node 
(diamond containing a B, §3.3.1.4) in a cognitive sequence: 
(6)  The hobbitsh lit the firef (t–3) and then the Nazgûln saw the firef (t–2). 
 
 
 
The crucial point to draw from Figure 7 is that the flow arrows before and after all of the FoRs 
and the Belief node indicate cognitive flow. Again, the flow operator arrow is semantically 
underspecified for logic or temporal sequence; however, flow can also facilitate progression 
Nazgûln See Firef 
(t?2)
Referent(s): n, f
Hobbitsh Light 
Firef (t?3)
Referent(s): h, f
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, s
MOD : epist : +s >> [s B]
B
[s B] (P = 0.9)
Figure 7.  Flow operator arrow indicating cognitive sequence.
Referent(s): a = addressee, f = fire, h = hobbits, s = speaker, n = Nazgûl
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through FoRs with out-of-sequence time indexes (e.g., in narrative flashbacks, see §4.3.2, Figure 
30 below (34)). The FoR header time indexes alone specify the flow temporality. In (6) above, [s 
B] (P = 0.9) represents the speaker’ss belief (S-9, §3.3.1.2) about the entire sequence 
‘downstream’ (after) the flow arrow on which it sits, viz., through all of the FoRs that follow it to 
the Final State node (black circle with surrounding line, §3.3.1.4). To semantically disambiguate 
P-values as for an Agent’s belief, the P = 0.9 Allan’s (2012: 231) credibility metric for a protasis 
proposition in Table 7 below concisely synthesizes probability and possibility and specifies the 
P-values on flow arrows:  
Table 7 P-values for a protasis proposition (adapted from Allan 2012: 231) 
P-value Degree of Agentive confidence Propositional attribution 
 
P = 1.0 
 
Undoubtedly true 
 
Necessarily P, I know that P. 
P = 0.9 Most probably true I am almost certain that P. 
P = 0.8 Probably true I believe that P. 
P = 0.7 Possibly true I think P is probable. 
P = 0.6 Just possibly true I think that perhaps P. 
P = 0.5 Indeterminable I don’t know whether or not P. 
P = 0.4 Just possibly false I think that perhaps not P. 
P = 0.3 Possibly false I think not P is probable. 
P = 0.2 Probably false I believe that not P. 
P = 0.1 Most probably false I am almost certain that not P. 
P = 0.0 Undoubtedly false Necessarily not P, I know that not P. 
 
 
The left column contains the P-values which appear on flow arrows to indicate an Agent’s 
degree of confidence in a belief (center column) at a time index (t). The corresponding 
propositional attributions appear in the right column. The selection of P-values for examples in 
§4 are estimates only. Consequently, the selection of P-values in this study are heuristic 
estimates rather than being mathematically precise and thus are not critical for the §4 analysis. In 
this study, P = 1.0 (certainty) is reserved for known past or present events or states-of-being. 
3.3.2.2 Inheritance 
Inheritance expresses the property scope interrelationship, viz., space Y having property x causes 
space Z to have x and that a conceptual property (e.g., context) of a deictic property or FoR has 
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scope over another deictic property or FoR. In Figure 8 below for (7), the FoR at the arrow tail 
has contextual scope (CS) over the head FoR in which the historianh recounts the event:  
(7)  On April 20, 1653, Cromwellc suspended parliamentp. 
 
 
 
In Figure 8, the past left FoR (t–1) in which Cromwellc suspends parliamentp has contextual 
scope (CS) (as marked on the inheritance arrow) over the historian’sh present reality FoR on the 
right. The use of inheritance precludes needing a context swim lane (§3.3.1.2, S-14) to indicate 
contextual FoRs. In this study, I restrict inheritance to this use indicating context scope, while 
acknowledging the inclusion of other property types is plausible. For instance, the inheritance 
operator could be used to indicate the qualitative scope (QUAL-S) or quantity scope (QUAN-S) 
of one FoR or deictic property (e.g., dynamic stance) over another. 
3.3.2.3 Composition 
Composition simultaneously expresses two interrelationships: (a) strong part-whole relation: W 
(whole) impossible without P (part) and (b) P is necessary for W (necessary condition). In (14) 
below, composition indicates that the [Highway Safety Law]l (head simple state) in Figure 9 
below is incomplete without the [Quality Standards]s (tail simple state) as a necessary part: 
(8) [Quality Standards]s as a necessary component of the [Highway Safety Law]l 
 
 
 
Present Reality (t0) 
Referent(s): a, s
Cromwellc Suspends Parliamentp (t?1) 
Referent(s): c, p
CS
Figure 8.  Inheritance operator arrow indicating the context scope (CS) of the left FoR over the right FoR.
Referent(s): a = addressee, c = Cromwell, p = Parliament, s = speaker
Figure 9.  Composition operator arrow indicating that the [Quality Standards]s 'simple state' at the arrow tail is a necessary 
component of the [Highway Safety Law]l 'simple state' at the arrow head. 
 
Referent(s): s = [Quality Standards], l = [Highway Safety Law] 
[Quality Standards]s
[Highway Safety Law]l
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3.3.2.4 Aggregation 
The complementary part-whole relation in standard UML for composition is aggregation (i.e., 
‘strong’ versus ‘weak’ part-whole relationships, respectively), which indicates the 
interrelationship that (a) a W (whole) possible without P (part) (§.3.3.2, Table 6). While using 
aggregation in this standard UML sense, I also contextualize aggregation for a second use to 
indicate that (b) without P (part) makes W (whole) more probable (contributing condition). To 
distinguish between instances of (a) and (b) in diagrams, a large head diamond arrow indicates 
(a) above and a small head diamond arrow indicates (b), as in Figure 10 below for (9): 
(9)  Polomé (1967: 153): 
 
 [If the childc is in the habith of playing at the shoemaker’ss doord]P, [perhaps he’llc want to 
help hims next]Q. 
 
 
 
In Figure 10, definition (a) as a ‘weak’ part-whole relationship is shown by the arrow white 
diamond (large head) between the left two FoRs to indicate that the childc being in the habith of 
playing at the shoemaker’ss doord (tail FoR) is an optional part of the Present Reality FoR (left). 
On the right, (a) as a contributing condition is shown by the arrow white diamond (small head) 
between the right two FoRs to indicate that the childc being in the habith of playing at the 
shoemaker’ss doord (tail FoR) at t0 increases the probability of the childc wanting to help the 
shoemakers at t1 (head FoR). However, the child’sc habith of playing there is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for the head FoR being realis (True) at t1. The probability (not shown above) of 
the head FoR being realis at t1 is also shaped by embodied, cognitive factors such as the child’sc 
 Childc in Habith of Playing at 
Shoemaker'ss Doord (t0)
Referent(s): c, d, h, s
Childc Wanting to Help 
Shoemakers (t1)
Referent(s): c, s
Figure 10.  Aggregation operator arrow (large head, left) indicating that the FoR at the arrow tail is a optional component of the FoR 
at the arrow head. Aggregation operator arrow (small head, right) indicating the FoR at the arrow tail is a contributing condition of the 
FoR at the arrow head.
Referent(s): c = child, d = door, h = habit, s = shoemaker
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): c, d, h, s
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disposition and pre-existing beliefs about shoemakers, what they do, and the desirability of 
participating in shoemaking (factors of cognitive accessibility, see §3.3.2). 
3.3.2.5 Realization 
Realization simultaneously expresses two interrelationships: (a) Y implements Z/Y causes Z 
(Implementation/Causation), and (b) Y suffices for Z (sufficient condition) (Figure 11 for (10)): 
(10)  Context: While resting on the ancient [Watchtower of Amon Sûl]w,  
the hobbitsh lit a firef. 
 Conditional 
Construction: 
However, [if the hobbitsh had known the Nazgûln would arrive]P,  
[theyh would not have lit the firef]Q: 
 
 
Q
No
Hobbitsh Aware That Nazgûln 
Would See the Firef (t?3) 
Referent(s): f, h, n
Nazgûln Travelling (t?2)
Referent(s): f, n 
P
h Decision: 
Light Fire?
Nazgûln Arrive at w (t?1)
Referent(s): h, n, w 
what would have happened
Nazgûln See h (t?3)
Referent(s): f, h, w
Fictional Narrative
Nazgûln Searching for Hobbitsh (t?3) 
Referent(s): h, n 
Nazgûln Close to Hobbitsh (t?3) 
Referent(s): h, n 
Hobbitsh Aware That Nazgûln 
Would See the Firef (t?3) 
Referent(s): f, h, n 
Nazgûln Look Toward Hobbitsh  (t?3) 
Referent(s): h, n 
Narratorn Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): n
MOD : epist : +n >> [n B1]
Nazgûln  Context
B
CS
Hobbitsh  Context
Nazgûln Travelling (t?2)
Referent(s): f, n 
Nazgûln Arrive at w (t?1)
Referent(s): h, n, w 
Nazgûln See h (t?3)
Referent(s): f, h, w
what actually happened
Hobbitsh Resting on w (t?3) 
Referent(s): h, w
[n B1] (P = 1.0)
Yes
Figure 11.  Realization operator arrows (bottom left, right) indicating tail FoRs as sufficient conditions for head FoRs.
 
Referent(s): f = fire, h = hobbits, n = narrator, n = Nazgûl, w = [Watchtower of Amon Sûl]
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To review, in UML state machine diagrams, flow proceeds from the Initial State node (top 
center) through states (e.g., FoRs) and pseudostates (e.g., Merge nodes, e.g., upper center, 
bottom right), occasionally to Exit nodes (not shown above), and ultimately to the Final State 
node (bottom right) (§3.3.1.4).  
 Now, in Figure 11, first notice the Hobbitsh Context swim lane (upper left) and Nazgûln 
Context (upper right) swim lane. The (a) Nazgûln relentlessly searching for the hobbitsh, (top 
right) (b) the Nazgûln being topographically proximal (physically close) to the hobbitsh, (second 
top right), (c) the Nazgûln looking in the direction of the hobbitsh lighting the firef, (third top 
right), (d) the hobbitsh resting on the [Watchtower of Amon Sûl]w (top left), and (e) the hobbitsh 
not being aware the Nazgûln would see theirh firef are all contributing and jointly sufficient 
conditions (aggregation, small head) arrows, upper middle, Figure 11) for theirh decision to light 
the fire (center Decision node and ‘Yes’ scenario, three bottom left FoRs). Put differently, any 
from among (a)–(e) alone would not result in the Nazgûln seeing the firef; together they do yield 
this result. Crucially, the realization arrows connect the top two FoRs in the realis ‘what really 
happened’ scenario (i.e., the Nazgûln arriving, bottom left) and also the top two FoRs in the 
irrealis ‘what really happened’ scenario (i.e., the Nazgûln not arriving, bottom right). In both 
FoR pairs, the tail FoR suffices for (realizes, makes realis) the head FoR. 
3.3.2.6 Dependency 
The UML dependency operator arrow is the weakest interrelationship between objects (e.g., a 
FoR mental space). Dependency indicates that A at the arrow tail depends in some way for some 
time interval on B at the arrow head—a very general definition that allows for flexibility in 
application. Like the other UML operators, dependency is a unidirectional arrow by default, but 
the UML 2.5.1 protocol (Object Management Group 2017) also permits non-contradicting 
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double-headed arrows. Accordingly, in this study, codependency (double-headed dependency) 
arrows indicate a biconditional interrelationship, viz., as in Figure 12: 
 
In Figure 12, the head and tail FoRs have the same T-value (True, False) (bidirectional 
contingency). On the left, if Brendanb is awake at t0 (e.g., a specific Saturday at 7:00 A.M.), then 
heb is hiking at that time. Again, the solid FoR borders indicate realis. In this instance, the 
dependency narrows FoR interpretation within the P-value (P = 0.6–P = 1.0) range to P = 1.0 
(True). On the right, the same principle inversely applies: if Brendanb is not awake at t0, then heb 
is not hiking at that time. The dashed FoR borders indicate irrealis. Here the dependency 
narrows the FoR interpretation within the P-value (P = 0.5–P = 0.0) range to P = 0.0 (False). 
3.4 Data selection criteria and sources 
The language under analysis in this study is Swahili [swa] (alternatively, Kiswahili), an SVO 
constituent-order Bantu language in the Niger-Congo family (see Ashton 1993 [1944], Loogman 
1965, Wilson 1970, Polomé 1967, Myachina 1981, and Vitale 1981 as descriptive grammars). 
Since analyzing corpus data where possible minimizes the risk of generalizing from a small, 
unrepresentative data set, several examples are selected from the annotated Helsinki Corpus of 
Swahili (HCS 2.0), which contains around 25 million words (Hurskainen 2016). Other available 
Swahili corpora are the TshwaneDJe Kiswahili Internet Corpus (de Schryver & Joffe 2009) and 
the SAWA Corpus (De Pauw, Wagacha, & de Schryver 2009). Mwamzandi (2017), the only 
descriptive corpus study of Swahili conditional constructions, analyzes data from the HCS 1.0 
Brendan Hiking (t0)
Referent(s): b
Figure 12.  Codependency operator arrow indicating biconditional contingency of T-values (True, False) (biconditionality).
Referent(s): b = Brendan
Brendan Awake (t0)
Referent(s): b
Context: Brendanb not Dreaming Heb is Hiking
Brendan Hiking (t0)
Referent(s): b
Brendan Awake (t0)
Referent(s): b
Context: Brendanb not Dreaming Heb is Hiking
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Corpus (12.5 million words) (Hurskainen 2004; see also Hurskainen 2014) and engages 
descriptive publications (e.g., Saloné 1983a, 1983b). The data in §4 are selected from the HCS 
2.0 and several descriptive publications. Several discourse examples are from Musyoki & 
Murphy (1985), a collection of Tanzanian newspaper articles.  
 The following are observations regarding the descriptive analyses on which this study 
builds. The terms conditional marker and conditional conjunction appear interchangeably in 
Mwamzandi (2017), inconsistently between Saloné (1983a) (on ikiwa as a conjunction) and 
Saloné (1983b) (i.e., ikiwa as a conjunction and as a marker), and somewhat incoherently in 
Saloné (1983b). Further, Mwamzandi (2017: 157) argues that Swahili conditional prefixes are 
not pragmatically contrastive, while Saloné (1983b: 21) holds that the contrasting distributions of 
some of them are pragmatically determined. A descriptive focus would allow for sorting out 
some of these descriptive discrepancies, but my theoretical focus only permits a partial account.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I first described the methodological design principles and then introduced UML 
mental spaces as the ontological method of analysis. I then described the data selection criteria 
and sources of the present study. The motivation for my abductive-inductive approach to the data 
is the goal of pursuing descriptive and explanatory adequacy for Swahili conditional semantics, 
pragmatics, and context-sensitivity. The standardized UML modeling language facilitates doing 
so by analyzing deictic properties (e.g., epistemic and modal stance) within language as a 
complex, adaptive system. Next, in §4, I operationalize these UML mental spaces in analyzing 
Swahili conditional constructions.
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4. Data analysis and findings 
4.1 Introduction 
This data analysis demonstrates that the embodied FoR is a better heuristic of conditional 
interpretations than T-values and P-values alone. It also shows how necessary, sufficient, and 
contributing conditions as the logical properties correlating with T-values and P-values obtain on 
the level of embodied FoR networks. Toward these goals, I operationalize UML mental spaces 
representing embodied FoRs to show the influences of epistemic, deontic, and dynamic stances 
as modal deictic properties and context-sensitivity on conditional interpretations.  
 This chapter as a cognitive-functional-descriptive analysis has two primary aims: (a) to 
describe the grammatical features of Swahili conditional constructions and (b) to explain the 
cognitive networks of FoRs represented as UML mental spaces that the data evoke in the mind of 
and from the perspectival viewpoint of the communicator. Again, mental spaces do not 
objectively map features in reality or function as sentence diagrams; only the most relevant 
factors of unspoken context (e.g., contextually required, unmentioned referents) are represented. 
These aims ((a) and (b)) present a challenge for a trackable presentation of data and explanations. 
Sections for conditional prefixes and conditional conjunctions proceed from data and data 
description, to the diagram, and then to explanatory prose for the data and diagram, respectively. 
Each diagram contains details that are not critical for my arguments but are nonetheless required 
for completeness within my formal framework; space prohibits explicating them in the prose. 
Also, verbs are not co-referenced in the analysis for the sake of simplifying the presentation. In 
this chapter, Section 4.2 discusses realis constructions and their grammatical constituents, and 
§4.3 does so for irrealis constructions.  
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4.2 Realis conditional constructions 
4.2.1 Overview 
Four conditional conjunctions (ikiwa, iwapo, endapo, and kama) and one conditional prefix (ki-) 
occur in Swahili realis conditional constructions. This chapter argues that the conditional 
conjunctions are truth-functional (T-values) and that the prefixes (ki- and the nge- and ngeli-
/ngali- irrealis prefixes) map a realis-irrealis probability scale (P-values). These prefixes have 
semantic scope over the conditional conjunctions while the latter have syntactic scope over the 
former. Along with examining conditional pragmatics, this section (§4.2) explores this issue of 
semantic scope of the conditional prefixes over the conjunctions. 
 On non-monotonicity, P-values express levels of agentive confidence in a belief (§2.2.2, 
§3.3.2.1, Table 7) and have semantic scope over (determine) T-values. Mwamzandi (2017) 
implicitly yet commendably presupposes non-monotonicity in arguing for a realis-irrealis scale, 
although he implements a four-level scale from van der Auwera (1983) and not P-values as such. 
However, Mwamzandi claims that the ikiwa conditional conjunction also expresses degrees of 
probability. Unfortunately, yet understandably, he does not consider semantic scope as a 
confounding factor for his analysis. I argue that this oversight skews his description of the 
collocations of ikiwa with other constituents. In contrast, my findings are that the conditional 
conjunctions such as ikiwa as construction parts express T-values. When ikiwa occurs without 
intervening constituents such as (a) negation markers (i.e., si-, hatu-, hu-, ham-, ha, hawa-, (b) 
modal verbs (e.g., -wezekana ‘be.possible’, elekea ‘be.probable’), (c) adverbs (e.g., labda 
‘perhaps’, pengine ‘possibly’), and (d) the ta- FUT or labda ’perhaps’, the most coherent glosses 
for it are truth-functional (e.g., is ‘since it was True’ for past realis constructions). More 
precisely, the additional constituents that override the P-value of ikiwa from True (P = 1.0) 
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have semantic scope over it, even though it has syntactic scope over them. The ‘difference-
making’ factor between these two cases is semantic scope.  
 Furthermore, conditional constructions as wholes also express P-values (§3.3.2.1, Table 
7) from 1.0 (True) to 0.0 (False) that emerge from constituent collocations, as such as the 
constructions containing ikiwa in (11)–(16) (Hurskainen 2016):  
(11) [Ikiwa tunakubaliana kuwa lugha ya kipicha ni muhimu sana katika ushairi]P,            
[basi ni dhahiri kuwa lugha hii haikujitokeza sana humu]Q. 
‘[If we agree that figurative language is especially important in poetry]P,  
[then it is evident that this language [literary device] did not feature much here [in this 
text]]Q.’ (P = 1.0) 
 
(12) [Ikiwa Marekani itaanza vita]P, [hakika Irak haitakaa kimya ...]Q.  
‘[If America begins the war]P, [Iraq will certainly not remain silent ...]Q.’ (P = 0.9) 
 
(13) Kuhusu mkutano na rais Yasser Arafat, Powell alisema [atakutana naye]P,  
 [ikiwa hali itakubali]Q. 
‘Concerning a meeting with president Yasser Arafat, Powell said [he will meet him]P,  
[if circumstances permit]Q.’ (P = 0.8) 
 
(14) [Bwana Amoako amesema kuwa lengo hilo litawezekana]Q, [ikiwa nchi za Afrika 
zitasaidiwa kuweka uzito zaidi katika miradi ya kuongeza mapato yake, kuinua elimu na 
kuhakikisha inajitosheleza kwa chakula]P. 
‘[Mr. Amoako said that this goal would be achieved]Q, [if African countries were helped 
to put more weight on projects to increase their income, improve education, and ensure 
food security]P.’ (P = 0.7) 
 
(15) [Labda tu ikiwa wahusika wengine watakuwa wametoka]P—naona Mheshimiwa 
Magdalena Sakaya hayupo—[ni mmojawapo wa wazungumzaji]Q. 
[‘Perhaps just in case the other persons in charge will be gone]P—I see the Honorable 
Magdalena Sakaya is not there—[he is one of the speakers]Q.’ (P = 0.6) 
 
(16) [... sijui wanachama na mashabiki wao wategemee nini]Q [ikiwa hata wachezaji wenyewe 
na makocha wao pia hawana uhakika wa kufanya vema]P. 
[... I don’t know what members and their fans have to rely on]Q [if even the players 
themselves and their coaches have no certainty about how to do well]P.’ (P = 0.5) 
 
As Emergent Grammar and Construction Grammar similarly argue, the encoding a semantic 
function such as probability need not be the task of one lexeme, as Mwamzandi implies 
concerning ikiwa. For (12), even though hakika ‘certainly’ appears in this construction, the P-
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value is not P = 1.0 (certainty). The P = 0.9 value reflects the writer’s awareness that, even 
though she is asserting certainty, the future may turn out differently. In this study, P = 1.0 
(certainty) is reserved for known past or present events or states-of-being.  
 The reason for Swahili having four conjunctions instead of one, if indeed they all denote 
T-values, certainly requires an explanation, although this issue is beyond the scope of the present 
study. Since the ikiwa (i-ki-wa: 9-IPFV-STEM ‘it being,’ see Saloné 1983b: 20), iwapo (i-wa-po: 9-
STEM-16REL ‘when it be/is True’, see Saloné 1983b: 20) and endapo (enda-po: AUX-16REL 
‘when/where (it) goes’, see Mohamed 2001: 84) conjunctions were at one time compounds, it 
seems that this fact is at least a partial explanation. The fourth conjunction kama is borrowed 
from Arabic, so it is lexical in Swahili and thus not a compound. In any event, Saloné (1983b: 
21) notes that, in modern Swahili, speakers no longer recognize the conjunctions as compounds. 
 The following is a summary of previous assessments of the semantic contrasts between 
the four conditional conjunctions. Loogman (1965: 372) considers ikiwa and iwapo almost 
semantically equivalent while adding that ikiwa marks a marginally higher degree of doubt. 
Contrariwise, Saloné (1983b: 23) concludes they are functionally identical as high-probability 
constituents that primarily appear in future constructions. The HCS 2.0 has 3,045 tokens of the 
endapo conditional conjunction, but no publication has examined its semantic functions. 
Mpiranya 2014: (127–128) equates endapo and iwapo in examples without comment. 
Mwamzandi (2017) glosses all four conjunctions as lexical analogs of ‘if’; so also do Loogman 
(1965), Myachina (1981), Saloné (1983a: 318; 1983b: 23), and Mpiranya (2014: 127–128) for 
kama. Mpiranya (2014: 127) regards kama and iwapo as semantically equivalent. All of these 
studies classify iwapo and kama as realis-marking conjunctions but gloss iwapo variously as ‘if’, 
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‘when’, and ‘even’. Only Saloné (1983a, b) argues that these meanings are context-sensitive 
(e.g., pragmatic implicatures), as seen in other Bantu languages (cf. Mwamzandi 2017).  
 This tangled web of perspectives on the semantics of the conditional conjunctions 
highlights the need for further corpus analyses. Even so, these open issues need not preclude 
using examples of the four conjunctions to illustrate the roles of modal stance and context-
sensitivity in delimiting conditional interpretations. Consequently, this section (§4.2) discusses 
the four conjunctions along with the conditional prefix ki-. 
4.2.2 ki- conditional prefix 
The ki- conditional prefix denotes a high or neutral probability (i.e., P ³ 0.5; see §3.3.2.1, Table 
7; see also Mwamzandi 2017: 157), depending on contextual constraints and agentive stances. In 
(17), the speakers pairs ki- with the deontic stance marker (deontic modal verb) lazima ‘must’ to 
depict the addressee’sa socio-cultural obligations to repay a debtd to a creditorc: 
(17)  Mwamzandi (2017: 163) 
 
 [U-ki-w-a na denid]P, [lazima u-lip-e]Q. 
 2SG-COND-be-FV with 5debt must 2SG-pay-SBJV 
 ‘[If youa have a debtd]P, [youa must pay]Q.’ 
 
 
 
Q
 Addresseea Having 
Debtd (t0)
Referent(s): a, c, d 
SOC : ?c >> ?a
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, c, d, s
P/N : u- [ 2SG ]
MOD : deontic : +s >> +a Paying d to c : lazima [ must ]
SOC : ?s >> ?a
Addresseea Paying Debtd to Creditorc (t1)
Referent(s): a, c, d
DISC : -e [ SBJV ]
P/N : u- [ 2SG ]
MOD : dyn : +a >> +a Paying d to c
SOC : +a >> +c
a Not Having d (t1)
Referent(s): a, c, d 
SOC : +c >> +a
CS
c Decision: 
Cancel d?
No (P = 0.9)
Figure 13.  The ki- conditional prefix indicating a P-value (P = 0.9) for the protasis (P) (Mwamzandi 2017: 163). 
Referent(s): a = addressee, c = creditor, d = debt, s = speaker
c Cancels d of a (t1)
Referent(s): a, c, d 
SOC : +c >> +a
Yes (P = 0.1)
P
Chapter 4: Data analysis and findings  59 
 
The speakers in Figure 13 for (17) above insists (positive deontic stance, P FoR) that the 
addresseea lazima ‘must’ pay (volition, positive dynamic stance, lower left FoR). Again, 
whenever data expresses a deictic property, it appears row-finally (§3.3.1.3). A highly unlikely 
(P = 0.9) decision of the creditorc to cancel the debtd (positive social stance) would suffice 
(realization arrow, bottom right) for the addresseea not having the debtd. This result also obtains 
(realization arrow, bottom center) when the addresseea has the ability and willingness (positive 
dynamic stance) to pay and then does so.  
 Mwamzandi (2017: 163) explains that the realis protasis in (17) is a sufficient condition 
for the speaker’ss apodosis speech act of commanding the addresseea to pay. Even though speech 
acts are not the focus of this study, Mwamzandi’s observation nevertheless highlights the fact 
that a sufficient condition can obtain on the ‘higher’ level of pragmatics instead of the ‘lower’ 
level of propositional logic where the T-value of a P proposition suffices for the T-value of a Q 
proposition. A bare propositional reading of (17) denudes the expression of embodied, ‘real-
world’ but unmentioned contextual contingencies such as the creditorc cancelling the debtd.  
 As the FoR network for (18) below, Figure 14 below shows how embodied socio-cultural 
perspectives again influence the ki- P-value as the speakers expresses a high probability (P=0.8) 
of the realis P FoR resulting in the realis Q FoR: 
(18)  Mwamzandi (2017: 162)  
 
 [Tu-ki-som-a]P, [tu-ta-erevu-k-a]Q. 
 1PL-COND.IMPV-study-FV 1PL-FUT-clever-STV-FV 
 ‘[If we{s, a} get educated]P, [we{s, a} will become wiser]Q.’ 
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The speaker’ss positive epistemic stance toward [s B1] (background belief) and [s B2] 
(foreground belief) expresses socio-cultural expectations of education. The [s B1] flow arrow 
points to the ‘Being wise’ simple state that is bidirectionally linked (conceptually correlated) 
with the ‘Being educated’ simple state (bottom left). This link models [s B1] that being educated 
conceptually correlates with being wise. Based on [s B1] and [s B2], the speakers desires 
(positive deontic stance, left FoR) to be educated by studying with the addressee(s)a (P FoRs). 
While including all agentive beliefs in a diagram is impossible, including the [s B1] background 
belief in Figure 14 illustrates the cognitive principle that agentive beliefs about perceived or 
imagined FoRs inform and guide agentive desires. These modal stances are cognitively upstream 
of the sufficient condition between the P and Q FoRs. 
  The analysis above of the sufficient condition (causal relation) obtaining between FoRs 
in the P swim lane contrasts with a monotonic analysis of (18) in which the T-value of P suffices 
for the T-value of Q on the level of propositional logic (see §3.3.2.1). This analysis seems 
plausible only if one takes the non-monotonist view that the P and Q propositions are atomic, 
namely, that both are semantically primitive with no internal semantic components (e.g., aspect 
Q
{s, a} Educated (t2)
Referent(s): a, s
P/N : tu- [ 1PL ]
{s, a} Wiser (t2)
Referent(s): a, s
P/N : tu- [ 1PL ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
TEMP : aspect : -k- [ STV ]
Speakers and Addresseea  
Being Educated (t1)
Referent(s): a, s
TEMP : aspect : ki- [ IMPV ]
Being wise
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, s
P/N : tu- [ 1PL ]
MOD : epist : +s >> {[s B1], [s B2]}
MOD : deontic : +s >> +{s, a} Being 
Educated
SOC : +s >> +a
B
Being educated
Figure 14.  The ki- conditional prefix indicating a P-value (P = 0.8) for the protasis (P) (Mwamzandi 2017: 162).
Referent(s): a = addressee, s = speaker
[s B1] (P = 0.9)
[s B2] (P = 0.8)
P
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markers). This presupposition ignores the internal temporal structure of P and the internal 
sufficient condition between the left and right FoRs.  
The embodied experience of acquiring first-hand or second-hand knowledge about 
agentive action patterns across time indexes informs choices of grammatical constituents to 
convey expected T-values or P-values. Example (19) below involves both value types, with ki- 
grammatically indicating a P-value based on knowledge about an Agent’s behavior patterns: 
(19)  Mwamzandi (2017: 162) 
 
 Kwa  kawaida Lukova ha-kuwa na tabiat ya ku-andika 
 17of normally Lukoval NEG-AUX with 9behavior 9of INF-write 
 andik-a baruab. [A-ki-andika]P, [ ku-na jamboj]Q.   
 write-FV 10letter 3SG-COND-write 17LOC16-with 5something  
 ‘Normally, Lukoval would not write (lit., ‘is not with the behaviort of writing) lettersb.    
[If hel writes (a letter)b]P, [there is an issuej]Q.’ 
 
 
 
 
16 In Bantu languages such as Swahili, locative markers such as ku- can have a non-topographic, abstract meaning 
that denotes possession (Ziervogel 2007 [1971]). 
Q
Lukoval Writing a Letterb (tn)
Referent(s): b, l
P/N : a- [ 3SG ]
MOD : dyn : +l >> +l Writing a b
Lukova's l Normal 
Behaviort (tn)
Referent(s): l, t
Lukoval Possesses Issuej (tn)
Referent(s): j, l
SOC : ?l  >> ?j
Lukoval Writing a Letterb (tn)
Referent(s): b, l
MOD : dyn : +l >> +l Writing a b
l Decision: 
Write?
Yes
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, s
MOD : epist : +s >> [s B]
B
[s B] (P = 0.7)
unspecified frequency
Q
Lukoval Possesses Issuej (tn)
Referent(s): j, l
DISC : ku- [ 17LOC ]
SOC : ?l  >> ?j
No
CS
Figure 15.  The ki- conditional prefix indicating a P-value (P = 0.7) for the protasis (P) (Mwamzandi 2017: 162).
 
Referent(s): a = addressee, b = letter, j = issue, l = Lukova, s = speaker, t = behavior
P
P
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In (19) above Figure 15, the speakers uses ki- and adverbial qualifier kawaida ‘normally’ to 
express strong confidence (positive epistemic stance, P = 0.7) of [s B] that Lukoval does not 
usually (i.e., tn as ongoing time interval, see §3.3.1.2, S-7) exhibit the tabiat ‘behavior’ (lit., ‘is 
not with the behavior’) of writing letters. This claim is based on the speaker’ss contextual 
knowledge (inheritance arrow) as indicated by the optional FoR (aggregation arrow, upper right).  
 The information flow between FoRs downstream of the Present Reality FoR in Figure 15 
is unspecified for time index(es) (non-temporal) as (tn) in each FoR indicates. The sequence 
flows through the l Decision node to two alternative scenarios. Each realization-flow arrow 
between the P FoRs and Q FoRs in the realis (left) and irrealis (right) scenarios indicates that 
the Q FoR social stance values of Lukoval suffice for hisl corresponding dynamic stance 
(volition) values in the corresponding P FoR. Further context is needed to ascertain whether or 
not Lukoval desires (positive deontic stance) or feels obligated (positive deontic status) to write 
letters, so these details are not shown in Figure 15. 
 Direct observations of FoRs about states-of-being or events are not required to posit P-
values for them in hypothetical scenarios; elements of encyclopedic knowledge are often grounds 
for doing so (cognitive accessibility, §3.3.2). For instance, the speakers in (20) need not have 
encountered a mtumwam ‘slave’ to have cognitive access to a slave’sm experiential context: 
(20)  Saloné (1983a: 316)  
 
 [Mtumwam a-ki-tak-a ku-ondoka-na na minyororo ya 
 1slave 3SG-COND.IMPV-want-FV INF-leave-RECP with 4chain 4of 
 unyonyajiu na ukandamizajio ili a-pet-e uhuruf halisi]P, 
 11exploitation CONJ 11oppression so.that 3SG-get-SBJV 11freedom real 
 [i-na-m-lazimu a-fany-e mapambano]Q.     
 9-PRS-3SG-be.necessary 3SG-do-SBJV 5struggle     
 ‘[If a slavem wants to rid himselfm of hism chains of exploitationu and oppressiono to gain 
real freedomf]P, [hem must strugglet]Q.’ 
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The speakers and addresseea in (20) and Figure 16 share encyclopedic knowledge that a slavem 
being socially proximal to unyonyajiu ‘exploitation,’ and ukandamizajio ‘oppressiono’ while 
being socially distal from uhuruf ‘freedom’ (negative social status, bottom left FoR) makes hism 
desire (positive deontic stance) to be free (P FoR) highly probable (P = 0.9) as denoted by the ki- 
prefix in the protasis. In the bottom right FoR, a highly unlikely (P = 0.1) decision of a [mmiliki 
wa mtumwa]i ‘slave owner’ as a contextually required referent to set the slavem (positive social 
stance) free would suffice for the slavem being free.  
 The slave’sm mapambanot ‘struggle’ (however defined) is an instance of positive deontic 
stance, Q FoR) at t1 is a necessary condition (composition arrow, bottom right) for the t2 FoR in 
which the slavem is free—the embodied state-of-being for which hem longs (positive deontic 
stance) at t0. While hism strugglet is not a sufficient condition for this outcome, it is a necessary 
(lazimu ‘be necessary’) condition (composition arrow between P and Q FoRs) for it. Various 
scenarios could result from the slave’sm struggle such as slave running away secretly or openly 
Q
m(k) Wants Freedomf (tn to t0)
Referent(s): f, i, k, m, o, u  
DISC : -e [ SBJV ]
P/N : a- [ 3SG ]
TEMP : aspect : -ki- [ IPFV ]
MOD : deontic : +m(k) >> +m(k) Wants 
to Be Free From {u, o} : -taka [ want ]
SOC : ?i >> ?m(k), ?m(k), >> ?i :                   
unyonyaji [ 11exploitation ],            
ukandamizaji [ 11oppression ] 
Slave'sm Freedomf 
From {u, o} (t2)
Referent(s): f, m, o, u  
SOC : +m : uhuru              
[ 11freedom]
Slave'sm Strugglet (t1)
Referent(s): f, i, k, m, o, u  
DISC : i- [ 9 ], -e [ SBJV ]
P/N : m- [ 3SG ], a- [ 3SG ]
TEMP : tense : -na- [ PRS ]
MOD : deontic : +m(k) >> +m(k) 
Strugglingt : -lazimu [ be.necessary ],               
mapambano [ 5struggle ]
SOC : ?i >> ?m(k), ?m(k), >> ?i 
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, s
MOD : epist : +s >> [s B]
B
i Decision:        
Set m free?
Yes (P = 0.1)
Figure 16.  The ki- conditional prefix indicating a P-value (P = 0.9) for the protasis (P) (Saloné 1983a: 316). 
Referent(s): a = addressee, f = freedom, m = slave, i = [slave owner], k = slaves, s = speaker, t = struggle, o = oppression,             
u = exploitation
[Slave Owner]i Keeping Slavesk
Referent(s): i, j, k
MOD : deontic : +s >> +s Keeping k
MOD : dyn : +s >> +s Keeping k
SOC : ?i >> ?m(k), ?m(k) >> ?i 
[s B]       
(P = 0.9)
No (P = 0.9)
P
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fighting for freedom. However, adding FoRs for all scenarios is not necessary since mental 
spaces are not ‘possible worlds’; they are meant to represent what is asserted and implied (§3.2). 
The Exit node terminating the ‘No’ scenario (P = 0.9) denotes the ‘dead-end’ outcome of the 
slave’sa condition remaining unchanged without a struggle. 
4.2.3 ikiwa conditional conjunction 
This section re-analyzes the ikiwa conditional construction as a truth-functional constituent 
(contra Mwamzandi 2017, see §4.2.1) from a Construction Grammar (CG) perspective (§3.2). 
Also, examples in this section are discussed in greater depth than others in this chapter in order 
to develop several concepts (e.g., social stance, social status). Also, in CG, it is not always the 
case that one lexeme or morpheme grammatically encodes a semantic function (e.g., P-value). 
For instance, the fact that scalar realis-irrealis (P-values) apply to a construction when ikiwa is 
present does not entail that the P-value is the semantic contribution of ikiwa. The functions of 
other constituents which have semantic scope over the T-value of ikiwa must also be considered.  
  In (21), ikiwa appears in a construction that as a whole denotes a high-probability belief:  
(21)  Mwamzandi (2017: 171) 
 
 [Ikiwa serikalis i-ta-pata hasarah hiyo]P, [i-ta-kuwa i-me-tokana na 
 CONJ 9government 9-FUT-get 9loss 9REF 9-FUT-AUX 9-PRF-cause CONJ 
 uwezou mdogo wa menejimentim]Q.       
 14skill small 14of 6management       
 ‘[If the governments will get that lossh (mentioned previously)]P, [ith will be because of 
poor skillsu of the [management team]m]Q.’ 
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Mwamzandi analyzes ikiwa as being the sole constituent indicating probability (P-value) in (21). 
However, doing so overlooks the semantic scope of the P-value-reducing ta- future marker over 
ikiwa that results from embodied, ‘real-world’ limitations on human knowledge of the future. 
The writerw in Figure 17 above takes a negative social stance toward the menejimentim 
‘[management team]’ regarding a previously mentioned potential hasarah ‘loss’ (Context swim 
lane). Herw assertion is not that the future scenario is likely to occur (P = 0.7), even though this is 
her background belief ([s B]) which is cognitively upstream of the proposition; as an embodied 
agent, the writerw cannot know what will occur. Instead, shew uses ikiwa ‘it being’ (True, P = 1.0) 
to assert that a refusal (negative dynamic stance, Q FoR) of the [management team]m to develop 
the requisite financial skillsh will suffice for the serikalis ‘government’ experiencing the lossh (P 
FoR, t2). The flow-realization arrow indicating this sufficient condition obtaining from P FoR to 
the Q FoR represents the phrase i-me-tokana na ‘9-PRF-cause by.’ Notice that it obtains in the 
opposite direction (Q FoR®P FoR) as in the modus ponens form but not on the level of 
propositional logic (i.e., P®Q). Instead, it obtains between pragmatic deictic properties on the 
level of embodied FoRs. 
Q
Governments Experiences Lossh (t2)
Referent(s): h, s
DISC : i- [ 9 ], hiyo [ 9REF ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
Potential Lossh Mentioned (t?1)
Referent(s): h
[Managment Team]m Having Skillsu (t1)
Referent(s): m, u
DISC :  i- [ 9 ]
TEMP : aspect : -me- [ PRF ]
MOD : dyn : +m >> +m Having u
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s):  r, m, w
MOD : epist : +w >> [w B]
SOC : ?w >> ?m : uwezo mdogo [ 14skill small ] B
[Managment Team]m
Governments[w B] (P = 0.7)
CS
Context
Figure 17.  The ikiwa conditional conjunction indicating a T-value (True) for the protasis (P) in a construction expressing a 
P-value (P = 0.7) as a whole (Mwamzandi 2017: 171).
Referent(s): h = loss, m = [management team], r = reader, s = government, u = skills, w = writer
P
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 Mwamzandi (2017: 157–158) insists that no examples of the four lexemes (including 
ikiwa) in his analysis have a necessary/True interpretation (T = True, P = 1.0) in his data set from 
the HCS 1.0. However, his example of ikiwa below in (22) is not probabilistic and thus must be 
truth-functional if a condition obtains between the protasis and apodosis:  
(22)  Mwamzandi (2017: 163) 
 
 [Ikiwa mtotom huyo a-ta-tosheleza vigezov vyetu  vya 
 CONJ 1child 1REF 3SG-FUT-fulfill 8prerequisites 1PL.POSS  8of 
 utoaji wa misaadaf]P, [basi tu-ta-m-saidia kadri ya uwezou 
 14giving 14of 4aid then 1PL-FUT-3SG-help 9extent 9of 14capability 
 wa chamac chetu]Q.   
 14of 7organization 1PL.POSS    
 ‘[If the childm meets all the prerequisitesv wec have set for giving [financial aid]f]P, 
[then wec will help himm to the best of ourc organization’sc abilityu]Q.’ 
 
 
 
The speakers in Figure 18 informs the addresseea of a Q FoR realization at t2 if the P FoR is 
realis at t1. However, even if the P FoR is realis at t1 (left), the speakers cannot guarantee the 
financial need will be met because of the organization’sc fiscal limitations. Accordingly, the 
[organization representative]s takes a neutral social stance (upper left FoR) toward the addresseea 
Q
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, c, f, m, s   
MOD : deontic : =s >> =c Gives f
MOD : dyn : =s >> =c Gives f
SOC : =s >> ={m, a}
Childm Meets Prerequisitesv (t1)
Referent(s): m, v
DISC : huyo [ 1REF ]
P/N : a- [ 3SG ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
MOD : dyn : +m >> +m Meets v : tosheleza [ fulfill ]
SOC : ?m
Organizationc Gives m [Financial Aid]f (t2)
Referent(s): c, f, m
P/N : tu- [ 1PL ], -m- [ 3SG ], chetu [ 1PL.POSS ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
MOD : deontic: +c >> +c Gives m f :-saida [ help ]
MOD : dyn: +c >> +c Gives m f : uwezo [ ability ]
SOC : +c >> +m
c Sets [Financial Aid]f Prerequisitesv (t?1)
Referent(s): c, f, v
P/N : vyetu [ 1PL.POSS ]
MOD : deontic : +c >> +c Sets f v
MOD : dyn : +c >> +c Sets f v
P
v met by m?
CS
unspecified 
outcome
Yes
No
Figure 18.  The ikiwa conditional conjunction indicating a T-value (True) for the protasis (P) (Mwamzandi 2017: 163). 
Referent(s): a = addressee, c = organization, f = [financial aid], m = child, s = speaker, u = ability, v = prerequisites
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and childm by not assuring that the need will certainly (P = 1.0) be met. Nevertheless, as seen 
previously in (21), the protasis in (22) contains a ta- future marker that has semantic scope over 
ikiwa. However, the positive deontic stance of the chamac ‘organization’ toward setting the 
vigezov ‘prerequisites’ (contextual FoR) is cognitively upstream of ikiwa and ta- (P FoR). Put 
differently, the P-value of the likelihood of P sufficing for Q is probabilistically qualified by the 
cognitively upstream P-value of the speaker’s belief. As a result, this deontic stance value 
cancels the P-value-reducing influence of ta-.  
 Moreover, a sufficient condition obtains between the childm meeting the prerequisitesv 
(positive dynamic stance, P FoR) and the organization’sc positive deontic status (obligated) and 
its positive dynamic stance (Q FoR) (willingness) toward giving [financial aid]f. Neither (a) the 
child’sm efforts (positive dynamic stance) toward meeting prerequisitesv (e.g., academic 
excellence) nor (b) the child’sm negative social status (financial need) alone suffices for the 
organizationc doing so. This plausible hypothesis builds on the presupposition that if there were 
only one prerequisitev, it would correlate with either (a) or (b). A contextual FoR representing the 
addresseea choosing (volition, positive dynamic stance) to apply for [financial aid]f is not shown 
in Figure 18 because it is not clear whether or not it has already occurred. This event would also 
a be contributing condition—and perhaps a necessary condition, depending on whether applying 
is a required—for a realis Q FoR, while not being sufficient for it.  
 Mwamzandi also uses (22) to argue that ikiwa appears more commonly than ki- in 
answers to polar (‘Yes’, True; ‘No’, False) questions, which implies that ikiwa indicates logical 
inter-clausal relationships. He also claims that ki- tends to denote temporal relationships (e.g., 
time index progression) more often than does ikiwa (Mwamzandi (2017: 163–164). However, 
these claims do not match the temporal succession of events (i.e., sequential time indexes) in 
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(22) above and next in (23), nor the logical-only succession (unspecified time indexes (tn)) in 
(19). In any event, distinguishing ki- and ikiwa in this way seems unnecessary; logical succession 
can flow in tandem with temporal succession, as (22) shows (see Contini-Morava 1991).  
 As an example of another constituent having semantic scope over ikiwa and reducing the 
constructional True (P = 1.0) value, the modal adverb labda ‘perhaps’ in (23) below encodes 
positive epistemic stance concerning a Q FoR with a ‘just possibly True’ (P = 0.6) realization: 
(23)  Polomé (1967: 153) 
 
 [Ikiwa mtotom hu-cheza mlangod-ni pa [mshoni viatu]i]P,   
 CONJ 1child HAB-play 3door-LOC 16of 1maker 8shoes   
 [labda a-ta-taka ku-m-saidia baadaye]Q.     
 perhaps 3SG-FUT-want INF-3SG-help next     
 ‘[If the childm habitually plays at the shoemaker’si doord]P, [perhaps he’llm want to help 
himi next]Q.’ 
 
 
 
In Figure 19 for (23), the childm is indifferent (neutral deontic and dynamic stances, neutral 
social stance, context FoR) to helping the shoemakers. The speakers speculates that labda 
‘perhaps’ the childm habitually (hu- HAB) (tn time index, §3.3.1.2, S-7) being topographically 
CS
Q
 Childm Habitually Playing                                     
at Shoemaker'si Doord (tn)
Referent(s): d, i, m
TEMP : aspect : hu- [ HAB ]
TOPO : +{m, i, d} : -ni [ LOC ]
MOD : deontic : +m >> +m Habitually Playing at i's d
SOC : =m >> =i
Childm Wanting to Help Shoemakeri (tn+1)
Referent(s): i, m
P/N : a- [ 3SG ], -m- [ 3SG ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ] : baadaye [ next ]
TOPO : +{m, i}
MOD : deontic : +m >> +m Wanting to Help i : 
-taka [ want ]
MOD : dyn : +m >> +m Helping i
SOC : +m >> +i
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, s
MOD : epist : +s >> [s B] : 
labda [ perhaps ]B
 Childm Habitually Playing at i's Doord (tn)
Referent(s): d, i, m
TOPO : +{d, i, m}
MOD : deontic : =m >> =m Habitually Playing at i's d
MOD : dyn : =m >> =m Habitually Playing at i's d
SOC : =m >> =s
[s B] (P = 0.6)
Figure 19.  The ikwa conditional conjunction indicating a T-value (True) for the protasis (P) in a construction expressing a 
P-value (P=0.6) as a whole (Polomé 1967: 153).
Referent(s): a = addressee, d = door, i = shoemaker, m = child, s = speaker
P
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proximal to the shoemaker’si doord (flow line to TOPO line, P FoR) will be a contributing 
condition (aggregation, small head arrow, bottom center) for the childm wanting to help the 
shoemakeri (positive deontic, dynamic, and social stances, Q FoR, tn+1). The essential 
generalization to draw from (23) is that T-values do not obtain for apodoses that contain modal 
adverbs (labda ‘perhaps’), verbs, and other constituents that express uncertainty and thus reduce 
the P-value. In contrast, the protasis-introducing ikiwa only depicts the P FoR as realis (True) in 
the scenario, not the probability of the Q FoR following from it. 
 Contextual factors such as the high emotive valency of interwoven socio-political 
contexts and their embodied participants rule out any probability less than P = 1.0 (True, 
certainty) for ikiwa in (24) below. Also, a deontic stance value cancels the P-value-reducing 
influence of ta-. The writerw quotes [Ibrahim Kaduma]k, a Tanzanian spokesperson, who 
commented on Tanzaniant international relations the previous day: 
(24)  Musyoki & Murphy (1985: 17, 111) 
 
 “Tanzaniat i-na-li-ona sualas la wa-Palestinap kuwa ni sualas la 
 Tanzania 9-PRS-5-see 5issue 5of 3PL-Palestinians CONJ AUX 5issue 5of 
  
 ukomboziu, na [[mapambano dhidi ya ukoloni katika Afrikaa]m 
 14liberation CONJ 6struggles against of 14colonialism PREP Africa 
 
 ha-ya-ta-kuwa na maanan]Q [ikiwa Tanzaniat i-ta-fumba macho 
 NEG-9-FUT-AUX with 9meaning CONJ Tanzania 9-FUT-close 6eyes 
 
 [watu wengine dunia-ni wa-na-po-kandamizwa]o”]P, [Waziri wa 
 2people 2other 5world-LOC 3PL-PRS-16REL-oppressed 5Minister 1of 
 
 Biashara]w, Ndugu [Ibrahim Kaduma]k a-li-sema mji-ni hapah jana. 
 9Trade 9comrade Ibrahim Kaduma 3SG-PST-say 3cityq-LOC 16PROX yesterday 
 
 “Tanzaniat considers the issues of the Palestiniansp as an issues of liberationu, and  
[[the struggle against colonialism in Africaa]m will be without meaningn]Q  
[if Tanzaniat closes itst eyes while [other peoples of the world are being oppressed]o”]P,  
said [Minister of Trade]l, Comrade [Ibrahim Kaduma]k, here in townq yesterday.’ 
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According to the writerr in (24) and Figure 20, Kadumak views the [Israeli government]i within 
the international context (upper right swim lane and embedded middle right FoR) as a 
colonialistc power who is oppressing the Palestiniansp. The writer’sw combining of the reporting 
verb stem sema ‘say’ with the past marker li-, brackets the T-value of Kaduma’sk views within 
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): k, l, r, t, w
TEMP : tense : -li- [ PST ]
MOD : epist : +w >> +k(l) Representing t
Tanzaniat Ignoring o (t0)
Referent(s): o, t
DISC : i- [ 9 ], -po- [ 16REL ]
P/N : wa- [ 3PL ]
TEMP : tense : -na- [ PRS ]
TOPO : +{t, o} : -ni [ LOC ]
MOD : dyn : +t >> +t Ignoring o
SOC : ?t >> ?o : fumba macho          
[ close 6eyes ]
k(l) Representing Tanzaniat (t?1)
Referent(s): c, k, l, o, p, s, t, u, q
P/N : wa- [ 3PL ]
TEMP : tense : -na- [ PRS ]
TOPO : +{k(l), w} : -ni [ LOC ]: hapa [ 16PROX ]
MOD : epist : +k(l) >> [k(l) B]
MOD : deontic : +{k(l) , t} >> +{k(l), t} Acting 
with Meaning Toward o
SOC : +{k(l), t} >> +{p, o}, ?k(l) >> ?{c, i} :              
ukombozi [ 14liberation ]
f Struggling Against c (tn to t?1)
Referent(s): a, c, f, i
TOPO : +{a, f, c} : katika [ PREP ]
MOD : dyn : +f >> +f Struggling 
Against c : mapambano [ 6struggles ]
SOC : ?f >> ?c
c Oppressing a (tn to t?1)
Referent(s): a, c, f
TOPO : +{a, c, f}
MOD : dyn : +c >> +c Oppressing a
SOC : ?c >> ?f : ukoloni [ 14colonialism ]
i(c) Oppressing                    
p(o) (tn to t?1)
Referent(s): c, i, p, o
MOD : dyn : +i(c)>> +i(c) 
Oppressing p(o)
SOC : ?i(c)>> ?p(o)
Q
t Acting with Meaningn   
Toward o (t1)
Referent(s): c, h, o, t  
DISC : -ya- [ 9 ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
MOD : epist : +t >> +o 
Struggling Against c
MOD : dyn : +t >> +t Acting 
with Meaning Toward o
SOC : +t >> +o : ha- [ NEG ], 
maana [ 9meaning ], 
-kandamizwa [ oppressed ]
CS
o Struggling Against 
c (tn to t?1)
Referent(s): c, o
MOD : dyn : +o >> +o 
Struggling Against c
SOC : ?o >> ?c
  c Oppressing o    
(tn to t?1)
Referent(s): c, o
MOD : dyn : +c >> +c 
Oppressing o
SOC : ?c >> ?o
International Context
Africaa Context
[k(l) B] (P = 1.0)
t Acting with Meaningn Toward o (t1)
Referent(s): h, o, m, t
MOD : epist : +t >> +o Struggling Against c
MOD : dyn : +t >> +t Acting with Meaning Toward o
SOC : +t >> +o 
B
CS
MCA
Figure 20.  The ikiwa conditional conjunction indicating a T-value (True) for the protasis (P) (Musyoki & Murphy 183: 17, 111).
Referent(s): a = Africa, c = [colonialist power(s)], f = Africans, i = [Israeli Government], k = [Ibrahim Kaduma], l = [Minister of 
Trade], m = [struggle against colonialism in Africa], n = meaning, r = reader, s = issue, t = Tanzania, o = [Other Oppressed 
Peoples in the World], p = Palestians, q = city, u = liberation, w = writer
CS
CS
P
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the reported speech. This illocutionary strategy allows the writerw to avoid expressing support or 
non-support for the truth of what was said (see Ivanova 2013; Massamba 1986). The context 
scope (CS) inheritance arrow from FoR below the MOD row in Present Reality FoR indicates 
the writer’sr ‘given’, experiential knowledge of Kadumak, speaking. 
 As for Kadumak, he believes (positive epistemic stance, upper left FoR) that the ongoing 
(tn to t–1) Palestinian-Israeli conflict (sualas ‘issue’) and the Africana struggles (mapambanom 
‘struggles’) against colonialismc are contextually comparable, a notion which entails the mutual 
cognitive accessibility (MCA) (§3.3.2; Sergo & Thome 2005) of embodied states-of-being (e.g., 
being oppressed) experienced by Undergoers (i.e., Africansf, Palestiniansp) in the two contexts. 
This analogy between the two socio-political contexts is modelled by the bidirectional flow 
arrow between Africana Context swim lane and the International Context swim lane. 
 To set up this analogy, Kadumak shifts between socially proximal (e.g., agreeing) and 
socially distal (e.g., disagreeing) referents. Hek asserts that Tanzaniat ignoring (P FoR) the plight 
of [other oppressed peoples in the world]o would suffice for Tanzaniat acting dishonorably (ha- 
NEG + maana ‘honor’) (right FoR, Q swim lane). Kadumak strongly disapproves of this outcome 
(negative deontic stance), stating that Tanzaniat should not ignore (i-ta-fumba macho ‘9-FUT-
close eyes’) the shared experience of Africanss and [other oppressed peoples]o. In sum, the 
positive social stance of Tanzaniat (or at least of Kadumak) toward the Palestiniansp, ikiwa in (24) 
contextually frames the constructional interpretation as truth-functional; no P-value is in view. 
4.2.4 iwapo conditional conjunction 
As seen previously with ikiwa, the iwapo conditional conjunction consistently functions to 
denote T-values (truth-functionality). In (24), the clashing of agentive actions and deontic 
stances in a socio-political context evoked the use of a truth-functional conjunction; the 
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speaker’s purpose was to express the certainty of a future outcome given a specified agentive 
decision. This contextual template also applies to the construction with iwapo in (25): 
(25)  Saloné (1983b: 17) 
 
 [Mwenyekiti wa CCM]m, [Mwalimu Nyerere]n a-me-sisitiza jana kwamba 
 1chairman 1of CCM 1teacher Nyerere 3SG-PRF-insist yesterday that 
 
 [Tanzaniat i-ta-m-piga sana fashisti [Idi Amin]a ndani ya Ugandau]Q  
 Tanzania 9-FUT-3SG-hit hard fascist Idi Amin inside of Uganda  
 
 [iwapo a-ta-jaribu tena ku-i-tumia Tanzaniat kama dirisha la ku-tolea 
 CONJ 3SG-FUT-try again INF-9-use Tanzania as 5window 5of INF-vent 
 
 matatizop yake ya ndani]P.        
 6problems his of inside 
 
       
 ‘The [chairperson of CCM]m, [Mwalimu Nyerere]n insisted yesterday that [Tanzaniat will 
beat fascist [Idi Amin]a hard inside of Ugandau]Q [if hea tries again to use Tanzaniat as a 
window out of which to vent hisa internal problemsp.’ 
 
 
 
[Idi Amin]a Using t (t1)
Referent(s): a, t
DISC : i- [ 9 ]
P/N : a- [ 3SG ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
MOD : deontic : +a >> +a Using t : 
-jaribu [ try ]
MOD : dyn : +a >> +a Using t 
SOC : ?a >> ?t : -tumia [ use ]
a Using t (t?2)
Referent(s): a, t
MOD : deontic : +a 
>> +a Using t
SOC : ?a >> ?t
Tanzaniat Defeating [Idi Amin]a          
in Ugandau (t2)
Referent(s): a, t, u
DISC : i- [ 9 ]
P/N : -m- [ 3SG ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
TOPO : +{a, t, u} : ndani [ inside ]
MOD : deontic : +t >> +t Defeating a In u
MOD : dyn : +t >> +t Defeating a In u
SOC : ?t >> ?a : -piga [ hit ], sana [ hard ]
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): w, n, m, a, r
MOD : epist : +w >> +n(m) Warning a
n(m) Warning a (t?1)
Referent(s): a, n, m, t
P/N : a- [ 3SG ]
TEMP : aspect : -me- [ PFT ]
MOD : deontic : +n(m) >> +n(m) 
Warning a, ?n(m) >> +a Using t
SOC : ?n(m) >> ?a : sisitiza [ insist ]
[Idi Amin]a Using Tanzaniat (t1)
Referent(s): a, t
MOD : deontic : +a >> +a Using t
SOC : ?a >> ?t 
a's Problemsp in Ugandau (t1)
Referent(s): a, p, u
TOPO : +{a, p, u} : ndani [ inside ]
CS
a Decision
Context
No
CS
Yes
Figure 21.  The iwapo conditional conjunction indicating a T-value (True) for the protasis (P) (Saloné 1983b: 17). 
Referent(s): a = [Idi Amin], i = [Chama Cha Mapinduzi], m = [chairman of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)], n = [Mwalimu Nyerere], 
p = problems, r = reader, t = Tanzania, u = Uganda, w = writer
CS
Q
P
Chapter 4: Data analysis and findings  73 
 
In (25) and Figure 21, [Mwalimu Nyerere]n, as the [chairperson of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM)]m political party in Tanzaniat, uses iwapo to assert that [Idi Amin]a resolutely using 
(positive dynamic stance, negative social stance, P FoR) Tanzaniat again as a socio-political 
victim will suffice for Tanzaniat defeating hima (positive deontic and dynamic stances, negative 
social stance, Q FoR). The -piga sana ‘hit hard’ verb phrase reflects Nyerere’sn warning 
(positive deontic stance and negative social stance) and characterizes Tanzania’st predicted 
defeat of Amina. From Nyerere’sn perspective, while Amina could independently decide to 
abstain from reckless military actions within Tanzania’st borders, the notorious idiosyncrasies of 
hisa embodied psychological traits rule out this scenario (bottom left FoR and Exit node). Hence, 
as seen in (21)–(23) with ikiwa, the semantic scope of the ta- future marker over iwapo is 
cancelled by contextual factors cognitively upstream of iwapo and ta-. Also, a biconditional 
interpretation of (25) above disregards situational contingencies. For instance, Tanzaniat may 
choose to defeat Amina for another reason. The contextual details of this alternative ‘No’ 
scenario (flow arrow, irrealis FoR, and Exit node) are unspecified.  
 Within academic debate as another rhetorical genre, iwapo in (26) is truth-functional: 
(26)  Hurskainen (2016) 
 
 Msimamom na madaia ya baadhi ya hawa [“Washairi wa Kisasa”]i 
 3position CONJ 6assertions of some of 2PROX 2poets 2of modern 
 
 u-me-potoka, kwani [iwapo tu-ta-ya-kubali]P [[i-ta-kuwa tu-me-sema]Q1 
 14-PRF-mistaken for COND 1PL-FUT-6-accept 9-FUT-AUX 1PL-PRF-say 
 
 kwamba Waswahilis, au [makabila mengine ya Kiafrika]t kwa ujumla, na wa 
 SBJV Swahili CONJ 6tribes 6other of African 17of 14totality CONJ 1of 
 
 hasa yale ya Kibantub, haya-kuwa na [u-tanzu wa ushairi katika 
 especially 6DIST of Bantu 6PROX-AUX with 11-genre 11of 11poetry PREP 
 
 fasihi]u y-ao kabla ya kuja kwa Waarabuk katika [Pwani ya 
 9literature 9POSS-3PL before of 15arrival 15of 2Arabs PREP 9coast of 
 
Chapter 4: Data analysis and findings  74 
 
 Afrika ya Mashariki]]p— [jamboj amba-lo si-kweli kabisa,]Q2 kwani 
 Africa of eastern 5matter which-5REL NEG-true completely because 
 
 [historia ya asili ya ushairi wa Kiswahili]h ha-i-ta-kubali. 
 9history of 9origin of 11poetry 11of Swahili NEG-9-FUT-accept 
         
CONTEXT: 
PROTASIS (P): 
‘The positionm and assertionsa of some of these [“Modern Poets”]i are 
mistaken, for [if we{w, r} accept them{m, a}]P,  
  
APODOSIS (Q1): [[we{w, r} will have posited]Q1 
  
BACKGROUND/ 
(False  
Conclusion)j: 
that the Swahilis, or [other African tribes]t in general, and especially those of 
the Bantub, did not have a [genre of poetry in their{b, s, t} oral literature]u before 
the Arabsk arrived to the [coast of Eastern Africa]p — 
  
APODOSIS (Q2): [a conclusionj which is not entirely true]Q2 
  
CONTEXT: because the [historical origins of Swahili poetry]h will not accommodate itj.’  
 
 
{w, r} Positing j (t1)
Referent(s): j, r, w  
DISC : i- [ 9 ], -lo [ 5REL ]
P/N : tu- [ 1PL ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
TEMP : aspect : -me- [ PRF ]
MOD : epist : +{w, r} >> j : si-kweli [ NEG-true ]
Arabsw Arriving to p (t?2)
Referent(s): p, w
TOPO : +{w, p} : katika [ PREP ], 
-ja  [ arrive ]
{w, r} Accepting {m, a} (t1)
Referent(s): a, m, r, w
DISC : ya- [ 6 ]
P/N : tu- [ 1PL ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
MOD : epist : +{w, r} >> {m, a} : kubali 
[ accept ]
SOC : +{w, r} >> +i
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, i, m, r, w
MOD : epist : +w >> +Some i Believing {m, a}, +w >>   
{[w B1], [w B2]}, ?w >> j, : -potoka [mistaken ]
MOD : deontic : ?w >> ?i (Some) Believing {m, a}
SOC : ?w >> ?i Believing {m, a} 
i (Some) Believing {m, a} (t0)
Referent(s): a, i, m 
DISC : hawa [ 2PROX ], u- [ 14 ]
TEMP : aspect : -me- [ PRF ]
{s, t, b} Having u (t?3)
Referent(s):  b, s, t, u
P/N : y-ao [ 9POSS-3PL ]
DISC : yale [ 6DIST ], haya [ 6PROX ]
[History of Swahilis Poetryu]h       
(t?3 to t0)
Referent(s): h, s, u
P
Q
{w, r}   
Decision:          
j = True?
B
j (P = 1.0)
{s, t, b} Having u (t?3)
Referent(s): b, s, t, u
DISC : yale  [ 6DIST ], haya [ 6PROX ]
[False Conclusion]j
CS
B
No
Context
Yes
[w B2] 
(P = 0.0)
[w B1] (P = 1.0)
Figure 22.  The iwapo conditional conjunction indicating a T-value (True) for the protasis (P) (Hurskainen 2016).
Referent(s): a = assertions, b = Bantu, h = [historical origins of Swahili poetry], i = [Modern Poets], j = [false conclusion],             
k = Arabs, m = position (opinion), s = Swahili (tribe), t = [Other African tribes], p = [coast of Eastern Africa], u = [a genre of poetry 
in the literature], w = writer
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The writerw in (26) and Figure 22 expresses negative epistemic and social stances (upper left 
FoR) by (a) disagreeing with a subset (baadhi ‘some’) of the [Modern Poets]i, (b) making a 
counter-assertion (P and Q FoRs), and then (c) appealing to historical evidence as epistemic 
justification. The information flow in Figure 22 for (26) is both logical and temporal. Transitions 
between the me- perfective aspect marker, ta- future marker, and the kuwa stative verb (see 
Contini-Morava 1991), along with kabla ‘before’ and historia ‘history’ as temporally encoded 
lexemes map time-index changes throughout this iwapo-marked truth-functional construction.  
 The T-value contrasts between [w B1] and [w B2] as the writer’sw actual beliefs (center) 
and the hypothetical belief j (bottom right swim lane) which the writerw finds problematic exhibit 
EPISTEMIC INCONGRUENCE, viz., disagreement about what is the case in a FoR (Stivers, Mondada, 
& Steensig 2011; Hayano 2011; Vatanen 2018; García-Ramón 2018). The iwapo conjunction 
introduces a hypothetical future scenario in which the writerw and readersr believe that j is true, 
hence their{w, r} positive epistemic stance toward j and positive social stance toward the [Modern 
Poets]i (P FoR). The writerw then inserts a background relative clause between the first and 
second halves of the apodosis to summarize the positionm and assertionsa with which hew 
disagrees and believes as false (si-kweli NEG-true). The writerw expresses distal social deixis 
(negative social stance, upper left FoR) while excoriating the [Modern Poets]i for asserting the 
backgrounded relative clause as true, contrary to the historical record (second top right FoR). 
 Even though iwapo is clearly truth-functional in the previous two examples, other 
examples in the HCS 2.0 such as (27) below could be invoked as counterexamples: 
(27)  Hurskainen (2016) 
 
 [Iwapo Simbas i-ta-shinda katika fainalif]P, [i-ta-chukua moja kwa moja 
 COND Simba 9-FUT-win PREP 9final.game 9-FUT-take immediately 
 
 
 [kombe la ubingwa]k baada ya ku-li-twaa mara mbili mgongo-ni 
 5cup 5of 11championship after 9of INF-5-take 9time 9two 3back-LOC 
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 mwa wataniw wao wa-kubwa, Yangay]Q. 
 18of 2rival 3PL.POSS 2-big Yanga. 
 
 ‘[If the Simbas win in the [final game]f]P, [theys will immediately take the [championship 
cup]k after being back-beaten twice by theirs major rivalsw Yangay]Q.’ 
 
Once again, however, a reservation about the truth-functionality of a Swahili conditional 
conjunction can be jettisoned by taking a Construction Grammar (CG) approach; otherwise, 
iwapo itself seems to mark the indeterminate probability (P = 0.5). A CG analysis of (27) is that 
iwapo ‘in case (of)’ is truth-functional as also seen in (25)–(26), and, when it co-occurs with the 
ta- future marker in P, the P-value emerges from the constituent pairing unless upstream 
pragmatic deictic properties cancel the semantic scope of ta-, as in Figure 23 below for (27):17 
 
 
17 The reader may have noticed by this point that the example set for the conjunctions is skewed toward future-
oriented constructions. The non-representativeness of this approach notwithstanding, such examples better show the 
semantic scope of other constituents over the conjunctions—a crucial point in arguing for their truth-functionality. 
P
Simbas Win Finalf Against 
Yangay (t2)
Referent(s): f, s, y
DISC : -i [ 9 ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
TOPO : +{s, y} : katika [ PREP ]
MOD : dyn : +s >> +s Win f Over y
SOC : ?s >> ?y
Yangay  Win Second Game 
Against Simbas (t?1)
Referent(s): s, y
TOPO : +{s, y}
MOD : dyn : +y >> +y Win 
Second Game Against s
SOC : ?y >> ?s Simbas Take [Championship Cup]k (t3)
Referent(s): k, r, s, y 
DISC : -i [ 9 ], -li- [ 5 ]
P/N : wao [ 3PL.POSS ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
TOPO : +{s, y}
MOD : dyn : +s : Take k
SOC : ?s >> ?y(r) : watani [ 2rival ]
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, r
MOD : epist : +r >> [r B1]
B
Q
Yangay Win First Game        
Against Simbas (t?2)
Referent(s): s, y
TOPO : +{y, s}
MOD : dyn : +y >> +y Win First Game 
Against s
SOC : ?y >> ?s 
Context
CS
Yangay  and Simbas    
Play to Win f (t1)
Referent(s): s, y
TOPO : +{y, s}
MOD : dyn : +{y, s}  >> 
+{y, s} Play to Win f
SOC : ?y >> ?s, ?s >> ?y
Figure 23.  The iwapo conditional conjunction indicating a T-value (True) for the protasis (P) (Hurskainen 2016).
Referent(s): s = Simba (a Tanzanian soccer team), f = [final game], k = [championship cup], w = rivals, Yanga (a Tanzanian 
soccer team), r = reporter, a = addressees
[r B1] (P = 0.5)
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By default, the probability of the construction as a whole that Figure 23 represents denotes that 
the Simbas winning the fainalif ‘final.game’ at t1 is indeterminate (P = 0.5) (center) because it is 
underspecified for probability since it describes a future (ta- marker) event with an outcome that 
is yet to be determined. However, if the reporterr believes that one team or the other is favored to 
win, the P-value will be higher, depending on the reporter’sr beliefs. The efforts (positive 
dynamic stance, top center FoR) of both teams toward winning against the opposing team are 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for winning (Context swim lane FoRs). In the case of 
(i.e., iwapo) Simbas winning at t2, such will suffice for thems taking the [championship cup]k at 
t4 as a result of their positive dynamic status, viz., being able to take it (see §2.3.4). 
4.2.5 endapo conditional conjunction 
Like ikiwa and iwapo, the endapo conditional conjunction is truth-functional, so the principle of 
semantic scope again applies. In (28) below, an example that parallels (25) in pragmatics, socio-
political context, and FoR network structure, endapo denotes truth-functionality: 
(28)  Musyoki & Murphy (1985: 73, 134) 
 
 Tanzaniat i-me-wa-ony-a [vibaraka na Namibian]v kwamba  
 Tanzania 9-PRF-3PL-warn-FV 8puppets PREP Namibia that  
 
 [mwishod wao u-ta-kuwa sawa na ule wa [vibaraka na  
 3end 3PL.POSS 3-FUT-AUX equal PREP 3DIST 3of 8puppets PREP  
 
 Zimbabwez]w]Q [endapo wa-ta-zidi ku-shiriki-ana na  
 Zimbabwe CONJ 3PL-FUT-increase INF-cooperate-RECP PREP  
 
 [Makaburu wa Afrika Kusini]m]P katika njamap za ku-taka  
 Boers 2of Africa South PREP 10plots 10of INF-intend  
 
 ku-endelea ku-wa-kandamiza [wananchi nchin-ni humo]w 
 INF-continue INF-3PL-oppress 2citizens 10country-LOC 18REF 
 
 ‘[Tanzaniat has warned the [puppets of Namibia]v that [theirv endd will be equal to that of 
the [puppets of Zimbabwez]w]Q [if theyv cooperate further with the [Boers of South 
Africa]m]P in plotsp intending to continue oppressing the [citizens in this countryn 
(Namibian)]x]Q.’ 
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In (28) and Figure 24 above, Tanzania’st spokesperson [Comrade Mkapa]c (unmentioned 
contextual referent) depicts the internationally [controlled leaders of Namibia]v as vibarakav 
‘puppets’ of the [Boers of South Africa]m because theyv are cooperating with themm (positive 
deontic, dynamic, and social stances) in njamap ‘plots’ against the [citizens of Namibia]x. This 
act of cooperation exhibits DEONTIC CONGRUENCE, viz., agreement between speakers about what 
is permitted or obligated to ‘be the case/be done’ in a FoR (see Stevanovic 2018). Furthermore, 
Context
[Puppets of Namibia]v Cooperating          
With [Boers of South Africa]m (t1)
Referent(s): m, v
P/N : wa- [ 3PL ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
MOD : deontic : +v >> +v Cooperating With m
MOD : dyn : +v >> +v Cooperating With m
SOC : +v >> +m : shiriki-ana [ cooperate-RECP ]
Tanazaniat Defeating z (t?2)
Referent(s): t, z
MOD : dyn : +t >> +t Defeating z
SOC : ?t >> ?z
Tanazaniat Defeating       
[Puppets of Namibia]v (t2)
Referent(s): t, v
DISC : u- [ 3 ], ule [ 3DIST ]
P/N : wao [ 3PL.POSS ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
MOD : deontic : +t >> +t Defeating v
MOD : dyn : +t >> +t Defeating v
SOC : ?t >> ?v, +t >> +x
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): r, t, v
MOD : epist : +r >> +t Warning v
Tanazaniat Warning v (t?1)
Referent(s): t, v
DISC : i- [ 9 ]
TEMP : aspect : -me- [ PFT ]
MOD : dyn : +t >> +t Warning the v      
SOC : ? t >> v : ony-a [ warn-FV ]v Cooperating With m (t1)
Referent(s): v, m
MOD : deontic : +v >> +v Cooperating with m
MOD : dyn : +v >> +v Cooperating with m
SOC : +v >> +m
m Plotsp Against                         
[Citizens of Namibia]x (t1)
Referent(s): m, p, x
DISC : humo [ 18REF ]
MOD : deontic : +m >> +m Plotsp Against x
MOD : dyn : +m >> +m Plotsp Against x
SOC : ?m >> +x : njama [ 10plots ], 
-kandamiza [ oppress ]
Yes
v Decision
CS
CS
Q
P
Figure 24.  The endapo conditional conjunction indicating a T-value (True) for the protasis (P) (Musyoki 1985: 73, 134).
Referent(s): a = addressees, c = [Comrade Mkapa], m = [Boers of South Africa], n = Namibia, p = plots, r = reporter, t = Tanzania,     
v = [puppets (controlled leaders) of Namibia], w = [puppets (controlled leaders) of Zimbabwe], x = [citizens of Namibia], z = Zimbabwe
No
CS
Chapter 4: Data analysis and findings  79 
 
since these plotsp are already transpiring (Context swim lane), Mkapac expects that theyp 
undoubtedly will increase (P FoR).18  
 As a result, Mkapac warns (positive deontic stance, negative social stance) that theirv 
cooperating with the Boersm against theirv own citizensx will suffice for Tanzaniat defeating 
themv (positive deontic and dynamic stances, negative social stance, Q FoR) to champion the 
cause of the [Namibian citizens]x. As supporting evidence, hec points to Tanzania’st proven 
ability to defeat itst enemies (e.g., Zimbabwez, bottom context FoR). Earlier in the article, 
Mkapac declares that “hatimaye wananchi wa Namibia watawatupilia mbali katika jaa la 
historia” ‘eventually the inhabitants of Namibia will cast themv into the rubbish-heap of history’ 
(Musyoki & Murphy 1985: 73, 134). Hisc illocutionary bravado (negative social stance) prohibits 
a probabilistic reading of endapo, even if one does not accept the principles of CG (§3.2). As 
also seen in (25), a biconditional interpretation of (28) above disregards situational contingencies 
because Tanzaniat may choose to defeat the so-called [puppets of Namibia]v for another reason 
(contextually underspecified ‘No’ scenario). 
 As in (28), endapo in (29) marks truth-conditions in a non-biconditional construction: 
(29)  Mwamzandi (2017: 165) 
 
 [Endapo walinziw wa-ngeli-kuwa imara]P, [vitendo vya wiziz 
 CONJ 2security.agents 3PL-COND-AUX vigilant 8cases 8of 11theft 
 na uporajiu vi-nge-weza ku-pungua ama ku-isha kabisa]Q. 
 CONJ 11vandalism 8-COND-can INF-decrease CONJ INF-end completely 
 ‘[If the [security agents]w were to be vigilant]P, [cases of theftz and vandalismu would be 
reduced or completely end]Q.’ 
 
 
18 The plotsp referenced in the article (see Musyoki & Murphy 1985: 53, 134) involve a substantial list of interacting 
referents and thus cannot be included in Figure 24 due to space constraints. 
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Unlike other examples in this chapter, (29) contains both of the Swahli irrealis prefixes ngeli- 
and nge- (§4.3.2 and §4.3.3). The difference between the irrealis prefixes and the ki- realis 
prefix is that the former reduce the constructional T-value by a higher degree than ki- to within 
the P ³ 0.5 range. The emergent meaning is comparable to the ‘if only’ gloss for laiti ((36), (40)).  
 Now, in Figure 25 for (29) below, the truth-functional endapo marks a hypothetically true 
(realis) P FoR sufficing for either or both of the Q FoRs (‘or’ node in Q swim lane): 
 
 
However, the construction as a whole is irrealis because of the speaker’ss cognitively upstream 
doubt (negative epistemic stance, upper right FoR) of the likelihood of the ‘Yes’ scenario 
cognitively downstream of the [security agents]w Decision node (upper right). Interestingly, 
endapo and the ngeli- counterfactual prefix jointly express the speaker’ss positive deontic stance 
Q
[Security Agents]w Being Vigilant (t1)
Referent(s): u, w, x, y, z 
P/N : wa- [ 3PL ]
MOD : epist : +w >> +{x, y} Completing {u, z}
MOD : deontic : +w >> +w Being Vigilant
MOD : dyn : +w >> +w Being Vigilant
SOC : ?w >> ?{x, y} : imara [ vigilant ]
Theftz and Vandalismu Eliminated (t2)
Referent(s): u, w, x, y, z 
SOC : ?w >> ?{x, y} 
Theftz and Vandalismu Reduced (t2)
Referent(s): u, w, x, y, z 
DISC : vi- [ 8 ]
SOC : ?w >> ?{x, y} 
or
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): s, a, w
MOD : epist : +s >> [s B]
MOD : deontic : +s >> w Being Vigilant
B
Thievesx and Vandalsy Completing {z, u} (t?1 to t0)
Referent(s): u, w, x, y, z 
MOD : deontic : {x, y} Completing {u, z}
SOC : ? {x, y} >> ?w : wizi [ 11theft ],                   
upoprajii [ 11vandalism ]
[Security Agents]w Being Vigilant (t?1 to t0)
Referent(s): u, w, x, y, z 
MOD : epist : +w >> +{x, y} Completing {u, z}
MOD : deontic : +w >> +w Being Vigilant
MOD : dyn : +w >> +w Being Vigilant
SOC : ?w >> ?{x, y} 
Context
CS
Figure 25.  The endapo conditional conjunction indicating a T-value (True) for the protasis (P) (Mwamzandi 2017: 165).
Referent(s): a = addressees, s = speaker, u = [cases of vandalism], w = [security agents],  x = theives, y = vandals,                        
z = [cases of theft]
 w Decision
[s B] (P = 0.7)
Yes
No
P
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toward the [security agents]w being vigilant against the acts of thievesx and vandalsy 
(unmentioned contextual referents). Consider the following paraphrase of (29) and Figure 25 that 
illustrates the truth-functionality of endapo: ‘It is not true (endapo + ngeli- counterfactual prefix) 
now that the [security agents]w are being vigilant; if only they were. Given a counterfactual case 
being true (endapo) (P FoR), cases of theftt and vandalismv can (nge- hypothetical prefix, §4.3.2) 
be reduced or completely end (Q FoR).’ 
4.2.6 kama conditional conjunction 
In §4.2.3 through 4.2.5, I showed that the ikiwa, iwapo, and endapo conditional conjunctions are 
truth-functional, and this section does the same for the kama conditional conjunction. Again, the 
previously discussed principles of semantic and pragmatic scope apply. In (30) below, the kama 
conditional conjunction is truth-functional, and has a True (P = 1.0) (certainty) reading within the 
framework of a fictional narrative: 
(30)  Maw (2013 [1992]: 34) 
 
 [A-ni-ta-ua-w-a]Q [kama ni-ta-sema jamboj hili, a-na kwa babab-ko]P. 
 3SG-1SG-FUT-kill-PASS-FV CONJ 1SG-FUT-say 5thing 5PROX 1-CONJ 17of 9father-2SG.POSS 
 ‘[Hek(b) will have mes(m) killed]Q [if Is(m) say such a thingj, and to youra(p) fatherk(b) ]P.’ 
 
In the narrative, (30) is uttered by a [poor man]s(m) to a princessa(p) who insists that hes(m) should 
marry hera(p). When hes(m) discloses that hes(m) does not have the money to do so, shea(p) offers to 
give hims(m) the needed funds. The jambo ‘thing’ is hiss(m) requesting hera(p) hand in marriage 
from hera(p) father the kingk(b). At another point in the discourse, the [poor man]s(m) avers that 
hes(m) will be killed for so asking because hes(m) is a poor man’s son (Figure 26):  
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As Figure 26 above is intended to show, the construction in (30) has nothing to do with a 
probabilistic prediction of a self-action at t1. To the contrary, the [poor man]s(m) uses kama to 
express a high probability belief [s B] (P = 0.9) about being killed in the future (Q FoR) in the 
case of deciding (positive dynamic stance, P FoR) to sema ‘say’ the request in question to the 
princess’sa(p) fatherk(b) (P FoR). The embodied experiences of fear and self-preservation also 
prompt the [poor man]’ss(m) negative response (negative social stance) to princess’sa(p)  
suggestion, hence the reason it is plausible that his belief of being killed in making the request is 
strong. Hiss(m) caution against the princess’sa(p) suggestion also instantiates DEONTIC 
INCONGRUENCE, viz., disagreement about what ought to be the case/be done in a FoR 
(Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2012; Smart, Pollock, Aikman, & Willoughby 2018: 104; Stevanovic 
P
k(b) Having s(m) Killed (t2)
Referent(s): b, k, m, s
P/N : a- [ 3SG ], -ni- [ 1SG ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
MOD : deontic : +k(b) >> +k(b) Having 
s(m) Killed
MOD : dyn : +k(b) >> +k(b) Having    
s(m) Killed : -ua- [ kill ]
SOC : ?k(b) >> ?s(m)
s(m) Speaking j to k(b) (t1)
Referent(s): b, k, j, m, s
DISC : hili [ 5PROX ], a- [ 1 ]
P/N : ni- [ 1SG ], -ko [ 2SG.POSS ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
TOPO : +{s(m), k(b)}
MOD : deontic : +s(m) >> +s(m) Speaking 
j to k(b)
MOD : dyn : +s >> ?s Speaking j to k(b)
SOC : +s(m) >> +k(b)
k(b) Having s(m) Killed (t2)
Referent(s): b, k, m, s
MOD : deontic : +k(b) >> +k(b) Having s(m) Killed
MOD : dyn : +k(b) >> +k(b) Having s(m) Killed
SOC : ?k(b) >> ?s(m)
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, b, j, k, m, p, s 
TOPO : +{s(m), a(p)}
MOD : epist : +s >> [s B]
MOD : deontic : ?s(m) >> +s(m) Speaking j to k(b)
MOD : dyn : ?s(m) >> +s(m) Speaking j to k(b)
B
Speaker 
Decision: Ask 
m?
[s B] (P = 0.9)
a as Princessa Suggests s(m) Make                 
[Possible Statement]j to k(b) (t?1)
Referent(s): a, b, j, k, m, s, p
TOPO : +{s, a(p)}
MOD : deontic : +a(p) >> +s(m) Speaking j to k(b)
MOD : dyn : +s >> +a(p) >> +s(m) Speaking j to k(b)
Q
No
s Is [Poor Man]m (t?1)
Referent(s): s, m
Figure 26.  The kama conditional conjunction indicating a T-value (True) for the protasis (P) (Maw 2013: [1992]: 34).
Referent(s): a = addressee, b = [princess' father], k = king, m = [poor man], p = princess, s = speaker
CS
Yes
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2018). While kama is truth-functional in (30), the construction is not biconditional because of the 
embodied possibility that hes(m) could be killed by the kingk(b) for a different reason. 
 In (31) below, kama has a truth-functional reading in a biconditional construction: 
(31)  Saloné (1983a: 314–315) 
 
 Jamboj la ku-zingatia ni kwamba [ujamaau na 
 5matter 5of INF-remember AUX that 11socialism CONJ 
 ku-ji-tegemeat ku-na-wezekana]Q tu [kama tu-na-zalisha zanaz na 
 INF-REFL-rely 15-PRS-be.possible only CONJ 1PL-PRS-produce 10products CONJ 
 vituv vya ku-kidhi mahitajim yetu wenyewe]P.     
 8things 8of INF-satisfy 6needs 2PL.POSS our.own     
 ‘Somethingj to bear in mind is that [socialismu and self-reliancet are only possible]Q       
[iff we{s, a} produce productsk and the thingsv to satisfy [our{s, a} own needs]m]P.’ 
 
 
 
In Figure 27 above for (31), the information flow downstream of the epistemic stance of the 
speakers (upper right FoR) is logical rather than also being temporal. Moreover, the tu ‘only’ 
adverb preceding kama above grammatically encodes the constructional biconditionality. The 
FoRs in the expressed realis (Option 1, left) and implied irrealis (Option 2, right) scenarios 
contain opposite collective deontic and dynamic stance and status values of the speakers and the 
P
{s, a} Producing {z, v} For m (t0)
Referent(s): a, m, s, v, z
P/N : tu- [ 1PL ], yetu [ 2PL.POSS , wenyewe [ our.own ]
TEMP : tense : -na- [ PRS ]
MOD : deontic : +{s, a} >> +{s, a} Producing {z, v} For m 
MOD : dyn : +{s, a} >>+{s, a} Producing {z, v} For m 
SOC : +{s, a} >> +{s, a}
{u, t} Possible (t0)
Referent(s): a, s, t, u
DISC : ku- [ 15 ]
TEMP : tense : -na- [ PRS ]
SOC : +{s, a} >> +{s, a} : 
-ji-tegemea [ REFL-rely ]
Options {u, t} Possible (t0)
Referent(s): a, s, t, u
SOC : + {s, a} >> +{s, a}
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, s
MOD : epist : +s >> [s B]B
{s, a} Producing {k, v} For m (t0)
Referent(s): a, m, s, v, z
MOD : deontic : +{s, a} >> +{s, a} 
Producing {z, v} For m 
MOD : dyn : +{s, a} >>+{s, a} Producing 
{z, v} For m 
SOC : +{s, a} >> +{s, a}
P
Q
Q
Option 1
{u, t} Mentioned (t?1)
Referent(s): t, u
[ s B] (P = 1.0)
Option 2
CS
Figure 27.  The kama conditional conjunction indicating a T-value (True) for the protasis (P) (Saloné 1983a: 314?315).
Referent(s): a = addressee(s), m = [ speaker's and addressees' needs], s = speaker, u = socialism, t = self-reliance, v = things,         
z = products
Chapter 4: Data analysis and findings  84 
 
addresseesa, respectively. The dependency arrow in each scenario indicates a codependency 
(§3.3.2.6) between T-values for the cultural practices of socialismu and self-reliancek (Q FoRs). 
If one of the P or Q FoRs is hypothetically True at t0 (present), so is its complementing 
proposition at t0. The logically inverse interrelation applies when one or the other is False. 
Whether or not the speakers is amicable toward these practices is unclear, so a corresponding 
deontic stance value is omitted in the Present Reality FoR (t0). 
 When kama appears with a negation marker (e.g., ha-, sipo-, see Beaudoin-Lietz 1997 
and Contini-Morava 2011), it co-produces19 a truth-functional interpretation of False (P = 0.0) 
for the protasis in (32): 
(32)  Musyoki & Murphy (1985: 7, 107) 
 
 Bani-Sadrb a-li-tahadharisha kuwa [kama halih hiyo  
 Bani-Sadr 3SG-PST-caution that CONJ 9situation 9REF 
 
 
 ha-i-ta-patikana]P, [[basi nchi yake]i i-ta-lazimika kw-enda 
 NEG-9-FUT-be.available then 9country 3SG.POSS 9-FUT-be.obliged INF-go 
 
 [sehemu nyingine]n na ku-fanya nazo biashara]Q  
 9region 9other CONJ INF-do with.3PL 9trade 
 
 
 ‘Bani-Sadrb cautioned that [if this situationh (previously mentioned) was not realized]P, 
[hisb country (Iran)]i would be obliged to go [other regions]r and trade (with them)o]Q.’  
 
Before the text above in (32) from a Tanzanian newspaper that is modeled Figure 28 below, 
Bani-Sahrb as a representative of Irani insists (positive deontic stance, negative social stance, 
second from upper left FoR) that [European nations (unspecified, but not Russia)]e relying on the 
[United States]u and Russiar must diversify theire trade (positive deontic and dynamic stances, 
middle right FoR) or lose trading privileges with Irani. 
 
19 Since all Swahili conditional conjunctions (i.e., ikiwa, iwapo, endapo, kama) consistently indicate a T-value 
(True) for protases, this pattern of combining with a negation marker to indicate a T-value (False) arguably applies 
to all four conjunctions. However, space constraints prohibits demonstration. 
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This scenario is the previously mentioned situationh (upper left FoR) that, if not realized (False, 
P = 0.0, P FoR), will suffice for Irani being obliged (positive deontic status, Q FoR) to trade with 
countrieso in [other regions]n instead.  
 The kama conjunction combines in (32) with the ha- negation marker and the verb 
patikana ‘be.available’ to portray a hypothetical future irrealis scenario of the [European 
nations]e not diversifying theire trade strategies (P FoR). The inverse scenario of theire deciding 
to do so (positive deontic and dynamic stances, middle right FoR) is contextually underspecified 
for outcome (Exit node). This fact precludes a biconditional reading of (32). For instance, Irani 
may decide to trade with [other regions]o, but for a reason unanticipated by any of the involved 
nations as collective Agents. Further instances of kama appear in (33), (35), and (38).  
Q
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, b, e, w
MOD : epist : +w >> b Warning e
Irani Trading With [Other Regions]n (t2)
Referent(s): e, i, n, u, r, t
P/N : yake [ 3PL.POSS ], i- [ 9 ], nazo [ with.3PL ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
TOPO : +i, ?n : sehemu nyingine [ 9region other ]
MOD : deontic : +i >> +i Trading with o :       
lazimika [ be.obliged ]
SOC : +i >> +n,  ?i >> ?{e, u, r}
b Warning e (t?1)
Referent(s): b, e
P/N : a- [ 3SG ]
TEMP : tense : -li- [ PST ]
MOD : deontic : +b >> +b Warning e
MOD : dyn : +b >> +b Warning e : 
-tahadhari- [ precaution ]
?i >> >> ?{e, u, r}
e Diversifying [Trading Policies]t (t1)
Referent(s): e, n, u, r, t
MOD : deontic : +e >> +e Diversifying t
MOD : dyn : +e >> +e Diversifying t
SOC : +e >> +n, ?e >> ?{u, r} 
[European Countries]e      
Diversifying [Trading Policies]t (t1)
Referent(s): e, n, u, r, t
DISC : hiyo [ 9REF ], i- [ 9 ]
TEMP : tense : -ta- [ FUT ]
MOD : deontic : +e >> +e Diversifying t
MOD : dyn : +e >> +e Diversifying t
SOC : +e >> +n, ?e >> ?{u, r} 
 b Mentions h 
(t?2)
Referent(s): b, h
MOD : dyn : +b >> 
+b Describes h
No
e Decision
Yes
CS
Figure 28.  The kama conditional conjunction combining with the ha- negation marker to indicate a T-value (False) for the 
protasis (P) (Musyoki & Murphy 1985: 7, 107).
Referent(s): a = addressees, b = Bani-Sadr, e = [European nations (unspecified, but not Russia)], h = [previously mentioned 
situation], i = Iran, n = [other regions], u = [United States], r  = Russia, w = writer
CS
P
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4.3 Irrealis conditional constructions 
4.3.1 Overview 
Two conditional prefixes (nge- and ngali-/ngeli-) occur as verbal prefixes in Swahili irrealis 
conditional constructions. The nge- prefix usually appears in low-probability (e.g., hypothetical, 
imaginary) constructions but also occasionally in counterfactual constructions (e.g., see 
Myachina 1981: 76–77). In contrast, the ngali-/ngeli- prefix primarily appears in counterfactual 
constructions (Mwamzandi 2017: 157). Mwamzandi (2017) observes that, in the HCS, 96 
percent of ngeli-/ngali- tokens express ‘impossible/false’, while only 64 percent of nge- tokens 
have this interpretation. Following Mwamzandi (2017) and Saloné (1983a, 1983b), this study 
assumes ngali- and ngeli- are allomorphs in standard Swahili (e.g., HCS 1.0 and HCS 2.0) (cf. 
Mohamed 2001: 166–167). Both prefixes denote P-values and have semantic scope over the 
conditional conjunctions that denote T-values (defeasibility) of protases. 
 Some linguists (e.g., Mwamzandi 2017: 164) reserve the term ‘counterfactual’ for 
impossible/false constructions (P = 0.0). Others (e.g., Givón 2011: 141–142) also use the term 
HYPOTHETICAL COUNTERFACTUAL to denote an event that did not or does not occur, but could, 
should, or would have been/would be otherwise (e.g., P = 0.3). Since doing so distinguishes 
between impossible and possible counterfactual FoRs, discussions in the following sections 
evoke this distinction where applicable. 
4.3.2 nge- conditional prefix 
The nge- prefix indicates low probability (i.e., P £ 0.4; see §3.3.2.1, Table 7; Leonard 1980) and 
is sometimes syntactically introduced by a conditional conjunction such as kama or iwapo 
(Saloné 1983b). In (33), nge- indicates a moderate probability (P = 0.4) of the P FoR and is 
introduced by kama: 
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(33)  Mwamzandi (2017: 160) 
 
 Tanzaniat ni nchi kubwa na yenye heshimah katika eneoe hili, 
 Tanzania AUX 9country 9big CONJ has 9respect PREP 5area 5PROX 
 lakini [kama i-nge-zi-bana [nchi zi-na-zo-i-shambulia Congo]j]P, 
 but CONJ 9-COND-10-press 10countries 10-PRS-10REL-9-attack Congo 
 [waasir wa-si-nge-kuwa na nguvun wa-li-zo-na-zo sasa]Q. 
 2rebels 3PL-NEG-COND-AUX with 10power 3PL-COP-10REL-with-10REL now 
 ‘Tanzaniat is a large country which has respecth in this regione, but [if itt would press the 
[countries attacking Congo]a]P, [the rebelsr would not have the powern theyr have now]Q.’ 
 
 
 
The speakers in (33) takes a positive epistemic stance toward two complementary (i.e., P-values 
add to P = 1.0) beliefs (Figure 29, center). The speaker’ss foreground belief is that Tanzaniat 
pressing (positive dynamic stance, negative social stance, P FoR) the [countries attacking 
Congo]a would suffice for the nguvun ‘power’ of the rebelsr being weakened (Q FoR). The nge- 
marker functions to express doubt (negative epistemic stance, P = 0.4) that Tanzaniat will pursue 
Q
{j, r} Attacking Congoc 
With Powern (t0)
Referent(s): c, j, n, r
TOPO : +{c, j, r}
MOD : deontic : +{j, r} >>  
+{j, r} Attacking c With n
MOD : dyn : +{j, r} >>   
+{j, r} Attacking c With n
SOC : ?{j, r} >> ?c
Tanzaniat Pressing j (t1)
Referent(s): t, j
DISC : i- [ 9 ], zi- [ 10 ], -zo- [ 10REL ]
TEMP : tense : -na- [ PRS ]
MOD : dyn : +t >> +t Pressing j : 
-bana [ press ]
SOC : ?t >> ?j
 Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, j, r, s, t
MOD : epist : ?s >>           
[s B1], +s >> [s B2]
MOD : dyn : +s >> +t 
Pressing {j, r} 
Rebelsr Attacking 
Congoc With n (t2)
Referent(s): r, c, n
DISC : -zo- [ 10REL ]
P/N : wa- [ 3PL ]
TOPO : +{r, c}
MOD : dyn : +r : Attacking 
c With n : -si- NEG,  
nguvu [ 10power ]
SOC : ?r >> ?c
Tanzaniat Respected In Areae           
By [Other Countries]o (t0)
Referent(s): e, o, t 
TOPO : +{e, o, t} : katika [ PREP ],        
hili [ 5PROX ]
MOD : dyn : =t >> =t Pressing a
SOC : +o >> +t : heshima [ 9respect ]
Tanzaniat      
Pressing j (t1)
Referent(s): t, j
MOD : dyn : +t >> +t 
Pressing j
SOC : ?t >> ?j
B
Tanzaniat 
Decision: 
Intervene?
[s B1] (P = 0.4)
Context
CS
[s B2] (P = 0.6)
No
CS
Yes
Figure 29.  The nge- conditional prefix indicating a P-value (P = 0.4) for the protasis (P) (Mwamzandi 2017: 160).
Referent(s): a = addressee, e = area (region), h = respect, j = [countries attacking Congo], n  = power, r = rebels, s = speaker,         
t = Tanzania
Areae (region)
Tanzaniat 
P
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this course of action. The speaker’ss complementary background belief (positive epistemic 
stance) that it will not intervene on Congo’sc behalf (P = 0.6). This doubt (negative epistemic 
stance) arises for the speaker because Tanzaniat is taking no action at t0 (neutral dynamic stance, 
left context FoR), despite being aware of (having cognitive access to, contextual scope (CS) 
arrow) Congo’sc need of external diplomatic or military intervention (shared encyclopedic 
knowledge, right context FoR). The si- negation marker before nge- in the apodosis contrasts the 
right contextual FoR and the logically inverse irrealis Q FoR with dashed borders (bottom left).  
 In the narrative excerpt below in (34), nge- denotes a low-probability P FoR realization:  
(34)  Saloné (1983b: 65–66) 
 
 Bahatib a-li-po-rejea kwao{b, m} ha-ku-m-kuta mamam nyumbak-ni. 
 Bahati 3SG-PST-16REL-return 3PL.POSS NEG-PST-3SG-find mother 9home-LOC 
 
 a-li-kuwa a-me-kwenda kwa jiranij ku-twanga mcheleq wakem   
 3SG-PST-AUX 3SG-PRF-go to 5neighbor INF-pound 11rice 3SG.POSS  
 
 biasharav ingawa sikus zote a-ki-sema [kuwa [Mungug a-nge-m-jalia]P, 
 9business although 10days 10all 3SG-IPFV-say that 1God 3SG-COND-3SG -bless 
 
 [a-nge-nunua kinuo chakem mweneyewe]Q kwani usou u-me-umb-w-a 
 3SG-COND-buy 7mortar 3SG.POSS her.own since 11face 11-PRF-shape.PASS.FV 
 
 na hayah, na-ye a-me-choka ku-piga hadi kwa majiranij. 
 PREP 9shame and-3SG 3SG-PRF-be.tired INF-beat until to 6neighbors 
 
 ‘When Bahatib returned to their{b, m} homek, sheb didn’t find herb motherm.  
Shem had gone to a neighbor’sj to pound herm riceq for herm businessv, even though every 
days shem says that, [if Godg were to bless herm]P, [shem would buy herm own mortaro]Q  
since herm faceu is disfigured by shameh, and shem is tired of going to herm neighbors’j.’ 
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In Figure 30 for (34) above, the reason Bahati’sb motherm was away when Bahatib returned home 
was herm intention (positive dynamic stance, top center FoR) to pound mcheleq ‘rice’ for herm 
biasharav ‘business’ (context FoR, second top right), despite herm distaste (negative dynamic 
stance, top center FoR) of going to a jiranij ‘neighbor’s (house)’ to do so. The protasis and 
apodosis nge- prefixes jointly indicate Bahati’sb mother’sm doubt (negative epistemic stance) that 
Godg will fulfill her wishw to have a mortarm. God’sg hypothetical doing so (positive dynamic 
and social stances, P FoR) would suffice for herm being able (positive dynamic status, Q FoR) to 
Bahatib Returning Homek (t?1)
Referent(s): b, k
DISC : a- [ 1 ], -po- [ 16REL ]
P/N : a- [ 3SG ], kwao [ 3PL.POSS ]
TEMP : tense : -li- [ PST ]
Motherm Buying a Mortaro (tn+1)
Referent(s):  g, m, o, w
P/N : a- [ 3SG ], chake [ 3SG.POSS ], 
mweneyewe [ her.own]
TOPO : +{m, o}
MOD : dyn : +m : Buying o
Mother'sm Faceu Disfigured 
with Shameh (tn)
Referent(s): h, m, u
DISC : u- [ 11 ]
TEMP : aspect : -me- [ PRF ]
SOC : ?m : haya [ 9shame ]
m Tired of Going to Neighbors'j Housec (tn)
Referent(s): c, j, m
P/N : -ye [ 3SG ] a- [ 3SG ]
TEMP : aspect : -me- [ PRF ]
MOD : dyn : ?m >> ?m Tired of Going to j's c 
Motherm Going to Neighbors'j (t?3)
Referent(s): b,  j, m, q
DISC : a- [ 1 ]
P/N : a- [ 3SG ]
TEMP : tense : -li- [ PST ]
TEMP : aspect : -me- [ PRF ]
TOPO : +{m, q}, ?j
MOD : dyn : ?m >> ?m Going to j,       
+m >> +m Pounding q For Her b
P
Q
Godg Grants Mother'sm Desirew (tn)
Referent(s): g, m, w
P/N : a- [ 3SG ], -m- [ 3SG ]
MOD : epist : +g >> m's w
MOD : dyn : +g >> +g Grants m's w
SOC : +g >> +m
Motherm Speaking Every Days (tn)
Referent(s): m, o
P/N : a- [ 3SG ]
TEMP : aspect : -ki- [ IMPV ]
MOD : epist : ?m >> [s B]
MOD : deontic : +m >> +m Buying a o
Motherm Pounding Riceq For 
Her Businessv (t?2)
Referent(s): m, q, v
P/N : wake [ 3SG.POSS ]b Finding m at Homek (t?1)
Referent(s): b, k, m
P/N : -m- [ 1 ]
TEMP : tense : -ku [ PST ]
TOPO : +{b, k}, ?m : -ni [ LOC ]
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): n, r
MOD : epist : +n >> +n [n  B]
B
B
Figure 30.  The nge- conditional prefix indicating a P-value (P = 0.4) for the protasis (P) (Saloné 1983b: 65?66).
Referent(s): b = Bahati, c = house, g = God, h = shame, j = neighbor's (house), k = home, m = [Bahati's mother], n = narrator,   
r = reader, s = day, u = face, o = mortar, q = rice, v = business, w = [Bahati's mother's desire]
[n  B] P = 1.0
[s B] (P = 0.4)
CS
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purchase a mortarm. The data does not contain information about whether Bahati’sb motherm has 
already asked for the mortarm or whether shem believes doing so is a necessary and/or 
contributing condition (aggregation, small head arrows) to God’sg fulfilling herm wishw. As such, 
the FoR network does not model these factors. 
 While the data is underspecified for these details, Figure 30 for (34) also illustrates a 
limitation of my methodology, namely, that several backgrounded but contextually relevant 
features cannot be modelled for the sake of space. For instance, one instance of Bahati’sb 
motherm going to the [neighbor’s house]j alone (top center FoR) may or may not a contributing 
condition for herb desire to buy the mortarm, but repeated instances together form a contributing 
condition (not shown) to herb face being filled with shameh. All instances of her going (not 
shown), joined with her weariness, are jointly sufficient for her face being filled with shame. 
 In (41) below, nge- marks a hypothetical P FoR as improbable yet possible (P = 0.2): 
(35)  Saloné (1983b: 57) 
 
 [Kama ni-nge-kuwa tajiri]P, [ni-nge-jenga nyumban    
 CONJ 1SG-COND-AUX rich 1SG-COND-build 9house    
 nzuri kando ya baharib]Q.       
 9nice beside of 9ocean       
 ‘[If Is were rich]P, [Is would build a nice housen beside the oceanb]Q.’ 
 
 
 
Q
Speakers Rich (t0)
Referent(s): b, n, s
P/N : ni- [ 1SG ]
MOD : dyn : +s >> +s 
Building n Beside b
SOC : +s : s Rich
s Building Housen 
Beside Oceanb (t1)
Referent(s): b, n, s
P/N : ni- [ 1SG ]
TOPO : +{s, n, b} : 
kando [ beside ]
SOC : +s : s Rich
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): , a, b, n, s
MOD : epist : ?s >> [s B]
MOD : deontic : +s >> +s Building n Beside b
BSpeakers Rich (t0)
Referent(s): b, n, s
MOD : deontic : +s >> +s Building n Beside b
MOD : dyn : +s >> +s Building n Beside b
SOC : +s : s Rich
   [s B]    
(P = 0.2)
CS
Figure 31.  The nge- conditional prefix indicating a P-value (P = 0.2) for the protasis (P) (Saloné 1983b: 57).
Referent(s): a = addressee(s), b = ocean, n = house, s = speaker
P
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In (35) and Figure 31, the speakers desires (positive deontic stance) to build a nyumban ‘house’ 
beside the baharib ‘ocean’ (realis Q FoR, t0), but doubts (negative epistemic stance, P FoR) that 
this event is likely to occur. The kama conjunction introduces the protasis nge- (syntactic scope) 
and portrays the P FoR (t0) as hypothetically realis. The nge- prefix, however, has semantic 
scope over kama and depicts the logically upstream contextual FoR (bottom left) as irrealis. The 
hypothetical P FoR is understood as present (t0), even though the na- present marker does not 
appear in the protasis (Saloné 1983b: 57). Also, the Q FoR is understood as future (t1), even 
though the future marker ta- does not appear in the apodosis; one must be rich (positive dynamic 
status, positive social status) before building a house on expensive waterfront property—a 
logically upstream embodied contextual constraint (context FoR). 
 In contrast with (35), the construction in (36) below is marked for present tense (na-) as 
the writerw depicts a hypothetical counterfactual P FoR as realis (bottom left). Also, the laiti ‘if 
only’20 conjunction syntactically introduces and thus has syntactic scope over nge-: 
(36)  Hurskainen (2016) 
 
 [Laiti a-nge-kuwa kiongozik]P, [basi jamiij a-na-yo-i-ongoza 
 if.only 3SG-COND-AUX 7leader then 9community 3SG-PRS-9REL-9-lead 
 i-nge-faidi]Q, sana li-na-po-kuja sualaq la ushirikishwajiu. 
 9-COND-benefit very 5-PRS-16REL-come 5issue 5of 11involvement 
 ‘[If only hea were a leaderk]P, [then the communityj hea leads would greatly benefit]Q, 
especially when it comes to the issueq of involvementu.’ 
 
 
20 The meaning of laiti ‘if only’ is not equivalent to iff (biconditional). See the discussion later in this section. 
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The speakers in (36) and Figure 32 above adds the protasis nge- to deny (negative epistemic 
stance, [s B1], P = 0.0) that the communityj is presently involved (ushirikishwajiu ‘involvment’) 
together in events and actions (bottom center FoR). The speakers argues that the referent k being 
a leaderk (positive deontic, dynamic and social stances, P FoR) would suffice for the jamiij 
‘community’ benefiting (positive social stance, Q FoR) by participating in involvement (positive 
dynamic stance, bottom center FoR). However, the speakers is skeptical (negative epistemic 
stance, [s B2] (P = 0.3) about the P FoR being realis at any given time (tn). For the speakers, had 
it already been such, the community would now be benefiting. So, the apodosis nge- denotes a 
modal prediction in contrast with the irrealis contextual realities (context FoR), much as does the 
modal verb ‘would’ in future constructions.  
 As for the laiti ‘if only’ conjunction that introduces the protasis, no research has focused 
on its semantic and pragmatic functions, let alone in conditional constructions. In Arabic, from 
whence laiti was borrowed, it functions as an optative interjection (‘oh, (I wish) that’) (Baldi & 
Q
r Being a Leaderk in Communityj (t0)
Referent(s): j, k, r
P/N : a- [ 3SG ]
TOPO : +{j, k, r}
MOD : deontic : +r >> +r Being a k in j : laiti [ if.only ]
MOD : dyn : +r >> +r Being a k in j
SOC : +r >> +jr Being a Leaderk in 
Communityj (t0)
Referent(s): s, k, j, r
TOPO : +{j, r}
MOD : deontic : +r >> 
+r Being a k in j
SOC : +r >> +j
Communityj Benefiting From r Being a k (t0)
Referent(s): j, r, k
DISC : -yo- [ 9REL ] i- [ 9 ]
P/N : a- [ 3SG ]
TEMP : tense : -na- [ PRS ]
TOPO : +{j, r(k)}
MOD : dyn : +j : Benefiting From r Being a k
SOC : +j : Benefiting From r Being a k
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): s, a, k, j, r
MOD : epist : ?s >> [s B1], +s >> [s B2]
MOD : deontic : +s >> +r Being a k in j
B
P
[Community j Participating 
in Involvement]q (t0)
Referent(s): j, u, a(k)
DISC : li- [ 5 ], -po- [ 16REL ]
TEMP : tense : -na- [ PRS ]
TOPO : +{j, a(k)}
MOD : dyn: +j : Participating 
in u
[s B1], P = 0.0
CS
  [s B2],     
P = 0.3
Figure 32.  The nge- conditional prefix indicating a P-value (P = 0.3) for the protasis (P) (Hurskainen 2016).
Referent(s): a = addressee(s),  j = community, k = leader, s = speaker, q = issue, u = involvement
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Toscano 2015). It has an equivalent isomorphic function in Swahili, as in Hii ndiyo radhi ya 
mama yangu. Laiti ningemsikiliza ‘This is my mother’s curse. I wish I had listened to her’ 
(Wakota 2014: 52). For this study, however, its isomorphism as a clause-introducing conjunction 
with pragmatic implicatures is of greater interest, although space prohibits discussing it at length. 
A further example appears in (40) as it co-occurs with the ngali-/ngeli- conditional prefix. 
 The epistemic dimension of laiti as a conditional conjunction, as seen in (36) above, is 
truth-functional, in that it expresses counterfactuality (upper left FoR) while also encoding an 
Agent’s presupposition that an interlocutor agrees regarding given (old) information (context 
FoR). In the deontic dimension of laiti, it expresses an Agent’s desire for an irrealis action, 
event, or state-of-being to obtain in an inverse FoR. In (36), laiti denotes speakers-addresseea 
agreement on the referenta not being a leaderk presently (context FoR) but also expresses the 
speaker’ss desire (positive deontic stance) of opposite being the case (P FoR).  
4.3.3 ngali-/ngeli- conditional prefix 
To review, the ngali-/ngeli- conditional prefix usually appears in counterfactual constructions, 
but also in low probability constructions (i.e., P £ 0.4; see §3.3.2.1, Table 7). In logic, two 
counterfactual types are possible: additive and subtractive (Roese & Olson 1993; Guajardo, 
Parker, & Turley‐Ames 2009: 684). The former denotes an Agent adding an action, event, or 
embodied state-of-being as a ‘difference-making’ factor (Menzies 2004) to a ‘fact’ FoR to depict 
a ‘counterfactual’ FoR. The latter, as the logically inverse form, denotes an Agent subtracting a 
‘difference-making’ factor (i.e., an event or state-of-being) from a ‘fact’ FoR to depict a 
‘counterfactual’ FoR.  
 In (37), ngali- appears in both the protasis and apodosis of an additive hypothetical 
counterfactual:  
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(37)  Beaudoin-Lietz (1999: 135) 
 
 Mtim huu [u-ngali-anguk-a]P, [u-ngali-ni-u-a]Q.   
 3tree 3PROX 3-COND-fall-FV 3-COND-1SG-kill-FV   
 ‘[This treem, if itm had fallen]P, [itm would have killed mes]Q.’ 
 
 
 
In (37) and Figure 33, the speakers adds the foreground ‘difference-making’ factor of the treem 
falling in the irrealis contextual FoR (t–1) (bottom second from left FoR, [s B1] P = 0.0 (False) 
background belief) to depict a hypothetical counterfactual scenario (P and Q FoRs). The protasis 
ngali- expresses the speaker’ss negative epistemic stance toward the treem falling at t–1 ([s B2] as 
hers foreground belief. As the apodosis nge- in (37) denoted a modally qualified prediction in 
contrast with the irrealis context FoR, so also does the apodosis ngali- in (37) above. A 
noteworthy embodied deictic property value in (37) is the speaker’ss topographic proximity (huu 
‘3PROX’, upper left FoR) to the treem. Had the speakers been positionally distal relative to the 
treem at t–1, such would have sufficed for an irrealis Q FoR identical to the left context FoR in 
which he does not die, even if the treem falls. 
 Next, (38) is an additive counterfactual construction in which T-values are bracketed 
within a context known to be untrue—a fictional narrative (see Semeijn 2019 on propositional 
attitudes toward fictional accounts in embodied social cognition):  
Q
Speakers Killed (t?1)
Referent(s): m, s
DISC : u- [ 3 ]
P/N : 1SG [ -ni- ]
TOPO : +{m, s}
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, m, s
TOPO : +{s, a, m} : huu [ 11PROX ]
MOD : epist : ?s >> [s B1], +s >> [s B2] B
P
Treem Falling (t?1)
Referent(s): m, s
TOPO : +{m, s}
Treem Falling (t?1)
Referent(s): m, s
DISC : u- [ 3 ]
TOPO : +{m, s}
[s B1]   
(P = 0.7)
Speakers Killed (t?1)
Referent(s): m, s
TOPO : +{m, s}
CS
Figure 33.  Additive hypothetical counterfactual. The ngeli-/ngali- conditional prefix indicating a contrast between a hypothetical 
counterfactual scenario (upper right FoRs) and an irrealis contextual scenario (two bottom left FoRs) (Beaudoin-Lietz (1999: 135).
Referent(s): a = addressee(s), m = tree, s = speaker
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(38)  Ashton (1993 [1944]: 259; (Beaudoin-Leitz 1999: 134) 
 
 [Wa-totow hao... kama wa-ngali-kuw-a [wa-ki-ka-a sana]h]P, 
 2-2children 2REF CONJ 3PL-COND-be-FV 3PL-IPFV-stay-FV too.long 
 [ha-wa-ngali-weza ku-pand-a ku-rud-i kwao  katika [Nchi   
 NEG-3PL-COND-be.able INF-go.up-FV INF-return-FV PREP PREP 9land   
 ya Mawingu]m]Q.    
 9of 6clouds     
 ‘[If these childrent had been in the [habit of staying too long]h]P, [theyw would have been 
unable to go up and return [home to Cloudland]m]Q.’ 
 
 
 
The narratorn in (38) and Figure 34 holds two provisional beliefs (positive epistemic stance) for 
the sake of telling a children’s tale, viz., (a) [n B1] that within the narrative, since the children’st 
home is in [Nchi ya Mawingu]m ‘Cloudland’ (background belief) and (b) [n B1] that the P FoR 
being realis would have sufficed for the Q FoR becoming realis since the childrent did not make 
a habit of staying too long (irrealis FoR, center right). The added ‘difference-making’ factor to 
[n B2] (P = 1.0)
Q
Childrenw in h (tn to t?2)
Referent(s): h, m, w
DISC : wa- [ 2 ], hao [ 2REF ]
P/N : wa- [ 3PL ]
TEMP : aspect : -ki- [ IMPV ]
MOD : dyn : +m >> +m in h
TOPO : ?m, +w
Childrenw in h (tn to t?2)
Referent(s): h, m, w
MOD : dyn : +m >> +m in h
TOPO : ?m, +w
Childrenw Going to Cloudlandm (t?1)
Referent(s): m, w
P/N : wa- [ 3PL ]
TOPO : ?m, +w : -pand-a [ go.up-FV ], 
-rud-i [ return-FV ], katika [ PREP ]
Childrenw Going to m (t?1)
Referent(s): m, w
TOPO : ?m, +w
t Decision:   
Stay or Go?
Stay
Childrenw Home in Cloudlandm (tn)
Referent(s): m, w
TOPO : +{m, w}CS
Narratorn Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): n, r
MOD : epist : +n >> {[n B1], [n B2]}
B
Fictional Narrative
Go
Figure 34.  Additive hypothetical counterfactual. The ngeli-/ngali- conditional prefix indicating a contrast between a hypothetical 
counterfactual 'Stay' scenario (P and Q FoRs) and a realis contextual 'Go' scenario (middle right and bottom right FoRs) (Ashton 
(1993 [1944]: 259; (Beaudoin-Leitz 1999: 134).
Referent(s): a = addressee(s), h = [habit of staying too long], m = [children's home in Cloudland] s = speaker, t = children
CS
[n B1] (P = 1.0)
P
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the hypothetical P FoR that did not occur (contextual FoR to Narrator Present Reality t0) was the 
childrent habitually staying too long (positive deontic stance, middle right irrealis FoR). Their 
reason for staying too long, where they were staying too long, and why these factors make a 
difference for the embodied experiences of the children are unspecified in this example. Without 
considering pragmatic factors and context-sensitivity, the construction in (38) is uninterpretable, 
and not merely because it is within a fictional narrative; without pragmatics and context, no 
conditional construction is interpretable. 
 Next, the ngali- in (39) below co-occurs with the negation marker si- to form a 
subtractive hypothetical counterfactual construction: 
(39)  Polomé (1967: 152) 
 
 [Si-ngali-kuw-a ni-me-chok-a]P, ni-ngali-tembet-a mji-ni]Q. 
 1SG.NEG-COND-be-FV 1SG-PRF-be.tired-FV 1SG-COND-stroll-FV 3townm-LOC 
 ‘[If Is had not been tired]P, [Is would have strolled around townm]Q.’ 
 
 
 
The speakers in Figure 35 for (39) subtracts the embodied state-of-being of being tired (ni-me-
chok-a 1SG-PRF-be.tired-FV) from the realis contextual FoR (bottom left) to create an irrealis P 
FoR. The speaker’ss desire to walk (positive deontic stance) was contingent upon this embodied 
condition of not being tired at t–2. The speakers being able and willing (positive dynamic stance, 
P FoR) to stroll in (-ni LOC) townm (Q FoR). 
Q
Speakers Tired (t?2)
Referent(s): m, s
P/N : ni- [ 1SG.NEG ], ni- [ 1SG ]
TEMP : aspect : -me- [ PRF ]
MOD : dyn : ?s : Strolling in m
Speakers Tired (t?2)
Referent(s): m, s
MOD : deontic : +s >> +s Strolling in m
MOD : dyn : ?s : Strolling in m
Speakers Strolling in 
Townm (t?1)
Referent(s): m, s
P/N : ni- [ 1SG ]
TOPO : +{m, s} : -ni [ LOC ]
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, s
MOD : epist : +s >> [s B]
B
P
CS
   [s B]    
(P = 0.7)
Figure 35.  Subtractive hypothetical counterfactual. The ngeli-/ngali- conditional prefix indicating a contrast between a past 
hypothetical counterfactual irrealis scenario (P and Q FoRs) and a past realis contextual FoR (bottom left) (Polomé 1967: 152).
Referent(s): a = addressee(s), m = town, s = speaker
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 Earlier in (36), the laiti ‘if only’ conjunction syntactically introduced and thus had 
syntactic scope over the nge- in a counterfactual construction. In (40) below, laiti does so for the 
ngali-/ngeli- conditional prefix in a subtractive hypothetical counterfactual:  
(40)  Hurskainen (2016) 
 
 [Laiti i-si-ngali-kuwa vitav]P, [Kongoc i-ngali-beba jukumuj kubwa 
 If.only 9-NEG-COND-AUX 7war Congo 9-COND-carry 5influence big 
 katika eneoe hilo]Q, na hasa kutokana na utajiriu wake wa madinim. 
 PREP 5area 5REF CONJ especially deriving PREP 11wealth 3SG.POSS 11of 6minerals 
 ‘[If only there had not been a warv]P [Congo would have had a significant influencej in this 
areae]Q, especially given its wealthu of mineralsm.’ 
 
 
 
The ngali-/ngeli- prefix already tends to indicate counterfactuality without laiti. The addition of 
laiti in (40) and Figure 36 expresses an augmented pragmatic valence (intensity) of the 
speaker’ss desire (positive deontic stance) that the realis context FoR would have been irrealis 
instead (P FoR). The speakers believes (positive epistemic stance, upper left FoR) that Congoc 
not warring with its foesf—taking negative dynamic stance would have sufficed for Congoc 
profiting (positive social status, Q FoR) from its mineralm resources and political influencej 
(bottom middle FoR). Finally, note that the deontic stance values for Congoc in this example are 
Q
Congoc in Warv with Foesf (t?1)
Referent(s): c, f, v
DISC : i- [ 9 ]
TOPO : +{c, f, v}
MOD : dyn : +c >> +c In v with f
SOC : ?c >> ?f, ?f >> ?c
Congoc in Warv with Foesf (t?1)
Referent(s): c, f, v
TOPO : +{c, f, v}
MOD : dyn : +c >> +c In v with f
SOC : ?c >> ?f, ?f >> ?c
Congoc Carrying Significant 
Influencej in Areae (t0)
Referent(s): c e, j
DISC : i- [ 9 ], hilo [ 5REF ]
TOPO : +{c e, j} ; katika [ PREP ]
SOC : +c : Carrying Significant j in e
Present Reality (t0)
Referent(s): a, s
MOD : epist : +s >> [s B]
MOD : deontic : ?s >> +c in v with f :  
laiti [ if.only], -si- [ NEG ]
B
P
Congoc Possessing a 
Wealthu of Mineralsm (tn)
Referent(s): c, m, w
P/N : wake [ 3SG.POSS ]
TOPO : +{c, m, w}
CS
[s B1] (P = 0.8)
Figure 36.  Subtractive hypothetical counterfactual. The ngeli-/ngali- conditional prefix indicating a contrast between a past 
hypothetical counterfactual realis context scenario (bottom left FoR) and a past irrealis scenario (P and Q FoRs) (Hurskainen 2016).
Referent(s): a = addressee(s), c  = Congo, e = area (region), j = influence, m = minerals, s = speaker, u = wealth, v = war
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not shown since it is not clear without further context whether or not Congoc desire the 
referenced warv with itsc enemies.  
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, to show that the embodied FoR is a better heuristic than T-values and P-values 
alone, I operationalized UML mental spaces to model how epistemic, deontic, and dynamic 
stance as modal deictic properties have scope over P-values, which in turn have semantic scope 
over T-values. Furthermore, I showed how several constituents have semantic scope over the 
conjunctions and that context-sensitivity influences P-values and T-values. I argued from a 
Construction Grammar (CG) perspective that the Swahili conditional prefixes map P-values 
while the conditional conjunctions do the same for T-values. I also operationalized UML mental 
spaces to model how necessary, sufficient, and contributing conditions as the logical properties 
correlating with T-values and P-values were shown to obtain on the level of embodied FoR 
networks. The UML mental spaces also modeled how one type of modal stance is salient in some 
FoRs while another is in other examples. This finding suggests that the latter is as significant for 
linguistic analysis as the former. Next, §5 summarizes the thesis contents, outlines theoretical 
and practical implications, and offers recommendations for further research.
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5. Conclusions, theoretical implications, and recommendations 
In this thesis, I argued that the embodied FoR as a heuristic describes and explains the influences 
of modal stances context-sensitivity on conditional interpretations better than monotonic T-
values and non-monotonic P-values alone. This chapter summarizes the contributions of this 
study (§5.1), examines theoretical implications of the findings (§5.2), evaluates their limitations 
(§5.3), and makes recommendations for further research (§5.4). 
5.1 Contributions 
In §2, I set out a preliminary synthesis of research across several disciplines to explore the 
research question, critically evaluated monotonic and non-monotonic analyses from an 
Embodied Cognition (EC) perspective, described the current empirical lacunae and advantages 
of (a) EC as the present theoretical framework and (b) Mental Space Theory (MST) as the 
present methodological approach, and reconceptualized modal stance in Embodied Cognition, 
showing how each type influences T-values and P-values. This finding concerns cognitive, 
communicative capacities, so it is relevant for studies of other languages. 
 In §3, I redesigned mental spaces for linguistic analysis in a UML ontology (i.e., the state 
machine diagram, excepting minor meta-model extensions), the de facto diagrammatic modeling 
protocol for disciplines ranging from computational linguistics and software engineering to 
systems biology. This study is not the first to do so with the UML state machine diagram (see 
Schalley 2004), which is useful for modeling linguistic changes across time indexes but is the 
first to operationalize UML diagrams as mental spaces (§3.3.1). Other applications for UML 
mental spaces are possible, such as for discourse analysis or in translation. If languages are 
complex, adaptive systems, an accordingly designed formalism such as mine that envisions and 
then visualizes linguistic and cognitive phenomena may be of some benefit in fieldwork. 
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 §4 is the first cognitive-functional-descriptive analysis of Swahili conditional 
constructions. In taking this unconventional approach to data, I operationalized UML mental 
spaces to represent the embodied FoR as a heuristic. As a result, agentive modal stances in 
embodied FoRs and contexts were shown to influence T-values and P-values. Finally, in §4, I 
showed how necessary, sufficient, and contributing conditions as the logical properties 
correlating with T-values and P-values obtain on the level of embodied FoR networks. These 
contributions enable non-reductionist, coherent descriptions, and explanations of the semantics, 
pragmatics, and context-sensitivity of Swahili conditional constructions.  
5.2 Theoretical implications 
In addressing the research question, this study raised several issues regarding some theoretical 
implications of the findings. As such, consider the following argument. The UML mental spaces 
in §4 modeled how epistemic, deontic, and dynamic stance as pragmatic deictic properties 
(mapping positions and distance) have scope over T-values and P-values. Moreover, as the cited 
experimental studies in §1 and §2 show, the perception-action cycle in which stance-taking 
occurs is embodied, constant, and cyclical. In every instance of oral or written communication, 
an agent simultaneously perceives and acts. The act of speaking requires self-perception and 
intentionality in production. The act of listening requires auditory perception and intentionality 
in comprehension. Therefore, all utterances are speech acts in some sense, including those that 
only function to convey information, whether or not T-values or P-values obtain (Performative 
Hypothesis (PH), see McCawley 1968; Ross 1970; Lakoff 1972; Sadock 1974). 
 The PH and the findings of this study supporting it problematize Sweetser’s (1990) three-
way categorization seen in Mwamzandi (2017). For Sweetser, a conditional construction 
expressing defeasible confidence in the truth of Q given P is an EPISTEMIC CONDITIONAL. When a 
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‘real-world’ causal relation obtains between P and Q, the expression is a CONTENT CONDITIONAL. 
Finally, when no condition or causal relation obtains between P and Q, a conditional 
construction is a SPEECH ACT CONDITIONAL, in that an agent acts (e.g., promises) by using it.  
 In contrast, I argued that beliefs (epistemic stance) and ‘real-world’ agentive causal 
relations (deontic and dynamic stances) are always perceptible (e.g., able to be inferred or 
imagined) and active (‘online’) in a contextual expression about some or other content. For 
instance, in §4, I showed with UML mental spaces how epistemic stance is more prominent in 
some cases, while deontic stance or dynamic stance is in others. This finding suggests that 
Sweetser’s (1990) three-way categorization highlights differences of degree. From this 
assessment, it follows that all conditional constructions relate in some manner to knowledge 
about content, to content about knowledge, and express embodied communicative acts.  
 Returning to the notion that conditional construction content, whether it be semantic or 
pragmatic, is always ‘online,’ this claim aligns with two observations in §2.3.4. The first was that 
modal stances (i.e., epistemic, deontic, dynamic) in conditional constructions are always about 
an Undergoer. The second was that, as an Agent takes a stance, an Undergoer (e.g., person, 
belief, action) is asserted to have a status value (i.e., +, =, –). The upshot of applying a 
Construction Grammar (CG) approach to these observations is that doing so circumvents the 
worry about finding a grammatical constituent that semantically encodes every modal stance-
status pairing; sometimes, this is the task of several grammatical constituents. Furthermore, 
agentive stance is sometimes pragmatically inferred by addressees without any constituents 
encoding it. Regardless of which situation is the case regarding a construction, using the 
embodied FoR as a heuristic shows how modal stance types as deictic properties shape 
conditional interpretations. 
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5.3 Limitations of the study 
Since this study is the first cognitive-functional-descriptive analysis of Swahili conditional 
constructions, several theoretical and descriptive limitations apply. Since this is the first study to 
explore ‘dynamic stance’ and ‘dynamic status’, my descriptions of them are preliminary. Section 
4 is among the first analyses of deontic stance in conditional constructions (see also Polyzou 
2012; Nissi 2015, 2016; Humă, Stokoe, & Sikveland 2018). As such, examining modal status as 
the complementary category would have distracted from arguing for modal stance having scope 
over T-values and P-values. In addition, since this is the first study to explore the concept of 
‘dynamic stance’, I leave open the question of its precise formulation as a linguistic category. 
 Moreover, at least since Höfler (1917 [1885], see Chisholm 1982), deontic modality 
studies map scalar values (e.g., Frantz, Purvis, Nowostawski, & Savarimuthu 2014; Lassiter 
2011, 2017; cf. Deal 2011; Verstraete 2005), including those in corpus linguistics (e.g., 
Kilicoglu, Rosemblat, Cairelli, & Rindflesch 2015; Sakyi 2019). Dynamic stance (ability, 
volition) is arguably scalar as well since levels of ability and willingness are ubiquitous 
embodied experiences. Regrettably, space prohibits exploring these issues in depth or also the 
intriguing interplay of social stance and status with deontic stance and status.  
 Given its theoretical focus (§2), a descriptive limitation of this study is that the small data 
set in §4 is not representative of the morphosyntactic distributions of all Swahili conditional 
prefixes and conjunctions. Consider, for example, the iwapo, endapo, kama, and laiti conditional 
conjunctions in their respective collocation patterns with negation markers, modal verbs (e.g.,     
-wezekana ‘be.possible’, elekea ‘be.probable’), the conditional prefixes, and adverbs (e.g., 
hakika ‘certainly’, bila shaka ‘without doubt’, labda ‘perhaps’, pengine ‘possibly’) that increase 
or reduce constructional P-values. A set of corpus studies would be beneficial for such a purpose. 
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5.4 Recommendations for further research 
Each of the limitations described above is a beginning point for further research. Two other 
noteworthy foci of exploration are how deictic projection and deictic shift relate to T-values, P-
values, and context-sensitivity. DEICTIC PROJECTION is a deictic property mismatch (e.g., present 
and past tense) between actual FoRs and depicted FoRs (see discussion of SoAs in Herman 
1999: 523; see Gibbons 2012: 26–45 as a neurolinguistic study). DEICTIC SHIFT involves 
discourse-level changes in deictic property values (e.g., proximal and distal, see Rapaport, Segal, 
Shapiro, Zubin, Bruder et al. 1989: 2–5; Duchan, Bruder, & Hewitt 2012 [1995]; see Mizuno, 
Liu, Williams, Keller, Minshew et al. 2011 as a neurolinguistic study). As a point of departure on 
these two foci, consider Sanders & Krieken (2019) as a cognitive discourse analysis that 
systematically examines both as they correlate with conditional semantics and pragmatics (see 
also Crouch 1993, 1994; Chilton 2014, and Hartman 2019). Amuzadeh & Rezaei (2012) also 
explore the connections between deictic projection, modality, and tense in a mental spaces 
analysis of Persian realis and irrealis conditional constructions.  
 In §4, I attempted to show that UML mental spaces are optimal interdisciplinary 
diagrammatic ontologies for cognitive-functional-descriptive studies. However, they can also aid 
field linguists in recognizing deictic properties (e.g., deontic stance) and patterns (e.g., deictic 
projection and shift) that otherwise might have been under-described or unnoticed (see Hanks 
1993, 2009 on fieldwork on deixis). To complete the picture of how deictic properties impinge 
on conditional semantics and pragmatics, exploring the effects of temporal deixis (e.g., tense and 
aspect) and social deixis (social stance-status pairings) on T-values and P-values is necessary. 
Close attention to perspectives in other disciplines is crucial as well. Cognitive, descriptive, and 
functional linguists, philosophers of language, cognitive psychologists, and cognitive 
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neuroscientists often do not consider the implications of findings in other disciplines (see Butler 
2008: 4). This bleak appraisal is verified by searching for citation overlaps for these disciplines 
on conditional semantics and pragmatics, although these circumstances are improving. 
 This study is primarily designed to inspire research on conditional semantics and 
pragmatics in non-Indo-European languages. However, more remote applications of UML 
mental spaces are conceivable. Regardless of the research field of application, recognizing the 
centrality of embodied FoR networks in language as a complex, adaptive system with emergent 
properties (e.g., modal stance as modal deixis) mitigates interdisciplinary gaps in methodologies, 
terminology, and theory (see Grimaldi 2012; Grimaldi & Craighero 2012). UML mental spaces 
are a viable diagrammatic interface for this interdisciplinary cross-fertilization. 
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